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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores the construction of illness in the context of two 
interrelated processes that both propose a more empowered patient role and a whole 
person model for healthcare. Specifically, these contexts are the digitally mediated 
space of “health 2.0” and the medical movement toward humanistic practices, such as 
narrative medicine. This research identifies and questions some of the deeply ingrained 
humanistic leanings of these approaches to reveal how an essentialist understanding of 
the human perpetuates the modern biomedical conceptualization of healing. The 
concept of wholeness is deployed—in the sense of bodies, selves, and illness 
narratives—to continue understanding the sick body/mind as broken and in need of 
mending by institutionalized medicine.  
This same conceptualization is taken up online where individuals represent their 
experiences of illness. The space of health social networking sites serves as a 
reinforcement of the quantified self of modern medicine, a tactic employed to support 
commercial profitability. By critically analyzing the language and goals of medical 
humanities, the visual rhetoric, social use, and political economy of websites where 
online illness narratives are crafted, and the social contexts attached to the 
contemporary experience of illness, this dissertation argues for a posthumanist thought 
intervention in medical training, healthcare delivery, and digital health. 
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We’re here to awaken from the illusion of separateness. 
 
Ram Dass, How Can I Help? 
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Introduction 
 
When I began this research project, I set out to explore the blogging practices of 
people with Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias (ADRD), a topic that sent me 
down a path toward a more expansive exploration of illness, narrative, posthumanist 
philosophy, disability studies, and new media. Early on, when I would tell others about 
the research that I was engaged in, many reacted with surprise. The surprise seemed to 
originate, not from the fact that I had chosen such a field of research, but at the idea of a 
person with dementia writing a blog. For me, this was a clear sign that my research 
needed to be done. Why was it shocking that someone experiencing memory 
impairment would write about this online? No one seemed to question the other kinds 
of social media communities I had been researching—those made up of persons with 
cancer or multiple sclerosis. Why were my friends surprised that people with dementia 
were capable of blogging? These lingering questions speak to both the cultural 
construction of dementia, which has created a certain mainstream or stereotyped 
“dementia figure,” as well as the larger question that this dissertation asks: who is 
entitled to a voice – to the right to construct a self-narrative – both on- and off-line? 
The questions I explore here are entangled with conversations happening within 
and between the interdisciplinary fields of medical and digital humanities. Not 
surprisingly for two emergent fields, both of these disciplines are engaged in vigorous 
debates over scope, aim, and methodology. Medical humanities currently attempts to 
define itself in the tension between the instrumentalization of humanities’ objects of 
study (using art, music, and literature to teach health practitioners how to be more 
humane) and the use of tools of critical inquiry (disability studies, critical health studies, 
etc.) to evaluate and intervene in medical relationships, practices, and technologies. 
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Similarly, in digital humanities disciplinary debates, we regard the tension between the 
creation of digital tools for the analysis of humanities object texts weighed against the 
critical analysis of digital culture and the use of humanities research-creation practices 
to intervene in the cycle of innovation and commodification (Raley 40-1). I do not think 
that these debates need to have either/or stakes and I am content to dwell in the 
messiness of both of these disciplines.  
This dissertation aims to complicate the expectation that difference, such as 
illness or disability, becomes socially accommodated in digital cultures—that there is 
space online for the performance of such identities. In my first chapter, I ground this 
exploration in a social historical analysis of patienthood in various ages throughout 
history, in order to give texture and depth to an understanding of the issues and 
realities of contemporary patienthood. In chapter two, I examine the implications of the 
rhetoric of whole personhood that characterizes discussions of medical humanities and 
narrative medicine, both of which are aimed at reforming contemporary patient care. In 
chapters three and four, I explore how this desire to put the sick body and, with it, the 
sick narrative “back together” also persists in online instantiations of health 
management and patient (self-)care, where commercial forces actively construct social 
and cultural meanings surrounding illness and health. Lastly, in chapter five, I 
investigate how the social, cultural, and rhetorical space of the dementia blog embodies 
the expectations of stable selfhood that substantiate the stigmatization of dementia. 
In a general sense, this work examines how digital media is imbricated within 
contemporary economies of medicine and healthcare, whether knowledge economies, 
social economies, or political economies. I explore the role that these processes, tools, 
and social spaces play in constructing or disrupting medical understandings of the 
body. The goal of this study is to serve as a foundation for future scholarly investigation 
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into the way in which digital tools might be reimagined to serve the best interests of 
individuals and communities whose lives are overdetermined by the medical-industrial 
regulation of bodily difference. 
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Chapter 1 | Patrons, Patients, and Participants: A Social History of the 
Healthcare Seeker 
 
We organize the world—that is, space and time and, within these, social 
roles, cultural paths, ways of living, moving about, getting to work, styles 
of communication, and habits of leisure—for a kind of average person, 
designated normal. This is a world that the person who cannot, or can no 
longer, move there comfortably threatens to modify and remake. The first 
is a fear of discomfort, a kind of strain that is imposed by the being who 
is no longer located within our familiar norms. . . . In us or around us, the 
onset of disability creates a disorganization that is both concrete and 
social. But from this vantage point we perceive yet another 
disorganization, much deeper and more painful: the disorganization of 
our acquired understandings, of our established values. 
Henri-Jacques Stiker, A History of Disability 
 
In April 2013, Health Canada issued a recall of the generic brand contraception 
pill Alysena-28, after manufacturer Apotex reported that one batch of the drug, rather 
than containing seven placebo pills, might actually contain fourteen. This mistake 
resulted in the replacement of a full week’s worth of active pills by a non-contraceptive 
sugar pill, thereby drastically reducing the effectiveness of the prescription medication. 
Individuals who had been taking pills from the affected batch for the past several 
months discovered that their risk of unplanned pregnancy had been, unbeknownst to 
them, significantly higher during that time (“Birth Control”).  
This story of a drug recall, though unsettling, is certainly not uncommon in 
North America. We can add it to the lengthy list of pharmaceutical, food, and product 
recalls listed at any given time on the Health Canada Recalls and Safety Alerts Database 
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(“Advisories, Warnings, and Recalls”). What seems unique about this news item, 
however, is the way in which Apotex and its retailers chose to position the affected 
women and their sexual partners in relation to the event—that is, as patients passively 
subject to the actions and expertise of healthcare service providers. Despite the apparent 
urgency of publicizing such a recall, Apotex chose to inform wholesalers and retailers 
several days before issuing a public report or press release that would directly inform 
the individuals affected by the error. The report did not break on CBC News until three 
days following the initial recall. 
 In response to the packaging error, CBC interviewed John Tse, the vice-
president of Vancouver-based London Drugs. Following the recall, the pharmacy 
directly contacted over 350 of its customers who may have been sold the botched drug 
and offered each customer a free pregnancy test or morning-after pill. The offer of a 
contraceptive pill that must be administered no more than 120 hours (five days) 
following sexual intercourse to women who had taken the defective medication months 
prior to this recall seems both absurd and alarming (“Morning-After Pill”). However, 
putting this quizzical detail aside to analyze Tse’s verbal response to the events, we see 
reflected a highly paternalistic conceptualization of the pharmacy in relation to a group 
of customers constructed as both victimized and dependent. In his comments, Tse 
articulates the pharmacy’s responsibility to its customers, but uses the paternalistic 
language of an arguably antiquated medical model, stating, “‘I looked at [the recall] and 
said, “there could be unwanted pregnancies out there . . . . We felt it was important to 
let the patient know so there can be a judgment call from the patient,’” and further, 
“‘We felt we need to go and look after our patients, because who would fight for our 
patients[?]’” (“Birth Control”). This characterization is germane to an exploration of the 
individual’s historical and contemporary relation to healthcare, particularly if—as this 
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chapter will explore—we broaden our notion of healthcare to include a series of both 
clinical and consumerist interactions.  
Tse’s remarks in this article point to a persistent tendency by healthcare 
providers to place the seeker of healthcare products and services in the passive role of 
patient, in spite of a twenty-first century context of the healthcare client or consumer. 
Despite using the language of control, Tse’s comments at least point to an interest in 
allowing for “a judgment call from the patient.” The same cannot be said for Apotex. At 
a time when corporate entities have direct access to the end-consumer through various 
avenues of social media, the example of Apotex reflects the perpetuation of an arguably 
unnecessary and forced dependency of the individual upon the denizens of medical 
authority. The possessive way in which Tse, as a stand-in for the company he 
represents, thinks about the individuals with whom he does business—as “our 
patients”—extends the proprietary etiquette of doctor ownership over patients to the 
realms of the medical market and, perhaps, beyond. Indeed, his words reflect an 
historical and ongoing tension within the sphere of healthcare between professional 
control and patient self-determination, a tension that underlies the development of the 
unique social contract that this dissertation examines. 
The world of online health consumerism, management, and social networking 
illuminates different, although not altogether dissimilar, issues with regard to the 
position of individuals who identify as having medical conditions. While the doctor 
figure may be absent from this world, she is, rather, displaced by the corporate entities 
that have assumed control of the neoliberalist health mandate. The promise that social 
media will empower patients to heal themselves and each other is undermined by the 
reality that powerful individuals serve to profit from the shared experiences of those 
who seek their services. The problematic idea of a private corporation “protecting its 
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patients,” as the CEO above pledges with regard to pharmaceutical sales, is similarly 
revealed in the case of a popular health social networking site called PatientsLikeMe 
(PLM) and its role in protecting user data.  
In May 2010, PLM discovered that Nielson, a large media research company, had 
secretly copied individual patient profile information—including personal 
demographic, health history, diagnostic, treatment, and medication data—to sell to one 
of its clients. As I will elaborate in chapter four, PLM’s messaging overtly emphasizes 
its commitment to empowering patients and providing them with the tools they need to 
improve their wellness. However, when PLM chairman Jamie Heywood notes in his 
interview with the Wall Street Journal, in response to the data-scraping incident, “We're 
a business, and the reality is that someone came in and stole from us,” he highlights the 
true issue at stake for the company (Anglin and Stecklow). As the WSJ article points out, 
the practice of data scraping is legally questionable, but not necessarily illegal. The 
incident reveals the troubling reality that virtually all information that individuals make 
available online can be scraped and sold for consumer market research. Again, the 
question arises as to who is truly empowered in this instance of twenty-first century 
patienthood. 
I have begun this chapter by elucidating two contemporary healthcare 
narratives, largely in order to frame the underlying motivations of this critical look into 
the historical medical archive. Indeed, the act of situating individuals’ contemporary 
healthcare experiences within the long history of medicine and medical relationships 
relies somewhat significantly on first articulating the problematic of defining 
contemporary patienthood. While the entire dissertation will elaborate on this issue, 
this chapter isolates two central concerns in the wider context of defining the historical 
patient: what does it mean to be a patient, and, more specifically, how have the social, 
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cultural, technological, political economic, and epistemological arrangements of each 
‘age’ of medicine continuously modified the concept of the patient? Perhaps more to the 
point, is the term ‘patient’ continuously applicable, over the course of medical history, 
to the individual healthcare seeker, or is this an unsatisfactory and partial term? These 
questions will be considered in the context of the larger problem around which the 
Apotex recall, the Nielson data scraping incident, and the wider problem of patients’ 
suppressed self-determination, revolves: that is, the question of “patient autonomy.” 
This controversial concept has been a central concern of medical ethics since at least the 
1950s, appearing in debates that pit patient rights to information and decision-making 
power against the professional expertise of medical authorities. As Rita Charon notes in 
her chapter on the narrative roots of bioethics, “many of the early concerns of 
bioethics—informed consent, safeguarding patients’ autonomy, and resource 
allocation—were powered by the suspicion that doctors, left to their own devices, will 
exploit patients or in some way harm them and that patients need defense against 
them” (204-5). This attitude is grounded in real historical abuses of power that have 
produced an understanding of clinical interactions as necessarily “adversarial,” a 
quality that certainly seems to inflect much scholarly and popular discourse on the 
subject of practitioner and healthcare seeker relations (Charon 205). 
In recent times, the growth of grassroots activism (fuelled in large part by the 
affordances of the web) that promotes participatory healthcare and the experiential 
expertise of patients, to my mind, signals an alarming situation—the perceived 
persistence of medical paternalism among patient communities and a continued search 
for a greater balance of power between individuals and their healthcare practitioners. In 
tandem with the work of constructing a more nuanced definition of patienthood in this 
chapter, I want to hone in on the emergence of the twin rhetorics of autonomy and 
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wholeness in the context of healthcare. As the following chapters will elucidate, the 
quest for greater patient autonomy has been accompanied by an equally prominent and 
undertheorized movement toward promoting, through teaching and practice, the 
‘wholeness’ of the patient-figure within medicine. Both of these reconceptualizations 
can be regarded as late-twentieth and early-twenty-first century rhetorical strategies in 
response to a long history of what was increasingly perceived as a depersonalized, 
dehumanized, and dehumanizing Western medicine. While the ideas of patient 
autonomy and wholeness are important elements of the political activism of 
marginalized patient communities, their deployment demands a more rigorous 
grounding in historical and philosophical ideas about the figure of the patient. 
The historical picture that I attempt to lay out here is, of course, only one 
interpretation of the lengthy and complex history of medicine, healthcare, and 
patienthood. I do not claim to construct the definitive narrative for how patienthood 
has evolved over the ages, nor do I desire to do so. As Jay T. Dolmage highlights in 
Disability Rhetoric, advancing a mētis historiography “characterized by sideways and 
backward movement,” historical accounts always necessarily leave something out (5); 
responsible scholarship must leave space for alternative, parallel, and conflicting 
possibilities. My goal here is to highlight some of the ways in which the role of patient 
has been construed throughout history, as well as the way in which the human at the 
centre of the medical question has been conceptualized. This does not preclude the 
existence of other modes of experience within the medical sphere; in fact, it would be 
virtually impossible, within this chapter, to account for the diverse subject positions 
from which individuals, over history, have interacted with healthcare providers. 
Therefore, the various interpretative lenses I employ here are meant to be generative, 
rather than exclusive. 
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With that in mind, in the next section, I explore how the healthcare seeker’s role 
might take on all or some of the three sufferer roles that Digby highlights: patron, 
participant, and/or patient. Keeping these roles in mind, the rest of the chapter 
highlights how certain theoretical undercurrents for conceptualizing the body and 
disease have created at least four different ways of understanding the human in 
healthcare: as symbolic sufferer, as natural-philosophical subject, as historical text, and 
as scientific object. The end of the chapter works toward developing a conceptualization 
of the contemporary healthcare seeker as “expert patient,” a topic I develop further in 
chapters three and four. 
 
Patrons, participants, and patients 
The inhabitant of the domestic sickroom of the seventeenth century cannot be 
identified as occupying the same political space as the iPhone-wielding ‘expert patient’ 
of the twenty-first century. There are, however, resonances in the social and economic 
structures of the healthcare interaction throughout history, such that we can isolate at 
least three different modes of experience. Drawing upon Anne Digby’s articulation of 
historical medical experience, these modes place the individual in one or a combination 
of the roles of patron, participant, or patient. While Digby uses the term “object of medical 
attention” rather than “patient” to describe the third role (305), this objectified position 
reflects precisely the definition which Michel Foucault ascribes to the patient in The 
Birth of the Clinic (83).  
Following from my interpretation of Foucault’s formulation, which I describe in 
more detail below, the healthcare seeker is a patient only in the context of the clinical 
encounter, when made the object of a clinical gaze. To the extent that the acting out of a 
role demands some active involvement, we can go so far as to say that the notion of a 
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‘patient role’ is inherently paradoxical, since this subject position is discursively tied to 
passivity, reflecting more of an inert non-role. The etymological roots of the term 
patient imply “one who waits”—waits to see the doctor, waits to see what will be his or 
her fate, waits for a medication to work, waits for the body to respond; one who is at the 
mercy of factors beyond his or her control. Indeed, the adjectival and noun forms of the 
word both have their roots in the mid-fourteenth-century French term pacient, from the 
Latin patiens, meaning “suffering” or “enduring without complaint” (Harper). It would 
seem that the term allows for only a distinctly disempowering and limited set of 
expectations for the individual, as it is both politically and ideologically bound up with 
issues of autonomy and self-determination. As Jay Katz argues in The Silent World of 
Doctor and Patient, his seminal text on patient autonomy and informed consent, one of 
the major historical objections to greater patient participation in medical decision-
making follows the logic that when persons become patients, they enter the “caring 
custody” of physicians (2, 105). In fact, “since physicians have generally maintained that 
patients do not have the capacity to participate in decision making, patients’ ‘autonomy’ 
was not a concept inscribed in medicine’s vocabulary” (Katz 104).  
The historical characterization of the patient as simply a case history or medical 
record helps to illuminate what I am calling the non-role of patienthood. While Foucault 
famously articulates how the ill person comes to be, in the clinic, “the accident of his 
disease, the transitory object that it happens to have seized upon” (59), we see how the 
term ‘patient,’ as far back as ancient Rome, denotes the dehumanized, inanimate ‘case 
history.’ Indeed, the renowned Roman physician Galen, in his infamous case histories, 
tellingly “refers to stories about patients simply as ‘patients,’ so that Hippocrates and 
Erasistratus ‘write patients’ or ‘write up patients’; one might ‘read this patient’ or 
‘interpret this patient’; or he might refer to the ‘beginning of a patient,’ meaning of 
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course the beginning of his or her story” (Mattern 42). As Susan P. Mattern observes, 
Galen’s use of the term arrhostos, ‘patient,’ implies the essentially static and objectified 
position of an individual whose existence and participation has been reduced to “a unit 
of discourse” (42). Along these lines, therefore, I distinguish between the passive 
position of the individual as patient and the more actively involved role of the 
individual as healthcare seeker. 
That said, however, there is certainly a counter-argument to be made that 
healthcare seekers are increasingly taking ownership of patienthood as a subject 
position, and in the process, transforming the meaning of the term by disrupting the 
traditional characterization of the passive patient figure. One could certainly argue that 
groups such as the Society for Participatory Medicine, forums such as the social 
networking site PatientsLikeMe, and individual patient activists like the well-known 
blogger Dave deBronkart, or e-Patient Dave as he is popularly known, are 
reappropriating patienthood. This activist stance could be seen as akin to other rights-
related reappropriations, most notably the attempts of the disability rights movement 
to, rather than replace a stigmatized word, “control its usage,” and thereby transform 
mainstream understandings of disability (Davis xv). 
On a less optimistic note, there is also, of course, the question of whether there 
truly exists any space for genuine nonconformity or individual action within what 
Foucault terms a system of disciplinary control, of which medicine is but a part. It 
would appear that even the participatory action of healthcare seekers, oriented toward 
self-determination and autonomy in decision-making, is nonetheless co-opted to serve 
the wider interests of the regulation of deviance—even this type of ‘democratizing’ 
activity winds up reasserting normative ends. I will tease out this question in greater 
detail in subsequent chapters, in which the theoretical approach of posthumanism may 
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serve to reassess the prioritization of particular human values that continue to perceive 
and assess human embodiment through the limiting value system of humanism. 
In many ways, my posthumanist reading of the human in healthcare will require 
a reconsideration of how we understand human interaction within medicine. Indeed, 
my problematization or, perhaps, narrowing of the definition of patienthood, above, 
also affects how we discuss the healthcare interaction; consequently, the phrase ‘doctor-
patient relationship’ is not necessarily accurate or useful in identifying the historical 
relationship that this chapter sets out to examine. Not only does the phrase impede a 
proper representation of the individual seeking care, it also only partially represents the 
‘medical’ side of the encounter. As historian Sally Wilde argues in the context of the 
changing surgical landscape of the 1890s, there are two major reasons for 
problematizing the term ‘doctor-patient relationship,’ not only in the historical context, 
but also in relation to contemporary encounters: 
First, focus on the dyad of a single doctor and a single patient is deeply 
misleading, because it erases from the picture the many other people involved in 
the process of seeking and providing medical advice. Secondly using these 
words obscures, and therefore supports, the false assumption that the content of 
the clinical encounter is constant, whatever the surrounding institutional and 
financial circumstances. (2) 
The productive distinctions that Wilde makes are based on an analysis of the 
social and financial elements of medical interactions in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Through Wilde’s analysis emerge two rather different 
arrangements. The first is the home visit wherein medical advisers “encountered 
patients in the company of varying numbers of friends and relations” who provided 
emotional, decision-making, and financial support (Wilde 15). As the historical 
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narratives below will illuminate, pre-clinical medicine might even be regarded as a 
predominately public affair, as dictated by social custom and the historically 
performance-oriented nature of the physician’s profession. By way of contrast, the 
second arrangement involves the hospital interaction, in which “the patient may have 
had various friends and relations with them in outpatients, but on the ward, visiting 
hours were strictly limited and they were far more likely to encounter nurses and 
doctors on their own, more or less unsupported by friends and family” (Wilde 15-6). In 
this case, junior doctors, supervising doctors, and nurses were all, as they are today, 
along with social workers, bioethicists, and even chaplains, members of a team of 
practitioners providing health-related care.  
In each case Wilde argues that to characterize the interaction as a ‘doctor-patient 
relationship’ “is to totally miss this complexity and variation” (16). Adding to this line 
of thought, historian Edward Shorter reminds readers that what we “understand by 
‘doctor’ before the nineteenth century had little to do with university-trained 
physicians, implicating instead a wide variety of professions whose essential 
preparation had been the apprenticeship” (784). More accurately, ‘doctors’ before the 
nineteenth century included some elite professors of medicine but, for the most part, 
referred to a heterogeneous cluster of medical and paramedical barber-surgeons, 
frontier or countryside doctors, midwives, apothecaries, corn-removers, and so forth 
(Shorter 784). Returning to the introductory anecdote to this chapter, pharmacists, 
contemporarily (but also historically), belong to this network of health professionals, 
particularly in jurisdictions where they have the authority to give prescription 
medication directly to consumers without a physician’s orders. We might also include 
the diverse range of specialist and subspecialist professionals that one might consult in 
the case of complex health issues, and while we are expanding this definition, the 
!! 15!
diverse and often anonymous multitudes of health practitioners, expert patients, and 
caregivers who share support, advice, and personal experiences in online spaces. 
Wilde traces the origins of the term ‘doctor-patient relationship’ to the shifting 
power arrangement that accompanied the transition from bedside to clinical interaction. 
Whereas the doctor’s attitude toward bedside care in the nineteenth century reflected a 
“desire to attract and keep a family’s custom,” and thus guarantee a longstanding 
business relationship, the clinical “waiting room experience” common by the 1950s 
denoted the prioritization of the physician’s, and not the patient’s, convenience (16). 
Interestingly, the doctor-patient dyad seems to have emerged directly out of the focus 
on “keep[ing] a family’s custom,” in combination with developing codes of medical 
ethics and etiquette. The growing competition over healthcare seekers in the 1890s 
made the articulation of a special relationship between the doctor and ‘their patient’ in 
private practice increasingly imperative” (Wilde 17). According to Wilde’s research, 
then, the phrase ‘doctor-patient relationship,’ which seems unproductively to dominate 
our discussions about individuals’ interactions with healthcare practitioners, is tied 
historically to a rhetorical tactic by physicians, deployed to support their own financial 
and professional self-interest.  
Wilde proffers the term “patient’s clinical interactions” as a more representative 
terminological replacement for ‘doctor-patient relationship’ (22). However, despite 
widening the frame of reference in a useful way, this phrase nonetheless bespeaks an 
unaddressed need; it fails to distinguish between clinical encounters and those 
interactions that took place both before the emergence of the clinic and those that 
happen contemporarily, outside of the institution—that is, in non-clinical real world or 
virtual spaces. Indeed, as this dissertation will analyze, contemporary discussions about 
patienthood focus on the notion of a ‘networked patient’ whose ‘care’ is dispersed 
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across a range of individuals, groups, resources, and institutions, and is ever 
increasingly defined in terms of a consumerist model.  
Interestingly, the articulation of the network of relationships that surround the 
experience of illness, most notably through the space of online social networks, is seen 
by many as working toward an ideal of autonomy for healthcare seekers.1 
Paradoxically, this observation suggests that the more heteronomous our experiences of 
illness become, the more capable we are of attaining autonomy as patients. As I will 
discuss shortly, the long-standing debate over patient autonomy, tilted in the literature 
toward a promotion of this elusive goal, is problematic for the ways in which it ignores 
the non-autonomous co-dependency of our bodies and our sociotechnical 
environments. 
 Both historical and contemporary attempts to define the individual’s role in 
relation to the healthcare sphere are complicated by several conflicting dynamics. The 
role of the healthcare seeker in the interactions that Wilde assesses is, in each instance, 
uniquely constructed within a context of competing forces. These may include intra-
familial dynamics, the financial interests of doctor and patron, the social conventions of 
the consultation space, the professional or social standing of the practitioner, the 
cultural expectations of the parties involved, and the socioeconomic position of the 
individual or family. As Digby notes, “patients’ class, race, gender, age, income, and 
status were balanced against medical expertise in the distribution of social, economic, 
and clinical power […] This suggests that patients were sometimes subjects but at other 
times objects: as patrons or participants they might control or influence their destiny, or 
alternatively—as with many hospital inmates or surgical patients—they might be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Numerous studies and scholarly publications assert the value or potential value of virtual communities 
in the growth of participatory medicine. See, among others, Eysenbach (2008), Gibson, Britton, and Lynch 
(2012), Lorig, et al. (2008), Thompson, et al. (2012); Topol (2012); Vawdrey, et al. (2011). 
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subordinate to it” (“The Patient’s View” 305). Hitting a decidedly less optimistic note, 
Katz has powerfully argued in his historical-sociological analysis of informed consent 
that doctors’ historical ‘ownership’ over patients and the silent way in which physicians 
have, up until fairly recently, controlled individuals’ medical decision-making, through 
both nondisclosure and even deception, has largely impeded true healthcare seeker 
participation in medical matters. 
With an eye to grounding my in-depth analysis of the contemporary illness 
experience, as it exists in excess of the overly narrow terminology of patienthood, the 
rest of this chapter will lay some historical groundwork for our current 
conceptualizations of the healthcare seeker. Focusing on my slightly adapted version of 
Digby’s ‘sufferer roles,’ this chapter explores how healthcare seekers within various 
paradigms of medical thought have occupied (or not occupied) the positions of patron, 
participant, and patient. In considering social, cultural, economic, and technological 
arrangements, this analysis will also take into account the various theoretical 
trajectories regarding pathology and physiology that have vied for primacy over the 
course of medical history. In this way, I hope to arrive at an understanding of how 
medical theories about bodies (whether ‘normal’ or ‘diseased’), modes of biomedical 
investigation, and sociocultural conventions regarding healthcare interactions co-evolve 
in mutually constitutive ways, and produce a particular set of roles, opportunities, and 
challenges for the healthcare seeker. At the heart of this analysis is a need to establish 
how the notions of “patient autonomy” and “patient wholeness,” specifically, have 
come to be the dominant, and in many ways, domineering, concerns of contemporary 
medical reform. 
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Theoretical undercurrents for conceptualizing the body and disease in medicine 
 The tendency in narrating the history of medicine over a time period ranging 
from ancient Greece to the present day seems typically to focus on a chronological 
account of how medicine has evolved from a religiously based, supernatural 
understanding of human illness to the rational, empirical, technoscientific approach of 
contemporary biomedicine. The Oxford Illustrated History of Medicine is one of several 
texts to follow such a model, favouring an interpretation of the development of medical 
knowledge as a march of progress. One notable exception to this approach is Jaclyn 
Duffin’s History of Medicine, which is organized around the historical narration of the 
various divisions within medicine: anatomy, physiology, pathology, pharmacology, 
epidemiology, and so on. In organizing her text in such a way, Duffin is able to parse 
out the various, often antagonistic, theoretical trajectories that characterize medical 
thought paradigms over time, and which result in specific approaches to the medical 
study of the body.  
Usefully, Duffin isolates several key theoretical dichotomies that help to classify 
each model; the power differential between the theories in each pair shifts according to 
the dominant worldview of the time period in question. The most basic distinction that 
Duffin identifies, and one which lies at the heart of medicine itself, is between the 
organismic (or individual) and nonorganismic (or population-based) conceptualizations 
of disease. The organismic theory, central to the medical model of disease, is 
unquestioningly accepted within the present-day Western medical institution. This 
model relies on the assumption that diseases are undesirable, represent a rupture of 
‘normal’ bodily experience, and afflict individual sufferers (Duffin 67). Conversely, the 
nonorganismic theory presents “ a world in which disease is constant and cannot be 
eradicated—indeed, probably should not be eradicated—a world in which some disease 
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might actually be beneficial” (Duffin 96). While we may frequently accept the 
organismic theory as fact—or, the only possible option—its opposite also frequently 
emerges in contemporary discussions surrounding healthcare funding, social assistance 
programs, overpopulation, and other conversations that engage the problematic 
eugenicist discourse of natural selection.  
Duffin’s important distinction between these theories of human disease, and 
especially her contention that the organismic theory goes unquestioned in biomedicine, 
resonates with arguments made by healthcare ethics scholar Jeffrey P. Bishop, as well as 
others before him, notably, the psychologist Ernest Becker. Both Becker and Bishop 
identify the problem of human mortality, and our abiding desire to overcome it, as 
central to the structures of our social and cultural systems. In Bishop’s case, the concern 
is Western medicine, which he argues in The Anticipatory Corpse is “founded in a dream 
as old as humanity itself: to defer death. For death and the disease that is its harbinger 
are the most brutal reminders of the radical finitude of human existence” (17). 
According to Bishop’s articulation, medical history, and its basis in what Duffin 
identifies as an organismic theory of pathology, has responded to the violence and 
abjection of disease with a violence all its own. In its unflinching obsession with 
deferring death, Bishop says medicine carves a spiritually destructive path through 
history in which 
dead anatomy begets physiology; physiology begets technology; technology—the 
replacing of a dead organ by a dead machine—begets a life worse than death. An 
over-technologized medicine begets a biopsychosocial medicine; a biopsychosocial 
medicine begets a biopsychosociospiritual medicine; but the holistic care of the 
dying comes to look totalizing, indeed, totalitarian. (18) 
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Bishop’s interpretation of the medical model presents a powerful critique of a historical 
narrative of medical advancement, in which attempts to stave off the threat of mortality 
result in the continuous dismissal or supercession of the psychological, social, and, 
especially, spiritual aspects of suffering and death. These experiences, he argues, are 
unavoidable and perhaps even essential parts of human life. This idea attained 
mainstream recognition, of course, through the work of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, whose 
research on the psychology of death contributed to the incorporation of more 
humanized methods of hospital care for the dying. In her famous work On Death and 
Dying, Kübler-Ross employs the stories of patients’ experiences with dying in order to 
awaken healthcare practitioners to the needs, frustrations, and expectations of the 
terminally ill. While Bishop reasserts Kübler-Ross’s observations regarding medicine’s 
problematic and harmful unwillingness to come to terms with death, he is strongly 
critical of more recent manifestations of palliative care as “total care,” which he regards 
as a continued retreat from the acceptance of mortality through the insertion of the 
healthcare apparatus into even the final, sacred moments of an individual’s life (255). 
Care at the end of life is no longer facilitated by “family, nurses, nuns, or their 
counterparts; it is deployed, for the patient’s own good, by experts […] becom[ing] the 
venue of professionals, who are bent on mastering death and finitude and fear and 
grief” (258). 
The Western cultural preoccupation with prolonging life and combatting 
disease—understood as a physiological/organismic problem—also obscures the ways 
in which disease is socially and culturally constructed. As medical anthropologists, 
sociologists, and disability studies scholars have argued, notions of disease and 
disability are intimately connected to social, cultural, and historical contexts. This is an 
obvious premise of my study, here, particularly in the current chapter’s concern with 
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the historically- and socially-situated role of the healthcare seeker. At a very basic level, 
we can turn to ‘culture-bound syndromes’ to understand how particular sets of bodily 
experiences, complaints, or behaviours become characterized as disease patterns solely 
in one historical moment, cultural group, and/or geographical location (Stolberg 5). 
One well-known example is the disease of ‘onanism,’ specific to eighteenth-century 
Europe and North America, which was believed to cause epilepsy, blindness, vertigo, 
hearing loss, headaches, impotency, memory loss, rickets, and irregular heartbeat—a 
disease that has since been demedicalized, and which we today refer to as masturbation 
(Joralemon 3). Another example is the mental disorder observed in Malaysia and 
Indonesia since the nineteenth century, known as latah, a disease “present in certain 
lower-class women past middle age [and] characterized by involuntary compulsive 
utterance of obscenities, parodying of others’ actions or other socially or morally 
offensive behaviour” (Horne 332).  
While culture-bound syndromes are frequently considered to be unconnected to 
structural or organic changes within the body, and based instead on non-medical and 
culturally-conditioned behaviour, which becomes pathologized, Stolberg is right to 
point out that “in certain respects, the term ‘culture-bound syndrome’ is a misnomer. 
All diseases are to some degree ‘culture-bound’, even if they are attended by ‘organic’ 
alteration. Culture has always had its share in the way diseases are perceived and 
described, let alone explained” (162).  
Indeed, through the lens of post-structuralism, we can understand not only the so-
called culture-bound syndromes, but also every biomedically categorized and 
controlled disease as socially and/or culturally constructed and belonging to a 
discursively-enacted system. As early as 1923, the epidemiologist and medical writer 
Francis Graham Crookshank critiqued Western medicine for its “vulgar” tendency “to 
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speak, write and ultimately to think, as if these diseases we name, these general references 
we symbolize, were single things with external existences” (qtd in Charon 29). Several 
decades later, psychiatrist and medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman’s landmark 
1973 essay entitled “Medicine’s Symbolic Reality” takes up this concept to spearhead an 
important social constructivist trajectory within the sociology of medicine. Kleinman 
insists that the medical system “is structed, like any other segment of social reality, by 
the regnant body of symbolic meanings. . . . From this view point, healing is not the 
outcome of diagnostic acts, but the healing function is active from the outset in the way 
illness is perceived and the experience of illness organized” (86). Kleinman’s challenge 
to scholars in this text is to attend to medicine as it reflects, not a biophysical reality, but 
a sociocultural system.  
George Engel’s influential 1977 article in Science, entitled “The Need for a New 
Medical Model: A Challenge for Biomedicine,” importantly articulates an issue that, at 
the time of publication, had becoming increasingly more obvious to healthcare 
practitioners, that being a crisis within medicine “stem[ming] from the logical inference 
that since ‘disease’ is defined in terms of somatic parameters, physicians need not be 
concerned with psychosocial issues which lie outside medicine’s responsibility and 
authority” (129). In describing the dangers of this mentality, Engel cites a respected 
speaker at a Rockefeller Foundation seminar who argues that “the physician should not 
be saddled with the problems that have arisen from the abdication of the theologian 
and the philosopher” (129). While my work here does not take up the question of 
theology in relation to medicine, it is certainly concerned with the philosophical ideas 
that ground the conceptualization of the patient, as described by Engel’s conference 
speaker, and as we understand this individual and her rights, roles, and responsibilities 
today. This is not a question simply for the philosopher, however, but, as Engel argues, 
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for those directly engaged within the profession of medicine, whose practices are 
grounded in particular philosophical understandings of human life that shape the scope 
and nature of healthcare interactions.  
Turning to the field of disability studies, the argument for the social model of 
disease and disability is articulated by a range of scholars. Shelley Tremain, in her 
chapter “On the Subject of Impairment” employs a Foucauldian theoretical framework 
to address what she sees as the false distinction between disability (as socially 
constructed) and impairment (as ontologically situated), arguing that historically and 
culturally specific conditions of possibility facilitate the interpretation of particular 
bodily states as ‘impaired.’ “As effects of an historically specific political discourse – 
biopower – impairments are materialized as unitary and universal attributes of subjects 
through the iteration and reiteration of rather culturally specific regulatory norms and 
ideals about human function and structure, competency, intelligence and ability” (42). 
In contrast to this, the medical model takes for granted that diseases and disabilities can 
be traced to bodily deviance, and that they exist as physiological lesions or 
psychological conditions; diagnosis seeks to isolate the connections between symptoms 
and disease entities, while treatment attempts to disrupt disease and rehabilitate the 
body (Good 65). 
Of course, the biopsychosocial bent of contemporary medicine, for Engel, and the 
biopsychosociospiritual concentration, as Bishop later describes it, developed over a 
period of centuries, and was closely connected to the historically oppositional 
distinction between the ontological and physiological conceptualizations of disease, 
both of which, nonetheless, ground disease, for the most part, (magico-religious 
explanations aside) in a material, biological reality. While our present-day 
understanding—the one that Bishop critiques—relies on a combination of these two 
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theories, they were not always seen as mutually inclusive. Whereas the ontological 
theory of disease locates the cause of illness outside of the patient and conceptualizes its 
manifestation as entirely discrete from the form and function of the individual’s body, a 
physiological understanding of disease proposes the opposite: that diseases and bodies 
are continuous and conditions derive from corporeal causes (Duffin 28). As I will 
explain shortly, the perceived location and origin of disease is closely tied to how the 
medical interaction becomes structured and, specifically, how the sufferer’s role is 
defined—that is, the degree to which their subjective experiences, individual symptoms, 
and personal interpretations are invested with value. Contemporarily, the perceived 
need to integrate practices that facilitate or respect the healthcare seeker’s autonomy is 
tied to a series of historical paradigm shifts regarding where in the body researchers, 
physicians, and laypersons have located “the seat of the disease” (Foucault), as well as 
the “source of blame” for disease (Sontag, Illness). 
These models for understanding the human body, whether applied to the study of 
structure (anatomy), functioning (physiology), or suffering and disease (pathology), 
help to illuminate the socially, culturally, politically, and technologically situated role of 
the individual within the realm of healing. Exploring how these theories influence that 
role—the extent to which they institute practices of patienthood, patronage, or 
participation—reveals what I identify here as four different ways of situating the 
healthcare seeker. These include identifying the individual with an illness, as symbolic 
sufferer, natural-philosophical subject, historical text, or scientific object. These 
classifications are not meant to be limiting but, instead, to draw on critical approaches 
established by Digby and Wilde in the act of evaluating shifting power arrangements 
and interpretative frameworks, insofar as they position the ‘diseased’ subject. While the 
predominant mode of these characterizations is one in which the individual is acted 
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upon by a healthcare practitioner or healer, these cultural spaces were not without 
opportunities for acts of self-determination on the part of healthcare seekers. In many 
ways, however, this autonomy relied also on heteronomy and the presence of kinship, 
social, and/or medical(-technological) support systems. 
 
The symbolic sufferer 
 
Come, let us consult some prophet or priest or some 
interpreter of dreams… and find out from him why Phoebus 
Apollo is so angry with us. He may be offended at some 
broken vow or failure in our rites. (Homer 1.60-4) 
 
At several moments throughout history, the position of healthcare seeker has 
been one in which the individual and his or her illness together exist as the physical 
manifestation of a symbolic event. We can extend this observation to suggest that, 
within this thought paradigm, the body of the sufferer, itself, becomes symbolic.  
Prior to the practice of “rational medicine” most famously signaled in Greece by 
the emergence of the seventy or so treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus (c. 420-350 BC), 
healers and laypersons in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Greece frequently understood 
diseases as emanating directly from supernatural sources, whether malicious demons or 
the gods, themselves (Longrigg 25-6). Mystical, animistic, and magical understandings 
of illness were met with particular healing practices in each civilization, aimed at 
ridding the body of dis-ease, as opposed to a concretely or categorically understood 
disease. These included, but were not limited to, the casting of horoscopes, soothsaying 
and ‘systematized’ sorcery of Mesopotamia; the spells, incantations, amulet magic, and 
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pagan worship of Egypt; and the divine healing, exorcisms, divination, and shamanic 
rituals of ancient Greece (Porter 47-53). The pre-Hippocratic conception of illness as 
having supernatural sources is evidenced in a range of texts, from Homer’s Iliad and 
Hesiod’s Works and Days to the Bible and the writings of Roman encyclopedist Corneliu 
Celsus (Duffin 70, Longrigg 25-6). While this dissertation (primarily due to concerns of 
scope) is limited to the development of Western notions of patienthood, it is certainly 
worth noting that First Nations populations throughout North America, as well as tribal 
communities around the world, continue to practice traditional (non-scientific) 
medicine that views the body as intimately linked to the cosmos and to the spirit world, 
and that invokes healing rituals that interpret disease as, at least in part, symbolic.  
 In contemporary Western society, rationalizations of pain, disability, or disease 
as tests of faith or personal challenges to overcome extend this classical idea that disease 
“is sent by remote powers to punish or to test” the sufferer (Duffin 70-1; Nutton 39). 
One rationalization of physical ‘abnormality’ that may become adopted by parents of 
severely disabled children relies on the idea that the disabled child’s existence serves to 
teach an individual parent or family about the virtues of patience, compassion, or 
empathy, as in The Boy in the Moon, Ian Brown’s memoir about his son who was born 
with cardiofaciocutaneous syndrome. In this narrative, the child’s life is portrayed as 
important or meaningful only insofar as it serves to improve the moral strength of those 
around him. A more canonical example of this narrative trope is seen in the American 
classic Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in which Harriet Beecher Stowe’s angelic, suffering child 
character Eva, spiritually enlightened by her illness, becomes a mouthpiece for the 
abolitionist movement and a lesson in grace and piety for the adults who surround her 
sickbed.  
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One contemporary example of the ‘punishment’ rationalization, compellingly 
addressed by Susan Sontag, is exemplified by the cultural narratives that, since the 
beginning of the AIDS crisis in the 1980s, continue to function as explanations for AIDS 
diagnoses. AIDS was initially (and perhaps continues to be) interpreted as punishment 
for ‘deviant’ behaviour, since public awareness of the disease in North America 
attached it to specific risk groups, particularly the already stigmatized populations of 
homosexual men and intravenous drug users. Along another vein, Sontag argues in her 
earlier text, Illness as Metaphor, that current-day diseases such as tuberculosis and 
cancer, “around which modern fantasies have gathered . . . are viewed as forms of self-
judgment, of self-betrayal,” rather than divine wrath, as in the ancient context, or moral 
justice, in the AIDS context (39-40, emphasis mine). Nonetheless, the notion that the 
mind is betraying the body, or that the body is rebelling against the emotions (40), 
alongside the common misconception by the nineteenth century that an individual 
“willed” a disease—that it was an expression of one’s character or the inner identity 
(46)—continued the “punitive” tradition of placing blame squarely on the sufferer as 
the creator of his or her disease (57). 
Returning to the context of ancient Greek medicine, importantly, not all disease 
was explained using a supernatural framework, and certain texts distinguish between 
diseases requiring straightforward medicinal treatment and those that demand the 
specialized knowledge of religious healers. In Homer’s Iliad (c. 700 BC), both Machaon 
and Podalirius are healers who perform medical actions such as wound dressing and 
diagnosis independently of divine intervention (Nutton 38). Similarly, in Babylon, 
cuneiform texts display two types of treatment for the same disease—cure by either 
religious rite or medical remedy (Nutton 42). Certainly, identifying the origins of 
disease, and the potential symbolism of such an event, was central to diagnosis and 
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cure. As historian Vivian Nutton notes, “the assumption that Apollo, Artemis, Zeus, or 
some other god might have sent a sickness on to a community or on individuals is one 
that was widely shared. But there are traces of another view” (39). In the example of 
Philoctetes’ abandonment by the Greeks due to his “stinking and excruciatingly painful 
ulcer” in Homer’s Odyssey, the affliction is attributed to a snakebite, and not to any 
moral or religious indiscretion (Nutton 39). Interestingly, as Nutton observes, in 
Sophocles’ tragedy Philoctetes, written approximately three hundred years later (c. 408 
BC), after a natural explanation for the ulcer (a snakebite) fails to produce a remedy, the 
event is ascribed supernatural significance and deemed curable only through the divine 
healing of the god Asclepius (51). As Nutton suggests, the interaction between and 
equal explanatory force given to both natural and supernatural explanations of disease 
points to the embryonic and highly contested state of medical knowledge before 
Hippocrates and Galen and their medical treatises arrived on the scene. Medicine was 
part of an enduring debate that in ancient Greece was uniquely distinguished by its 
inclusivity; laypersons and medical experts alike engaged in discussions of medical 
ideas, even despite the presence of rival camps of physicians concerned with identifying 
“the true art of medicine” (Nutton 44). This democratic spirit is evident within the 
Hippocratic and Galenic practices, as well, pointing to a time during which medical 
knowledge was more “open to varied influences and accessible to outsiders” than it 
was in the Near East (Porter 55), and certainly more so than it would become by the 
nineteenth century in the West as a result of the professionalization of physicians, and 
the elitism attached to this venture.  
I will return to the implications for the individual healthcare seeker of a robust 
and democratic Greek medical sphere in the next section, but first I would like to 
analyze the way in which diagnosis within a supernatural model of disease constructs 
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the healthcare seeker, both physically and socially. Because of the narrative frame 
within which the experience of disease as a spiritual, magical, or supernatural event is 
understood, the methods of healers and priests involved searching the patient’s body 
for symbolic clues or signs that would explain the divinely ordained ailment. As Duffin 
aptly notes, “in this context, the patient’s subjective opinion about the causes of illness 
are [sic] given serious consideration, including the possibility that the disease may have 
moral, spiritual, or pedagogic functions. Treatment is the maintenance or restoration of 
integrity—righting wrongs, keeping faith” (70).  
The important distinction made here, in the assessment and treatment of disease, 
is between the search for signs versus the identification of symptoms. In the symbolic or 
supernatural interpretation of disease, the body is not a medical object through which a 
biological disorder expresses itself and becomes recognizable by way of empirically 
acquired evidence. Instead, the physical body and the experience of the sufferer is 
predominately symbolic; the problem is not attributed to material causes and its 
existence is purely emblematic of spiritual or moral disorder. Following from this, we 
cannot, then, classify the individual in the sufferer role as a patient; the sufferer is, more 
accurately, a participant. Further, this participation takes place, not in the context of a 
medical or biological frame of reference, but through the individual’s engagement in an 
interpretative or a narratological mode of inquiry in partnership with a professional 
healer or priest. 
 By way of example, the first book of Homer’s Iliad narrates the inauspicious 
beginnings of the Trojan War for the Greeks. In describing a ten-day plague symbolized 
by the wrathful arrows of “Plague-god” Apollo that “rained down on every part of the 
broad Greek camp” so that “day and night, packed funeral pyres burned,” Homer’s 
epic narrates the supernatural explanation of disease characteristic of ancient Greek 
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thought (1.49, 383-4, 51-2). In the narrative, the solution to disease is not to seek a 
physician to diagnose symptoms or to cure the afflicted using medical expertise, but to 
find a seer gifted with the faculty of interpretation who can identify the cause of the 
god’s anger (and, consequently, the army’s suffering) (Homer 1.60-4). By knowing the 
cause, the situation can be remedied through appropriate action.  
Once “the matchless prophet” Calchas “account[s] for the anger of lord Apollo 
the Archer-god,” Achilles learns that the restoration of health depends upon the safe 
return of Chryseis, the daughter of Apollo’s priest, whom Agamemnon has kidnapped 
and refused ransom for (Homer 1.92, 72-3). As Calchas explains, Apollo “will not 
release us from this loathsome plague till we give the dark-eyed girl back to her father” 
(Homer 1.97-99). Interestingly, the entire army—through the death and destruction 
caused by Apollo’s plague—is called to account for Agamemnon’s transgression. While 
the physical pain and suffering is not inflicted directly upon Agamemnon himself, the 
attack on his army exposes the leader to extreme threat—and not just physically, since a 
military loss would constitute a direct attack on Agamemnon’s oversized ego. Further, 
since Calchas’s role as healer is to interpret the event as figurative, we must interpret 
illness in this context as understood through a particular set of sociocultural 
circumstances. 
Indeed, the individual bodies of the sufferers do not even enter into the picture 
assessed by Calchas; instead, narrative details relating to social relationships, cultural 
customs, and religious practices are signposts along the route to explaining and 
remedying disease. Unlike contemporary biomedical knowledge, in which the 
discovery of causes rarely results in cures, ancient Greek healing relied on the notion 
that within the cause lay also the solution. As I will elaborate in chapter two, 
contemporary movements toward the teaching and practice of narrative medicine 
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demonstrate some overlap with a more symbolic interpretation of disease; in 
attempting to disrupt the explanatory authority of biomedical epistemological 
structures, largely through a focus on narrative creation and analysis, narrative 
medicine engages with bodily experience in a way that considers the medical alongside 
the narrative, symbolic, and sociocultural. 
 
The natural-philosophical subject 
 
The art [of medicine] consists in three things: the disease, the 
patient, and the physician. The physician is the servant of the 
art, and the patient must combat the disease along with the 
physician. (Hippocrates, Of the Epidemics 1.2.5) 
 
The interpretation of disease as supernatural was gradually displaced by the 
introduction of philosophy into healing. This does not, however, mean that disease 
experience was entirely or immediately divested of religious or spiritual significance. 
According to Digby, “until the scientific (and more particularly the surgical) 
achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries endowed Western medicine 
with an enhanced authority based on greater therapeutic effectiveness, a providential 
worldview—where disease could be seen as punishment for sin, and good health be 
seen as God’s work—remained resilient” (296). This appeal to providentialism was 
most likely to be applied in cases where medicine proved unsuccessful or inadequate 
(Digby 296).  
However, historians note that during the classical age, there emerged a definitive 
rejection of religion as providing a default explanation for suffering. What came to be 
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the dominant attitude of Greek rational medicine followed directly from the influence 
of the Ionian natural philosophers of the sixth century BCE and their outright rejection 
of supernatural causes (Nutton 45). Instead, the world was understood as governed by 
discoverable laws. The Ionian stance that humans were a part of this natural 
environment, composed of the same material and subject to the same rules, strongly 
informs the medical literature of the fourth and fifth centuries BCE (Longrigg 29, 31). 
Reiterating such discourse, the Hippocratic Corpus asserts that diseases, too, are 
products of the environment possessing their own independent natures. The unifying 
theory beneath Hippocratic medicine interprets bodily health as resulting from a state 
of natural and originary equilibrium, while disease inserts itself as an upset, a 
subversion of the healthy body’s harmonious balance of fluids (Porter 56). This idea, 
most clearly articulated in the Hippocratic treatise On the Nature of Man (c. 400 BCE), 
would remain dominant in medicine well into the Middle Ages. A glut of fluids or 
chymoi (humours) in a particular area of the body was believed to create a particular 
illness (Porter 56-7). The Hippocratic treatise expounds the classic theory of the four 
humours (blood, phlegm, black bile, and yellow bile), as they connect to the four 
primary opposites (hot, moist, cold, and dry), the four seasons (spring, summer, winter, 
fall), and the four ages of man (infancy, youth, adulthood, old age) (Longrigg 29-32), 
“thus afford[ing] a neat schema with vast explanatory potential. On the assumption, for 
example, that blood predominated in spring and among the young, precautions against 
excess could be taken, either by eliminating blood-rich foods, like red meat, or by blood-
letting (phlebotomy) to purge excess” (Porter 57).  
The empirical approach of the Hippocratic perspective emphasized the 
individuality of the patient and not the identification of a discrete disease entity (Porter 
60). Despite acknowledging the recurrence of certain identifiable diseases in the body, 
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Hippocratic medicine principally followed a physiological conception, studying disease 
as manifested in individual bodies, so that each illness was unique and required an 
individually tailored treatment plan (Nicolson 802-3).  
In the second century AD, the celebrated Roman physician Galen endorsed 
Hippocrates and the Corpus attributed to his scholarship as founding the basis of his 
medical practice (Longrigg 34). This included Hippocrates’ work in both medical and 
ethical spheres—his articulation of the theory of natural equilibrium, as well as his 
ethical codes in Oath, The Physician, Law, Precepts, and Decorum that continue to define 
social expectations for medical practitioner behaviour. Regarding pathology, Galenic 
medicine also sought to describe, predict, interpret, and justify diseases and treatments 
based on individual clinical observation and reasoning (Duffin 71). In the empirical 
study of disease, the role of the patient centred on providing descriptive accounts of 
observed and subjectively experienced signs of illness. This participation in the healing 
process, under the guidance of the physician-philosopher, took precedence over 
interpreting the symbolic significance of disease. In intuiting the inner state of the 
humours, the Galenic physician monitored the sick individual’s body for such 
biometrics as pulse, the colouring, density and composition of urine and feces, 
complexion, temperature, the presence or absence of vomiting, the appearance of the 
blood, and the feel of the abdomen over the liver, spleen, and bladder. In Galenic 
practice, effective diagnosis combined sense experience, received anatomical wisdom, 
and inductive reasoning (Nicolson 805). Further, in Galen’s case histories, descriptions 
of the aforementioned indicators “are followed immediately by the patient’s ‘history,’ 
an account of what had occurred on the days before the development of symptoms. . . . 
Medical issues overlap with social, cultural, and moral ones from which they cannot be 
easily distinguished; furthermore, the patients emerge as characters in the literary 
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sense, with their own history, perspective, and attributes” (Mattern 99). The uniqueness 
and individuality of each patient that Galen writes about, even if many remain 
nameless and unidentified, and even if they deviate from Galen’s implicit (and 
preferred) “standard of the adult, Greek male” (104), is one of the most “socially 
leveling ideas in Galen’s work” (119).  
Galen can be said to have adopted the Hippocratic notion that “the art [of 
medicine] consists in three things: the disease, the patient, and the physician. The 
physician is the servant of the art, and the patient must combat the disease along with 
the physician” (Hippocrates, Of the Epidemics 1.2.5). This tripartite structure resonates 
with contemporary patient advocacy for participatory medicine that endorses the 
cooperation of doctor and patient in working toward a goal of wellness. Indeed, as 
Susan Mattern notes in her text Galen and the Rhetoric of Healing, Galen believed firmly in 
a democratic and open medical sphere, particularly promoting the notion that every 
aristocrat should be well-versed in medical concepts. In his writings, he “excoriates 
wealthy men who are crammed with erudition but do not understand their own bodies, 
who are incapable of examining and choosing physicians based on their skills and 
medical knowledge, and who lack the technical sophistication of their own slaves” 
(Mattern 25). Galen seems to have supported the medical self-education of non-
aristocratic laymen as well, and Mattern notes that in his case histories, he 
sympathetically portrays those patients who are knowledgeable about medicine, unless 
they object to his own interpretations (137). The case histories often record a subtly 
competitive dialogue between Galen and his patient, in which causes and cures are 
negotiated. Or, rather, this negotiation happened only between men—that is, between 
Galen and the patient’s male guardian, in the cases of women and children. As with 
other parts of Greek society, Galen’s assertion that all educated individuals should have 
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some medical expertise actually refers only to the erudition of adult male citizens, 
certainly not women or slaves: “in stories featuring the head of household—a husband, 
a master, or a father—this man’s voice and point of view tend to overwhelm that of the 
patient or supplant it altogether” (Mattern 123). Even in the case of a female patient, 
however, the individual being treated by Galen is still involved in the telling of her 
illness experience. The case histories reveal a physician who is decidedly patient-
centered in his respect for the healthcare seeker’s (or her guardian’s) perspectives and 
opinion, and yet unflinchingly forceful and paternalistic in his demand for patient 
compliancy, “dominating his patients, and . . . reducing them to servile passivity in 
their own homes” (Mattern 148). The importance of this show of domestic and 
professional authority cannot be overstated, particularly for a physician whose prolific 
work is overshadowed only by his enormous ego (Mattern 178; Porter 73). 
Importantly, in the Galenic context, involvement in the sphere of domestic 
patienthood is not always as a patient, but also as a public participant, lay expert, or 
personal advocate for the patient. Part of the medical training that Galen suggests for 
educated men involves visiting sick friends and relatives at their bedsides to both 
“advise” and “aid in examining and treating [them]” (Mattern 25). In the context of the 
highly competitive atmosphere of Greek medicine at the time, in which physicians’ care 
and cure of patients in their own homes resembled the public spectacles of the stadium, 
we might slightly tweak Hippocrates’ statement about the art of medicine—that it, in 
fact, consists in the disease, the patient, the physician, and the public. Physicians 
competed for the opportunity to take on a particular case through public displays of 
talent and expertise; as Mattern observes through her reading of Galen’s case histories, 
“medical contests at the patient’s bedside—like the public debates and contests 
[between Greek physicians]—were not always calm; they could involve noisy 
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disputation and exclamation of amazement. The contest of deeds was essentially 
physical, and Galen sometimes conveys a sense of urgency or even violence” (77). Due 
to the culture of competition surrounding medicine, in which diagnosis, prognosis, and 
cure were framed within a narrative of “victory and defeat, glory and humiliation” (69), 
in the agonistic component of Galen’s medical practice, the healthcare seeker’s position 
reflects that of the passive object of medical attention—“a body upon whom Galen 
displays his superior medical skill” (71). 
Despite the affinities between Hippocratic or Galenic diagnostic practices and the 
modern clinical consultation, particularly in their ‘patient-centredness,’ these 
perspectives should not be interpreted as having, in any way, a historical relationship 
or suggesting “a timeless scientific impulse”; instead, “Hippocratic diagnostics served 
purposes specific to the social role and status of the Hellenic physician,” the cultural 
context of medicine during the period, and the specific interests of practitioners 
(Nicolson 804-5). It is important to keep in mind that well into the twentieth century the 
relationship between the healthcare seeker and the physician was dominated primarily 
by what Jonathan Will terms “benevolent deception.” This term denotes a type of 
relationship in which doctors intuitively or deliberately withhold crucial information 
pertaining to individuals’ health status, diagnosis, treatment, and therapeutic options 
because, as Katz notes, “physicians have always maintained that patients are only in 
need of caring custody” (2). With regard to disclosure in the ancient Greek context, Katz 
points to the Hippocratic Corpus, which advises that physicians “perform calmly and 
adroitly, concealing most things from the patient while you are attending to him. Give 
necessary orders with cheerfulness and serenity, turning his attention away from what 
is being done to him” (qtd in Katz 4). Physicians did not condescend to engage in 
dialogue with slaves or the free poor, and, as mentioned previously, conversation with 
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wealthy patients was not an invitation for shared decision-making, but served the 
didactic purposes of preventive medicine or the therapeutic purposes of winning 
patients’ trust. The ability to win the trust, good faith, and obedience of the patient was 
central to the physician’s ethos and perceived therapeutic effectiveness; both relied on 
the idea that his interests and the patient’s interests were identical. Thus, “there is no 
‘other’ who requires an explanation, for both want the same things: recovery and cure” 
(6); in this case, shared decision making would have been viewed as unnecessary. I will 
explore Katz’s work more thoroughly in the following sections and chapters, since his 
interpretations are central to exploring how the healthcare seeker’s role has developed.  
The “identity of interests” perceived to be central to healthcare seekers’ 
relationships with doctors emerged from a belief that the two were united in philia, or 
friendship (Katz 6). Furthermore, a naturalistic, teleological understanding of the body 
in relation to the universe imposed a fairly rigid system for interpreting and treating 
illness. During the early history of rational medicine, the influence of philosophy, 
particularly that of Aristotle, is deeply relevant. Thus, in characterizing the physician as 
“the servant of the art,” Hippocrates also suggests, not only a particular kind of 
collaboration between doctor, patient, and disease (and public), but also the idea that 
the practitioner is bound by allegiance to a certain set of philosophical principles. While 
these undoubtedly include the tenets of the Oath, notably the promise to act only “for 
the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous,” 
the physician under Hippocratic or Galenic medicine is also tied to the prescripts of a 
philosophical worldview that reflects a naturalistic cosmology (Nicolson 803). Indeed, 
Galen “was committed to the integration of philosophy and medicine and believed that 
to be a good doctor one had to be a philosopher; that medicine presupposed all parts of 
philosophy” (Longrigg 39).  
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Aristotelian natural philosophy had an obvious influence on medical practice 
from antiquity into the eighteenth century. Several of Aristotle’s best-known treatises, 
including Physica, De Anima, and Meteorologica, evidence the philosopher’s deep 
commitment to the study of natural phenomena—particularly, his interest in asking, 
“Why?” Aristotle’s explanations are intrinsically teleological because the answers to his 
questions seek to isolate final causality, that is, the function or purpose out of which 
something comes to be present or absent. While teleological explanations preceded 
Aristotle’s philosophical writings, his perspective presents a critical innovation, since he 
dismisses extrinsic factors as primary causes in nature; rather than attributing purpose 
to divine will or intelligent design, Aristotle understands nature as an end in itself 
(Johnson).  
 As discussed above, Galen’s inheritance of the Hippocratic diagnostic practice of 
“knowing the person” through thorough (sometimes days-long) empirical observation, 
applies this Aristotelian empirical teleology within the context of medical investigation 
(Nicolson 805). In his medical writings, Galen quips sarcastically, “It was, of course, a 
grand and impressive thing to do, to mistrust the obvious, and to pin one's faith in 
things which could not be seen!” (Galen, On the Natural Faculties 1.13). At the same time, 
he appeals to teleology in using pre-established theories of humouralism and natural 
philosophy to explain the final causes of bodily processes. In one line of inquiry in On 
the Natural Faculties, Galen explains why the humours of the body are attracted to one 
another. His explanation relies on the notion that, because of the greater purpose of 
nutrition—a faculty granted by Nature, which “is artistic and solicitous for the animal’s 
welfare”—each part of the body possesses the faculty of attraction, which allows it 
naturally to draw to it the appropriate type and quantity of  “its proper juice,” or 
humour (Galen, On the Natural Faculties 2.1). Along the lines of teleological philosophy, 
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Galen’s thinking here justifies a theory of humoural attraction through the final cause of 
nature’s beneficence in sustaining animal life. As Mattern aptly observes, for 
Hippocrates and Galen, “Nature is the original physician that creates and heals, and the 
doctor, in this ennobling view, is the assistant of Nature” (24). 
 Returning to the position of the individual healthcare seeker, then, in a 
naturalistic paradigm of medical thought, the body of the sufferer and the processes of 
the disease (the signs and sense observations induced from both) reflect the higher 
purposes and physical laws of nature. Thus, in a similar way to ancient, symbolic 
understandings of disease, the body is read for signs, but this time of natural—rather 
than divine—processes. Diverging from previous traditions, however, is the emphasis 
on the five senses of both practitioner and patient as providing empirical evidence; the 
tactility of such an interaction, as well as the holism of an approach that considers the 
individual’s “way of life habitation, work, diet, and so on” is premised on a person-
centred conceptualization of disease (Nicolson 802). While it is anachronistic to say that 
classical medical practitioners understood the role of socioeconomic, environmental, 
and idiosyncratic factors in what they regarded as disturbances in the body’s natural 
state, their methods can be seen to constitute the original holistic, alternative, 
integrative, or complementary medicine, as it is variously termed. Adopting a non-
canonical narrative of medical history, doctor of integrative medicine Bruce Hoffman 
proposes that 
an integrated approach to healing is not a new idea. It has appeared in various 
forms since antiquity. In fact, what is now termed traditional or allopathic 
medicine has only been dominant for about 100 years, but the tendency to be 
focused only on outer ways of healing has been dominant for at least the last five 
hundred years. Alternative or complementary medicine is, in fact, the true 
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traditional medicine. ‘We have been calling genuinely traditional medicine—used 
for at least 2500 years—‘alternative’ only because today’s newcomer ‘traditional’ 
medicine has misappropriated that attractive word, and truly traditional 
medicine has not shouted theft. (2, my italics) 
Certainly, many contemporary practitioners within so-called alternative healing circles 
endorse this interpretation, which traces their professional roots directly to Hippocratic 
medicine. 
 
The historical text 
 
The historical embraces whatever, de facto or de jure, sooner 
or later, directly or indirectly, may be offered to the gaze. A 
cause that can be seen, a symptom that is gradually 
discovered, a principle that can be deciphered from its root 
do not belong to the order of ‘philosophical’ knowledge . . . . 
(Foucault 5-6) 
 
Scientifically speaking, the strength of Galenic authority eventually waned, 
partially owing to the context of seventeenth-century ailments like the plague and 
syphilis that Galenic medicine was unequipped to explain or treat (Duffin 45-6). During 
this time and into the early eighteenth century both mechanistic and vitalistic theories 
of physiology competed for scientific precedence. The theoretical binary of mechanism 
versus vitalism is concerned with explaining the basic concept of life—how does the 
body maintain a constant state of animation, regeneration, and cohesion? Vitalism 
explains life by appealing to the notion of a “life force.” For German physiologist Georg 
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Stahl in the early eighteenth century, “a God-given super-added soul (anima) [was] the 
prime mover of living beings ”; the ancient idea of a gaslike anima provided a useful 
model for articulating an “agent of consciousness and physiological regulation” (Porter 
247).  
While proponents of vitalism like Stahl, an evangelical Lutheran, have often 
believed in a theological concept of spirit or soul, a vitalistic philosophy of the body 
does not necessarily equate to divinity or religion (Porter 247, Duffin 41). Recently, Jane 
Bennett (2010) has articulated a theory of vital materialism that pays homage to the 
early-twentieth-century “critical vitalism” of some experimental scientists. While this 
theory does not endorse a “‘naïve vitalism’ of soul,” critical vitalism seeks out 
alternative understandings of materiality that reject a dominant “mechanistic or 
deterministic” bias in which materiality “is thus in principle always calculable to 
humans” (“A Vitalist Stopover” 48). As Bennett explains, “central to this vitalism was 
the idea that ‘life’ was irreducible to ‘matter,’ that there existed a life-principle that 
animates matter, exists only when in relationship with matter, but is not itself of a 
material nature” (“A Vitalist Stopover” 48).2 Bennett’s work, and that of others in the 
area of speculative realism, will enter heavily into my philosophical reading, in chapter 
two, of how the human is currently conceptualized within medicine; the decentering of 
the human being through a focus on shared vulnerability and kinship networks among 
various forms of life allows us to rethink the human along the lines of a different value 
system that could revolutionize the way in which medicine is practiced. 
In contrast to vitalism, the theoretical understanding of the body that has held the 
most sway since approximately the seventeenth century is that of mechanism—the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Both Timothy Campbell and Eugene Thacker have also engaged, contemporarily, with theories of 
vitalism, both within the context of biotechnology. 
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conceptualization of life as, indeed, reducible to physical and chemical forces. Unlike 
some versions of vitalism, it often “defines all existence in terms of tangible matter” 
(Duffin 41). Seventeenth-century philosopher and mathematician René Descartes’ 
mind-body dualism separated a divinely created soul from the operations of the 
physical body in order to explain bodily functions according to mechanical laws. 
Rejecting vitalism, rival camps of eighteenth-century scientific medicine, inspired by 
William Harvey’s mechanistic explanation of the circulation of the blood, sought to 
understand the body using models derived from mechanical and chemical processes 
(Porter 247; Duffin 48). Similarly, applying physics to medicine, Dutch scholar Herman 
Boerhaave “construed health and sickness as expressions of such variables as forces, 
weights, and hydrostatic pressures,” attempting to give scientific validity to the notion 
of humoural imbalance (Porter 246).  
One way that mechanistic theories entered into practice, in this case through the 
application of chemistry, was through a refinement of Galen’s analysis of urine, called 
uroscopy; “charts were constructed to allow physicians to associate the colour, odour, 
turbidity, sweetness, and other chemical properties of urine with a specific diagnosis” 
(Duffin 74). At the same time, however, this diagnostic tool was only minimally 
illuminating and practitioners’ interests in reducing or ending suffering became more 
focused on remedying symptoms than reading signs. Hesitant to “invoke unknown 
causes for disease[,] instead, they built a new system of diagnosis, deliberately labeled 
nosology, based on the careful observation of symptoms. It was a self-conscious effort 
to avoid theorizing. A flurry of classic disease descriptions followed” (Duffin 74). 
 Although Galen’s writings had emphasized the importance of sense observation, 
the Galenic medicine of his predecessors (mostly university-educated physicians) “took 
upon itself the general characteristics of medieval scholarship, including a disdain for 
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manual work and a deference to textual authority. For the medieval and Renaissance 
physician, authority lay with the works attributed to Galen. But this exemplar was 
developed selectively, so as to endorse reason over observation, book learning over 
sensory experience” (Nicolson 805-6). Because of a renewed philosophy of sensualism, 
which pronounced the “importance of observation and the dangers of theory,” by the 
eighteenth century, dissection became more respectable (Duffin 74, 29).  At the same 
time, however, sensualism cast anatomy in a suspicious light, since anatomical analysis 
permitted only post-mortem diagnosis; thus, greater energy was directed toward the 
development of symptoms-based methodologies (Duffin 32). 
The sensualism of the eighteenth century found strong proponents in the Latin 
nosological texts of English physician Thomas Sydenham and the philosophical 
writings of his friend and colleague, John Locke. As Duffin notes, Sydenham did 
reference the humours, but endorsed the use of a defined and limited set of 
predetermined potentialities of each disease as the foundation for a strong diagnosis 
(74). Following Sydenham, “nosologists” began the task of creating disease maps, which 
organized pathologies “into conceptual trees with branches for classes, orders, genera, 
and species. Symptoms and their sequence were used to categorize diseases as if they 
were entities, or ‘beings,’ like animals and plants” (Duffin 74). Not surprisingly, the 
memorization of disease characteristics and classifications recorded in nosological 
treatises, rather than the experiential learning of bedside practice, formed the basis of 
medical training at this time (Duffin 74). 
 In the nosological approach to medical diagnosis, diseases were entirely 
ontological—that is, they originated from outside the patient and existed separately 
from the body, representing a drastic turn away from naturalistic conceptions of 
disease. As Stolberg illuminates through his examination of the letters and personal 
!! 44!
testimonies of early modern patients and scholarly physicians, illness is described as 
something apart from and adversarial to the individual’s body. These experiences are 
discussed through the language of occupation, invasion, and antagonism: “In the 
language of patient letters, . . . the disease or the ‘morbid matter’ was an ‘enemy’ that 
‘struck’ you ‘fell upon’ you, ‘assailed’ you or ‘attacked’ you, as it was put innumerable 
times. It ‘invaded’ you or ‘snuck into’ you and ‘exposed itself’ like a secret agent after it 
had established itself in the body, or it proved to be ‘rebellious’. In accordance with this 
martial, aggressive language, patients asked physicians for suitable weapons to 
‘victoriously attack’ the illness, to ‘wage war’ on it, to ‘exterminate’ it” (24-5).  
Michel Foucault in Birth of the Clinic summarily states that, when the ontological 
view predominated, the “individual was merely a negative element, the accident of the 
disease” (Foucault 14). Foucault characterizes this pre-clinical positioning of disease as a 
medicine of forms or essences. In Birth of the Clinic, he traces the historical conditions 
that made the clinic possible by describing how various spaces, each with its own 
genealogy, coalesced during a brief period in French history from 1760 to 1830. One of 
these threads describes the nosological classification of disease in France, which was 
characterized by the publication of two key texts: François Boissier de Sauvages’ 
Nosologie (1761) and Philippe Pinel’s Nosographie (1798) (Foucault 4). Between the 
publications of these texts, medicine began to position “disease as its primary object” 
(Bishop 39). As Bishop notes, Foucault’s description of nosology as a medicine of forms 
uses ‘form’ in the philosophical, but not strictly Platonic sense; the classificatory table of 
diseases gave a formal arrangement to the act of diagnosis (Bishop 39). In line with 
Foucault’s identification of space as the primary organizing principle in medicine, the 
space of the nosological table “treats localization in the organism as a subsidiary 
problem, but defines a fundamental system of relations involving envelopments, 
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subordinations, divisions, resemblances” (5). On the basis of a space “of projection 
without depth, of coincidence without development,” a “flat surface of perpetual 
simultaneity,” the physician abstracts the patient—“his predispositions, his age, his way 
of life”—to hone in on the formal characteristics of the disease, reading these signs in 
order to classify it ontologically, as one would a species of flower, which “grows, 
flowers, and dies always in the same way” (5-8).  
 The reification of this formal arrangement led to the belief that this organization 
of knowledge ordered reality and, in the process, uncovered an ultimate truth about 
disease that had previously been obscured (7). This contributed to the process described 
above, whereby an ontological conceptualization of disease emerged; the objects of 
medicine—the forms or essences of disease—existed in the conceptual space of the 
table. As Foucault writes, “the form of the similarity uncovered the rational order of the 
diseases” (7). We can understand this as a process of secondary spatialization, “in 
which vicinity is not defined by measurable distances [within the body], but by formal 
similarities”—that is, proximity within the nosological table; “when they become dense 
enough, these similarities cross the threshold of mere kinship and accede to unity of 
essence” (Foucault 6-7).  In Foucault’s example, the relative “freedom” of the space of 
disease in classificatory medicine, as compared to the anatamo-clinical method, meant 
that the same single malady expressed as “a nosebleed may become haemoptysis 
(spitting of blood) or cerebral haemorrhage; the only thing that must remain is the 
specific form of blood discharge” (11). 
 Foucault’s description of pre-clinical medicine highlights the significance of a 
logic of similarity in diagnosing disease; similarities in the surface signs and symptoms 
of illnesses indicate that they belong to the same class of diseases, regardless of any 
anatomical relation (or lack thereof). Likewise, remedies functioned on a “doctrine of 
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signatures,” so that matter with healing properties could be deduced on the basis of its 
outward appearance; “a flower whose blossoms resembled the shape of liver thereby 
suggested that it might be good for healing liver diseases” (Stolberg 27). This 
understanding took its cues from the organizing principles of nature; because disease 
was accorded a place in the natural world (as in the case of Hippocrates and the Ionian 
philosophers), it should also be dealt with and allowed to progress in the natural 
environment of its host—the family home. The disease “must not be fixed in a 
medically prepared domain, but be allowed, in the positive sense of the term, to 
‘vegetate’ in its original soil: the family, a social space conceived in its most natural, 
most primitive, most morally secure form, both enclosed upon itself and entirely 
transparent, where the illness is left to itself,” to follow nature’s course (Foucault 18). 
Drawing on the centrality of the family and the home to seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century medicine, Digby, notes the underrepresentation of this space in 
histories of medicine, while Stolberg points to the centrality of domestic space in 
continuing the open and quasi-public tradition of healing inherited from the Greeks. 
While observation of a physician’s healing finesse may have continued to be a 
significant element of this scene, particularly during a time when competing medical 
ideologies and the lack of systematized medical training fostered suspicion and mistrust 
among laypeople, social conventions also dictated the presence of family, neighbors, 
and friends at the sickbeds of their relations. “Certainly among the nobility visiting sick 
relatives was de rigeur, and one’s absence had to be explicitly excused and accounted 
for” (Stolberg 53-4). Among poorer, rural populations, friends, acquaintances, 
neighbors, and others conventionally assisted nurses and physicians at the sickbeds of 
those whom they visited (56). The communal nature of healthcare, thus, “created ideal 
conditions for the dissemination of medical ideas and practices far beyond the narrow 
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circle of the physician-patient relationship” (82). Patient and physician letters, Stolberg 
observes, record evidence of the transmission of medical know-how communicated by 
those who had been privy to the healing practices of physicians and other practitioners 
(82). 
 Alongside the vitality of medical conversation within the public sphere, another, 
and perhaps most significant, detail that influenced how individual healthcare seekers 
engaged with and experienced medicine prior to the birth of the clinic was the tentative, 
contestable, unauthorized (and pre-technoscientific) quality of medical theories and 
knowledge. Indeed, therapeutic techniques and theories about the body frequently 
varied from one physician to the next (Stolberg 73-4). These factors were particularly 
influential in emphasizing the patronage side of the healthcare seeker’s role. And, 
despite negative critical reaction to N.D. Jewson’s theory that medicine during this time 
was overwhelmingly dominated by the patronage model, as Stolberg notes, the 
economic side of the arrangement certainly exerted significant influence on how 
healthcare seekers and physicians interacted; the patron asserted significant power over 
both a practitioner’s economic success and reputation, and “their relationship was 
much more symmetrical than it is today. . . . The patients’ wishes and desires carried 
great weight simply because there was usually a wide range of other healers and 
healing practices at hand which they could easily resort to if they were not happy with 
a physician’s advice or treatment” (Stolberg 68). The letters that Stolberg examines in 
his book point strongly to the idea that healthcare seekers were quite comfortable with 
managing their own illnesses (74), taking or rejecting physicians’ advice and 
prescriptions, vocalizing their dissatisfaction when necessary (69), and consulting the 
readily available (and bestselling) medical reference texts, health handbooks, and 
plague pamphlets of the day (21).  
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Is this the first evidence of a pushback against the authority of the physician? An 
attempt by patients to assert decision-making autonomy and champion the value of 
experiential expertise against a figure that was increasingly seen as potentially 
threatening were the balance of power to tip even slightly? An assertion like this would 
likely require a significantly more in-depth look into the historical archive, which is 
unfortunately outside the scope of this paper. Allow me to gesture, however, toward 
the virtual nonexistence of patient participation in medical decision-making during this 
time. As Katz suggests, there exists no evidence in primary or secondary texts on 
medical ethics, prior to the eighteenth century, that healthcare practitioners involved 
patients in the medical decision making process. Instead, “conversations with patients 
served purposes of offering comfort, reassurance and hope, and of inducing patients to 
take the cure. Achievement of these objectives demanded an emphasis on the need to be 
authoritative, manipulative, and even deceitful. That emphasis was dictated less by self-
serving interests than by a wish to be helpful to patients; for without respect for medical 
authority, there could be no cure” (7). This protocol reflects a general attitude of denial 
toward and non-disclosure of the stultifying uncertainty that characterized most 
medical decision-making prior to the rise of scientific methods in medicine. Unwilling 
to risk damaging their already-shaky authority, physicians mostly disguised the reality 
that doctoring was (and to some extent, still is) comprised of a series of educated 
guesses (Katz 166). Not only was this disclosure stonewalled by the belief that 
laypersons were incapable of comprehending the “esoteric complexity” of medical 
knowledge, but “cure, doctors believed, required professing certainty to patients” (45). 
This is not to say that participation was nonexistent; the tradition of letter writing 
between healthcare seekers and physicians meant that literate individuals frequently 
participated in the recording and interpretation of their own illness experiences in their 
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correspondences. Physicians expected a wealth of specific information on an 
individual’s diet, lifestyle, medical history, and “bodily constitution” so that they could 
provide a specifically tailored treatment plan (Stolberg 66). Interestingly, this routine 
practice reflects the sort of personalized healthcare that patient advocacy groups seek 
today, in the twenty-first century context. However, because medical nosology operated 
on the premise that specific sets of symptoms would point to a specific diagnosis and 
prognosis (with precision being the goal), “differential diagnosis” was nonexistent 
(Shorter 784). Further, the process relied upon the patient’s involvement as a 
participant, not in decision-making, but through personal testimony and the co-
construction of a narrative of disease; often, the patient was simply regarded as a source 
of objective information in response “to a series of ‘yes-no’-style questions” and 
symptom-based inquiries (Shorter 792). 
While healthcare seekers may have appeared to have a similar degree of 
involvement in health-related matters to their present-day counterparts, they were also 
entangled within a very different discourse about the body, which guided their 
experiences and perceptions. While the use of nosological classifications in pathology 
and clinical medicine persists today, the central difference between eighteenth-century 
and contemporary categorizations that “simplify the mass of information gleaned […] 
in clinical experience by giving it order and structure” is the relatively recent primacy of 
anatomical and chemical observations in identifying disease (Duffin 75-6). For the most 
part, this change has been facilitated by technological advancements that collect 
internal, molecular, and genetic data. But before this could happen, the epistemological 
framework of medicine had to undergo a shift with regard to the social and bodily 
spaces where disease was identified, treated, and monitored. These changes eventually 
led to much greater success in diagnosis and prognosis. But, as Foucault and other 
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scholars of history and sociology have noted, these shifts also drastically altered the 
position of the healthcare seeker, particularly in terms of power relationships. 
 
The scientific object 
 
Disease is no longer a bundle of characters disseminated here 
and there over the surface of the body and linked together by 
statistically observable concomitances and successions; it is a 
set of forms and deformations, figures, and accidents and of 
displaced, destroyed, or modified elements bound together 
in sequence according to a geography that can be followed 
step by step. It is no longer a pathological species inserting 
itself into the body wherever possible; it is the body itself 
that has become ill. (Foucault 136) 
 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, scientists and doctors had begun to 
think beyond symptoms-based diagnosis and to connect disease to particular alterations 
in anatomy. Prior to this time, many doctors were interested in pathological anatomy, 
however, “they were baffled by its relevance to practice, since both diagnosis and 
therapeutics were predicated on symptoms. Methods of examination before death 
revealed little about the internal organs. To have a ‘disease’ in the eighteenth century, a 
person had to feel sick” (Duffin 78). As Foucault points out, the obstacle to anatomical 
thinking in medical practice during the classificatory period, was never an issue of 
social taboo—the proscription against opening up corpses was far from prominent in 
the 1700s, contrary to illusions perpetrated in medical history; “the conflict was not 
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between a young corpus of knowledge and old beliefs, but between two types of 
knowledge” (126). This epistemological shift had to happen gradually before techniques 
such as taking the pulse, thoracic percussion, or auscultation could be used to identify 
the existence of disease. In classificatory medicine, an irregular pulse or breathing was a 
sign of disease because it was a symptom that constituted the disease; thus, as Foucault 
elucidates, “it was natural that clinical medicine at the end of the eighteenth century 
should ignore a technique that made a sign appear artificially where there had been no 
symptom, and solicited a response when the disease itself did not speak. […] But as 
soon as pathological anatomy compels the clinic to […] bring to the surface what was 
given only in deep layers, the idea of a technical artifice capable of surprising a lesion 
becomes once again a scientifically based idea” (Foucault 162). By the nineteenth 
century, then, practitioners used the recent inventions of thoracic percussion and 
auscultation in service of “physical diagnosis” that connected symptoms to anatomical 
changes and identified signs where there were no symptoms (Duffin 78).  
As a result of this marriage between anatomy and pathology, the physician’s 
concern shifted from “how the patient felt, to emphasis on what lesion could be found” 
and disease names changed to reflect anatomy, rather than symptoms (for example, 
“phthisis” or “consumption” became “tuberculosis”) (Duffin 78). As Foucault notes, 
“the space of configuration of the disease and the space of localization of the illness in the 
body have been superimposed, in medical experience, for only a short period of time—
the period that coincides with nineteenth-century medicine and the privileges accorded 
to pathological anatomy” (Foucault 3-4). 
The refinement and popularization of microscope technology in medical practice 
in the 1830s added fuel to the movement toward deprioritizing the patient’s subjective 
experience and emphasizing the doctor’s objective findings. With the added authority 
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of microscopic vision, the patient’s subjective experience of illness could now be 
attached to a technoscientifically sanctioned, visually identifiable disease, signified by 
alterations at the level of tissue structures. This turning point is characterized by an 
understanding of disease that we maintain today, that is, as sometimes ontological, 
ascribed to a physical legion that can be regarded as separate from the ‘normal’ body, 
and sometimes physiological, emerging from within the patient and possibly dependent 
on individual factors (Duffin 79-81). The fierce opposition of these two theories, 
represented by the ontologically-based germ theory, which emerged in the 1880s, and 
Mendel’s physiologically-based laws of heredity, consolidated in 1900, continued the 
debate between scientists on the true source and ‘location’ of disease. This eventually 
led to the acceptance of both as concomitant; the current medical model offers a 
synthesis, incorporating viral and bacteriological alongside genetic and autoimmune 
conceptualizations of disease (Duffin 81-92). 
 While technological innovations seem central to the shifting gaze that 
transformed the body’s position in medicine, from a collection of subjective experiences, 
signs, or symptoms to an object of scientific scrutiny, to pinpoint these innovations as 
solely responsible would be to adopt an unproductive standpoint of technological 
determinism. As Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic analyzes, the transformation of the body 
within medicine emerges from, first and foremost, a discursive shift in the healthcare 
encounter. Foucault’s archaeology focuses on how changes in the late eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century—bound up with the political milieu of the French 
Revolution—introduced a new gaze to medicine that came to characterize the modern 
clinical encounter. This clinical gaze comprised a change in the conceptual space of both 
the disease and the body, which emerged alongside changes in political space—namely, 
the reorganization of the social infrastructure related to public health and curricular 
!! 53!
reform within faculties of medicine. The collusion of these different histories signified 
the introduction of a “new, coherent, unitary model for the formation of medical 
objects, perceptions, and concepts” (51).  
Clinical medicine, for Foucault, was partially a product of tertiary 
spatialization—that is, “all the gestures by which, in a given society a disease is 
circumscribed, medically invested, isolated, divided up into closed, privileged regions, 
or distributed throughout cure centres, arranged in the most favourable way” (16). In 
France, the transition of the ‘natural habitat’ of disease from the family home to the 
hospital—the institutional spatialization of disease in the interests of free, centralized 
healthcare—was connected to the liberatory ideals of the French Revolution. The 
political concern of ‘good medicine’ thus became a task for the state and the ensuing 
regulation of the medical profession led to both the centralization of knowledge and the 
governance of all medical activity (19, 28, 31-6). The new clinic focused on medical 
training in hospitals, where doctors “learn[ed] as they practice[d], at the patient’s 
bedside: instead of useless physiologies, they [would] learn the true ‘art of curing’” (70). 
This training would be heavily grounded in a systematized body of authorized medical 
knowledge based on pathological anatomy (72). As Foucault notes, “this conceptual 
transformation… gave the clinical field a new structure in which the individual in 
question was not so much a sick person as the endlessly reproducible pathological fact 
to be found in all patients suffering in a similar way” (97). 
Central to the process whereby clinical experience becomes a mode of knowledge 
creation is the instrumentalization of language in the objective correlation of that which 
is visible and that which is expressible (Foucault 196). By this, Foucault suggests that 
scientific discourse authorizes the clinical gaze, so that verbally articulating what one 
sees becomes a way of knowing (196). The clinical gaze depends on a careful balance 
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between speech and vision, “a precarious balance, for it rests on a formidable postulate: 
that all that is visible is expressible, and that it is wholly visible because it is wholly 
expressible” (Foucault 115, original emphasis). As Bishop understands it, “medical 
practice conceived signs as speaking their truth without remainder or excess—no 
interpretation being necessary” (35). 
 Foucault’s analysis highlights important changes in the power dynamic between 
physicians and patients as enacted by epistemological and discursive changes that 
effectively objectified the patient’s body and provided the physician—rather than the 
subject—with a privileged perspective on bodily experiences of disease. The clinical 
mode of investigation positions patients as “cases” in the sense that it “proceed[s] 
initially to the diminution of individualities” and, in so doing, discounts the 
idiosyncrasies of subjective experience (168). While the individual is no longer “the 
accident of the disease,” as she was positioned in classificatory medicine, now the 
individual within medicine represents a scientifically defined instance of abnormality. 
While eighteenth-century medicine was concerned much more with health than 
normality and was generally uninterested in the ‘regular’ functioning of the body, 
“nineteenth-century medicine, on the other hand, was regulated more in accordance 
with normality than with health; it formed its concepts and prescribed its interventions 
in relation to a standard of functioning and organic structure, and physiological 
knowledge” (Foucault 35).  
Indeed, as Lennard Davis notes in his 1995 text Enforcing Normalcy, the word 
‘normal’ as we currently use it, to describe the state of conforming to a standard, did not 
enter the English language until 1840 (24). Davis argues, echoing Foucault, that the 
emergence of the “norm” at this point in history was directly connected to the growing 
field of statistics, which emphasized an average state of being—‘l’homme moyen’ (27). 
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As opposed to a previously dominant notion of an ‘ideal’ body or moral disposition, the 
notion of a norm “implies that the majority of the population must or should somehow 
be part of the norm. . . . When we think of bodies, in a society where the concept of the 
norm is operative, then people with disabilities will be thought of as deviants” (29). This 
medical bipolarity, pitting the normal against the pathological, came to infuse value 
judgments about more than just the individual body, but also about the lives of groups, 
societies, and races (Foucault 35). As Davis points out, statistics and eugenics co-
evolved due to a mutually reinforcing assumption “that a population can be normed” 
(30). Thus, in conversations surrounding both disease and disability, the ‘normal,’ as a 
concept that grounds much of our thinking about embodiment (particularly in the 
realm of medicine) must be regarded as inextricably bound up with discourses of 
human perfectibility and progress; nationalism, capitalism, and public health; and the 
medicalization of ‘abnormality’ (49). 
 
The partner, the client, the consumer, the ‘expert patient’ 
 
Physicians’ persistent and relentless demand that patients 
trust their doctors . . . should have alerted doctors to the fact 
that patients may not trust them, or that they trust them only 
with profound reservations. . . . Instead, the idea of informed 
consent suggests that trust must be earned through 
conversation. (Katz xiv) 
 
As I have explained, socially constructed notions about normal human 
embodiment, along with the epistemological changes which lent authority to the 
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physician’s observations, knowledge, and intuitions in the nineteenth century, silenced 
the voice of the healthcare seeker to the extent that exclusion from life-altering medical 
decisions became commonplace. While informed consent laws in recent times have 
placed legal checks and balances on this practice, the paternalistic approach of many 
physicians continued to reign (and, arguably, still does). 
Beginning around the time of functionalist sociologist Talcott Parsons’ 
theorization of the “sick role” in his 1951 text The Social System, there emerged a flurry 
of scholarly activity directed toward analyzing the social roles of doctor and patient and 
defining the overarching relationship between these two figures. Parsons’ theory 
formulated illness as a deviant social position, characterized by a “passive-alienative” 
element and a mode of “dependency,” which threatened to disrupt the social order if 
left uncontained (193). The sick role allowed for the “conditional legitimation” of illness 
experience and the conformity of the sick individual by constructing it as a period of 
temporary abnormality, part of a journey back to a normal state (197, 211). In this 
theoretical framework, physicians become representatives of a system that controls 
deviance: their emotionless, professional relationships with patients support an 
interpretation of illness as a valid state governed by institutional arrangements and 
their role is, thus, to guide individuals to social reintegration (296-305).  
Arthur Frank offers a useful interpretation of the implications of Parsons’s 
observations about patienthood when he writes, “I understand this obligation of 
seeking medical care as a narrative surrender and mark it as the central moment in 
modernist illness experience [as opposed to pre- and postmodern experience]. The ill 
person not only agrees to follow physical regimens that are prescribed; she also agrees, 
tacitly but with no less implication, to tell her story in medical terms…” (6). This notion 
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of narrative surrender comes heavily into play in contemporary attempts to reform 
medical care through narrative medicine, a point I will return to in chapter two. 
Following from Parsons, in 1956, Thomas Szasz and Marc Hollender articulated a 
more nuanced interpretation of the sick role in their formulation of three “basic models 
of the doctor-patient relationship.” In this brief analysis of the philosophical 
preconceptions associated with particular medical scenarios, the authors suggest that 
doctors and patients conform to one of three frameworks for social interaction 
predominated by activity-passivity, guidance-cooperation, or mutual participation 
(Szasz and Hollender 586-7). Refraining from offering value judgments about any of 
these power arrangements, the authors argue that “each of the three types of 
therapeutic relationship is entirely appropriate under certain circumstances and each is 
inappropriate under others” (591). In situations where individuals are incapable of 
more active involvement in their care, whether physically, cognitively, emotionally, or 
logistically (due to circumstances such as surgery or treatments that require their 
passivity), physicians assume dominance; “psychologically, [the activity-passivity 
model] is not an interaction, because it is based on the effect of one person on another . . 
. . ‘Treatment’ takes place irrespective of the patient’s contribution and regardless of the 
outcome” (Szasz and Hollender 586). When both individuals in the clinical interaction 
are active, usually when the patient “is conscious and has feelings and aspirations of his 
own,” physicians may take a guiding or ‘parental’ type of role, in which the patient is 
expected to cooperate, but in a diminutive mode of obedience to doctor’s orders; “the 
main difference between the two participants [in the guidance-cooperation model] 
pertains to power, and to its actual or potential use” (Szasz and Hollender 586-7). The 
final model, Szasz and Hollender note, “is essentially foreign to medicine. This 
relationship [of mutual interaction], characterized by a high degree of empathy, has 
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elements often associated with the notions of friendship and partnership and the 
imparting of expert advice. The physician may be said to help the patient to help 
himself” (588). In this type of interaction, patients take primary responsibility for their 
own care and the ideal of ‘equality’ is upheld. The conditions necessary to this mode of 
interaction include the requirements that participants have equal degrees of power and 
interest in the situation and are mutually interdependent in some way. 
Importantly, Szasz and Hollender argue that this last model of mutual 
participation is not morally more favourable than the previous two and, instead, is 
appropriate only under certain conditions, namely, “when the physician does not 
profess to know exactly what is best for the patient. The search for this becomes the 
essence of the therapeutic interaction. The patient’s own experiences furnish 
indispensable information for eventual agreement, under otherwise favorable 
circumstances, as to what ‘health’ might be for him” (589). In other cases, they suggest, 
it is both important and necessary that doctors take a more guiding and paternalistic 
role in their practice. Ultimately, it would seem, the relationships elucidated in this 
model reflect three highly different ways of conceptualizing both the disease and the 
healthcare seeker. Of particular interest to my research is the question of why Szasz and 
Hollender’s third model of mutual interaction, characterized by equality and 
partnership, is “essentially foreign to medicine”? While one might certainly argue that, 
since the time of writing in 1956, doctors and patients have come closer to achieving this 
elusive ‘third way,’ largely through the widespread accessibility of biomedical 
knowledge and the promotion of self-care within the health industry, closer 
examination suggests that true partnership is just as foreign as ever. 
Certainly, however, since the publication of this paper, the interest in exploring 
the potential for healthcare seekers’ greater autonomy within medical interactions has 
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only increased in both academic and popular spheres. In this context, one of the most 
noteworthy events of the latter half of the twentieth century was the creation of 
informed consent laws. As Katz explains, in the late 1950s, judges began to ask the as-
yet unconsidered question: “Are patients entitled not only to know what the doctor 
proposes to do but also to decide whether an intervention is acceptable in light of its risks 
and benefits and the available alternatives, including no treatment?” (59). While the 
answer to this question may seem obvious and far from revolutionary by today’s 
standards, the question, as Katz documents it, was highly contentious and polarizing. 
Informed consent was finally introduced as a result of the 1957 legal proceedings of 
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, in which Justice Bray determined 
that “a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he 
withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by 
the patient to the proposed treatment . . . In discussing the element of risk a certain 
amount of discretion must be employed consistent with full disclosure of facts 
necessary to giving informed consent” (qtd in Katz 61). 
While Katz discusses the individual legal cases that created precedence for the 
eventual establishment of the informed consent laws we have today, it is important to 
note, also, that the development of informed consent as a concept within medical 
practice took place in the context of a growing awareness of atrocities that had been 
committed by medical scientists against vulnerable persons. The largest such example 
in the twentieth century is the grievous breach of human rights against marginalized 
persons subjected to Nazi experiments during the Holocaust. But, as Davis notes, “we 
have largely forgotten that what Hitler did in developing a hideous policy of eugenics 
was just to implement the theories of the British and American eugenicists” (38). 
Indeed, forced sterilization of persons with inherited disabilities was endorsed in the 
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respected magazine Nature in 1933 (Davis 38) and actually carried out in North America 
in the twentieth century on those institutionalized for “mental illnesses,” which at the 
time included so-called pathologies such as feeblemindedness and epilepsy (Shapiro 
158-9). There are, sadly, a plethora of other cases that belong to this dark history. In 
1956, children at the Willowbrook State Hospital were infected with hepatitis B, while 
in 1963, older adults at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital were injected with cancer 
cells, in both cases without the consent of the unknowing research subjects. In 1972, in 
Tuskegee, Alabama, six hundred black men were denied penicillin for treatment of 
syphilis so that scientists could study the development of the untreated infection 
(Charon 204). And, over a century prior to this, J. Marion Sims, the so-called founder of 
modern gynecology, performed unconsented painful and life-threatening gynecological 
experiments on seven enslaved African-American women in order to study the 
treatment of vesico-vaginal fistulae (Ojanuga 29-30). 
This legacy of deception, misinformation, and exploitation forms a dark shadow 
over the relationship between healthcare practitioners, as representatives of the medico-
scientific authority responsible for these atrocities, and those who have no choice but to 
disclose their states of suffering and vulnerability. As I mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, Charon suggests that the emergence of bioethics within this context has 
resulted in an understanding of doctor-patient relationships as adversarial or 
necessarily conflict-ridden. “The extreme focus on patient autonomy,” Charon believes, 
makes sense only “if the doctor is seen as prone to take advantage of the patient” (205). 
While this may be true, there are certainly other reasons one could enlist in support of 
greater patient autonomy, aside from the imperative to eliminate coercion or deception. 
Indeed, while the patient-empowering rhetoric of Justice Bray’s words in the 
1956 informed consent trial is certainly noteworthy, Katz suggests that the effects of the 
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law on actual medical practice have proven to be relatively underwhelming (Katz 60). 
In exploring the many ways in which informed consent failed to deliver on its promise 
of greater decision-making power for patients, up until the time of publication in 1984, 
Katz argues that the denial or occlusion of the unavoidable uncertainty inherent in 
medical diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment was an undeniable part of the problem. 
The lack of transparency over uncertainty in discussions with patients, Katz suggests, 
could have been prevented by the medical use of more scientific methodologies that 
would have emphasized clarity and openness between doctors and healthcare seekers 
regarding medical unknowns. Instead, feigned certainty and professional superiority on 
the part of physicians simply preempted any potential for an open, trusting, and equal 
relationship between practitioner and healthcare seeker (206). As Katz suggests, 
medical practice failed to acknowledge that 
in the absence of any one clear road to well-being, identity of interest cannot be 
assumed, and consensus on goals, let alone on which path to follow, can only be 
accomplished through conversation. Two distinct and separate parties interact 
with one another—not one mind (the physician’s), not one body (the patient’s), 
but two minds and two bodies. Moreover, both parties bring conflicting 
motivations and interests to their encounters. . . . Silent altruism alone cannot 
resolve these conflicting tensions. (xviii) 
The questions of paternalism and autonomy central to Katz’s study of informed consent 
are now, more than ever, at the forefront of a booming Health 2.0 movement, in which 
medical power and patient expertise meet (and sometimes clash) in the so-called 
democratizing networks of new media. However, even more recent scholarship 
continues to express doubt over patients’ capacity to participate in medical decision-
making.  
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A noteworthy 1992 article by Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel enters into this debate 
to ask the pressing question: “what should be the ideal physician-patient relationship?” 
Expanding upon Szasz and Hollender, they propose a fourfold model of the interaction 
in question that isolates the paternalistic, informative, interpretive, and deliberative 
models, each of which put forth a different role for and conception of patient autonomy 
(Emanuel and Emanuel 2221-2). The paternalistic model echoes Szasz and Hollender’s 
active-passive model, while the informative, interpretive, and deliberative models fall 
somewhere between the guidance-cooperation and mutual participation models. The 
difference between the latter three lies in how the patient’s values enter into the medical 
decision-making process; while the physician in the informative model is merely a 
technical expert who presents information and a range of options that the patient then 
assesses according to his or her value system, the physician in the interpretive model 
offers technical information and then assists the patient in articulating or interpreting 
his or her values to determine which options best realize these. In the last model, the 
physician and patient exchange ideas in “deliberation about what kind of health-related 
values the patient could and ultimately should pursue” (2222). In this deliberative 
model, the physician’s role is extended to also reflect the interests of a teacher or friend 
and the “conception of patient autonomy is moral self-development; the patient is 
empowered not simply to follow unexamined preferences or examined values, but to 
consider, through dialogue, alternative health-related values, their worthiness, and their 
implications for treatment” (2222).  
Emanuel and Emanuel argue that certain conceptions of patient autonomy, such 
as the informative model, unproductively disempower the doctor by reducing their role 
to that of a technical expert; as such, they endorse the deliberative model, because it 
reflects “the essence of doctoring [as] a fabric of knowledge, understanding, teaching, 
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and action” (2226). Indeed, recent scholarship emerging from medical sociology and 
clinical practice has noted that the ‘asymmetry’ of relationships between practitioners 
and patients—“the inescapability of medical authority and patient deference”—is 
crucial to “what doctors are there for” (Pilnick and Dingwall 1374).  
In the end, Emanuel and Emanuel fail to explicitly define the ideal role of the 
patient, though their deliberative model seems still to reflect a perpetuation of 
predominant passivity on the part of the healthcare seeker: despite amplifying the 
patient’s voice, arguably, the model still places the doctor in a more active, didactic role. 
This ideal runs up against some problems when we consider health and illness outside 
of a narrow biomedical lens. If doctors are trained exclusively in the language of 
biomedicine, there is much that their “caring custody” will exclude from consideration. 
As Anne Jurecic notes in her reading of Margaret Edson’s play W;t. “patients give their 
bodies over to doctors and hospitals only to encounter inattention and indifference, not 
because [patients] cannot express their suffering, but because their language is 
unvalued and unrecognized in medical culture” (48). In a relationship model in which 
the physician is a friend or a teacher, that figure is in some ways no less domineering 
than a medical professional in a paternalistic role, particularly if the way in which he or 
she guides the healthcare seeker toward a decision enforces a biomedically framed 
interpretation of that person’s experience. 
While changes in the field of medicine since the 1950s have converged around 
developments in understanding biochemical, pharmacological, and genetic processes, 
the position of the healthcare seeker continues primarily to reflect objectification under 
the clinical gaze (Shorter 793). The widening landscape of increasingly more refined 
testing equipment and visualization technologies extends the gaze in perhaps more 
invasive and alienating ways. In her cultural analysis of medical imaging, José van 
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Dijck analyzes the various imaging technologies that medicine deploys to make the 
body more transparent—X-rays, ultrasounds, endoscopes, computed tomography, 
magnetic resonance imaging, positron emission tomography, and electron microscopes, 
to name a few. These medical interventions amplify the process whereby individual 
bodies undergo the scrutiny of medical and information technologies that code, label, 
and assess biological structures and, thereby, ‘invade’ corporeal space. As these systems 
extend the Foucauldian medical gaze of the physician, patients are further alienated 
from identification with or understanding of their bodies, resulting in a sort of 
subjection as scientific scrutiny over the body works to isolate mutation and, 
incidentally, construct notions of normalcy and difference.  
Despite scholarly involvement, for at least the past sixty years, in the 
conversation regarding paternalism and autonomy in healthcare, many patient activists, 
as well as proponents of person-centred care and medical humanism, take issue with 
the almost total dismissal of the patient’s story or perspective in the clinical encounter; 
they continue to suggest that the prioritization of information yielded from advanced 
diagnostic devices has resulted in a serious breakdown in the relationship between 
individuals and their medical practitioners. Despite doctors’ greater therapeutic power 
“in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as an ever-broader stream of antibacterial, 
anti-inflammatory, antineoplastic medications became available, patients [have become] 
increasingly alienated from the former ‘demigods in white’” (Shorter 794). Furthermore, 
patients continue to be unnecessarily denied greater influence and autonomy in medical 
interactions. My example at the beginning of the chapter of the birth control drug recall 
illustrates a perfect example of the continued authority of medical professionals—in this 
case, pharmacists—as paternalistic spokespersons for healthcare seekers and 
intermediaries between pharmaceutical companies and healthcare consumers.  
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Much recent criticism of the medical establishment and doctor training reasserts 
and responds to the Foucauldian analysis that I have favoured in this history of the 
patient. In her study of narrative within medical practice, Julia Epstein studies how 
patient stories are translated into medical records in a way that seeks to contain 
corporeal deviance within a manageable space by giving semiotic meaning to 
experience; this ensures that the individual body is constrained within what Foucault 
terms a system of regulatory control (Epstein 4). The medically authorized 
representation of individual experience is problematic because it relies on the idea that 
the body can be decoded, “at a remove from the individual’s production of meaning 
within that body as it operates inside culture” (Epstein 1). While the narrative medicine 
movement, since the 1980s, has been presented as an antidote to the reductive and 
dehumanizing medical chart, in the sense that it attempts to consider the individual 
healthcare seeker as a “whole person” and not just as a patient, there remains some 
danger, to my mind, that the healthcare seeker’s story will nonetheless be subjected to 
the kind of regulatory control that Epstein traces in her rhetorical study of medical 
records. The illness experience, as interpreted by healthcare professionals, will always 
be sculpted to serve the interests of a narrative of normalization that becomes defined 
and, in some ways, appropriated by the medical practitioner who hears and authorizes 
that story. This is a topic I will examine in more detail in chapter two. 
A wealth of literature in the medical humanities field, a sibling to the narrative 
medicine movement, also articulates the desire for medicine to move away from the 
current accepted system, in which patients are merely cases, to a mode of engagement 
that ‘humanizes’ healthcare (Brody 2; Polianski and Fangerau 121; Shapiro et. al 192-3; 
Macnaughton 928). These models promote conceptualizations of healthcare seekers as 
“whole persons” and partners in care. While the proposed methods for effecting a 
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conceptual innovation of the healthcare seeker’s position within (and without) the 
medical institution vary from the prescription of a “humanities pill for what ails us” to 
the humanities’ “intellectual co-engagement with policy makers and clinical 
researchers,” the most promising and, indeed, most challenging remedies prioritize 
empathy and compassion as necessary facets of the relationship between individuals 
and healthcare practitioners (Peterkin; Macnaughton; Pembroke). At the same time, 
these new directions, which appear undoubtedly positive, also fall victim to an 
embedded liberal humanist value system that prioritizes qualities like wholeness, 
autonomy, and agency in ways that actually undermine the positive goals—equal 
partnerships, more nuanced definitions of illness, empathic care—to which the 
movements strive. The philosophical question of the human is central to how 
contemporary North American medicine, through attempted reforms like medical 
humanities, narrative medicine, and participatory healthcare, conceptualizes the subject 
as healthcare seeker. 
 
Conclusion 
As I have explored in this chapter, the role of the healthcare seeker is highly 
context sensitive and has developed in tandem with particular social and medical 
constructs for understanding the human body. Over history, and persisting to the 
present day, the person at the heart of the medical inquiry is at times regarded as an 
entity through which symbolic emanations, in the form of bodily ‘abnormality,’ are 
channeled and interpreted; at times, as a natural being out of balance with an 
interconnected natural world; at times, as a bodily container for diseases that can be 
classified and treated according to rational systems of categorization; at times, as an 
object to be scrutinized under a medical gaze that views the patient—mind, body, and 
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soul—as his disease; and, at times, as a combination of some or all of these constructs. 
Awareness of these various approaches to understanding the human over time can aid 
us in critically investigating which threads of these historical conceptualizations persist 
in our contemporary medical sphere in ways that, potentially, do not serve the goals of 
humanized healthcare. 
In the next chapter, I use these foundations to explore how deeply rooted 
humanistic assumptions about life contribute to the perpetuation of some of the 
persistent issues introduced in this chapter, which prevent individuals from assuming 
an adequate level of involvement in the decisions that affect their emotional, 
psychological, social, and bodily well-being. These assumptions are at the heart of the 
philosophical questions raised by posthumanist theory. And they are the questions that, 
I argue, must be interrogated far more directly than they currently are within the 
medical humanities movement in doctor training and the burgeoning field of narrative 
medicine. Indeed, the shift toward a partnership model within medicine depends upon 
a more critical transformation of medicine’s philosophical conceptualization of the 
human. 
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Chapter 2 | Conceptualizing the Patient in Medical Humanities: A Posthumanist 
Intervention 
 
What if our understanding of ourselves were based not on static labels or 
stages but on our actions and our ability and our willingness to transform 
ourselves? What if we embraced the messy, evolving, surprising, out-of-control 
happening that is life and reckoned with its proximity and relationship to death? 
. . . And what if each of these things were what we were waiting for, 
moments of opening, of the deepening and the awakening of everyone 
around us? What if this were the point of our being here rather than 
acquiring and competing and consuming and writing each other off as 
stage IV or 5.2B? (89, my emphasis) 
Eve Ensler, In the Body of the World 
 
If the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, and cultural criticism 
has a task at the present moment, it is no doubt to return us to the human 
where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and at the limits of its 
capacity to make sense. (151) 
Judith Butler, Precarious Life 
 
Claiming to be “no apologist for cancer,” Eve Ensler, in her memoir In the Body of 
the World, nonetheless credits the bodily trauma of the disease for allowing her a return 
to a body from which she had been exiled (8). I begin this chapter with a series of 
questions from Ensler, which are more aptly challenges to the clean, categorical 
imperatives of medicine, in order to introduce an idea that medical practice has been, 
thus far, unable to reckon with—that is, the idea of all embodied experience as both 
fragmented and existing outside of the permeable corporeal boundaries of the humanist 
self.  
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After dealing with a painful post-surgical abscess following the removal of her 
uterus, ovaries, cervix, fallopian tubes, rectum, and sections of colon, Ensler recalls the 
lead-up to her eligibility for radiation and chemotherapy. Along with the guilt and 
blame imposed upon her by cold, detached physicians who cruelly comment upon her 
body’s too-slow recovery—“I feel as if I have failed,” she remarks—she also writes of 
the dismissal and judgment attached to something so dull and non-vital as a medical 
chart (70, 88). The brutality of having her body categorized within a particular stage of 
cancer—either IIIB or IVB, they tell her—reminds her of being placed in the ‘stupid’ 
group in fifth grade—5.2B, labeled one of “the wrong children, the fat, the pimply, the 
depressed, the painfully introverted, the ones with behavioural disorders, the broken 
and oily-haired girls, the aggressive, menacing boys” (86). The resonances between 
these experiences that each imposed upon her a deficit, prompt Ensler to ask the series of 
questions above.  
Most notable of these questions, for my purposes in this chapter, is the challenge 
to “[embrace] the messy, evolving, surprising, out-of-control happening that is life” 
(89). Admittedly, when taken out of context, this line reads as a cliché, perhaps 
grandiose, observation on the unruliness of human life in a vast and mysterious 
universe. Indeed, I am not interested in defending an argument that “life is crazy—
accept it” (an argument that I do not believe Ensler is making, either). Instead, I hope to 
uncover some of the insidious humanistic impulses that guide the narratives to which 
we turn when we attempt to think about the human experience of illness—impulses 
that lead us to overstate allegedly human qualities like agency, rationality, autonomy, 
and wholeness. In contrast to an illness journey depicted as a rupture and repair of 
body, self, and personal narrative—conforming to a medical master narrative, of sorts—
in Ensler’s memoir, for example, we see serious illness narrated through a different 
!! 70!
frame. What Ensler describes as her emotional ‘emptiness’ and feelings of 
incompleteness derive from the violence of sexual abuse that divorce her from her 
body, as well as the emotionally damaging experience of having paid witness to the 
stories of sexual assault victims from many countries around the world. As I will 
explore in more detail below, her cancer, while ravaging, excruciatingly painful, and 
near-fatal does not create a ‘narrative rupture’ in the negative sense; it opens her to a 
world of interconnectedness in which she begins to see her suffering—and her joy—as 
belonging to, with, and in the world. 
The first part of this chapter will examine the values and goals of medical 
humanism—its attempts to respond to a legacy of impersonal medicine—as it manifests 
in the writings and curricula of medical school educators, scholars, and other 
commentators. For the most part, the call for a humanistic revitalization of medicine 
revolves around the practice of narrative medicine and the related concept of “whole 
person care,” ideas that I will explore in detail through the writings of Arthur Frank, 
Rita Charon, and others. Narrative analysis of illness by researchers in literature, 
sociology, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, and other related disciplines tends 
typically to illuminate the complexities of the illness experience and the ways in which 
meaning is negotiated variously in context-specific and relational ways. However, 
literature promoting the study and adoption of narrative techniques within medical 
practice seems, often, to construe illness narrative in terms of a rehabilitative or, what 
Frank in The Wounded Storyteller calls a “restitution narrative,” figured through binaries 
in which health is aligned with wholeness and coherence and illness with fragmentation 
and chaos. Despite criticism of this limited mode of understanding the healthcare 
seeker’s story, the narrative of restored wholeness (and the doctor’s role in achieving 
this) seems pronounced in the literature, perpetuating a seemingly inescapable 
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conceptualization of the patient as no more than a collection of parts to be reconstituted. 
As I will argue, this reductive view is inextricably linked to the continued reliance of 
medical practice upon a liberal humanist value system. 
Throughout the discussion I will return to Ensler’s eloquent and complex 
account of her experience with cancer in terms of how her perspective can contribute to 
a rethinking of medical humanities’ and narrative medicine’s conceptualization of the 
human. In the last half of the chapter, I will introduce the phenomenological concept of 
posthumanism and explain its relevance within a contemporary medical sphere that 
seems intent on reforming its relationship to the human, but has yet to escape the 
confines of liberal humanism. This posthumanist intervention asks medical humanities 
scholars, medical practitioners, and medical students to think more critically about the 
rhetorics of holism, autonomy, and humanization endemic within current attempts to 
reconceptualize the healthcare seeker. Expanding on this idea through the work of Cary 
Wolfe, Judith Butler, and Jane Bennett, I explore how consideration of the body’s 
incomplete, atomistic, and fragmentary nature poses an occasion for a more nuanced 
understanding of illness experience, based on the lived human experience of shared 
vulnerability. I connect this reading of human embodiment to the work of disability 
studies scholars, including Jay Dolmage and Margrit Shildrick, who critically 
deconstruct notions of wholeness, prosthesis, and the disabled body. 
 
Medical humanities and narrative medicine 
Returning to one of the probing questions of Ensler’s memoir—that is, what it 
means to be human in and through the embodied experience of disease—we are faced 
with a line of inquiry that sits at the forefront of ongoing conceptual renegotiation 
within the medical field. Beginning most notably, perhaps, with the work of French 
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poststructuralist Michel Foucault, modern medicine has been heavily criticized for its 
objectification of the patient and its reductive, atomizing view of the individual as 
merely a diseased body or medical case (Foucault 168). This situation is well addressed 
in literary form by Ensler when she recounts her oncologist’s suggestion that she 
undergo radiation: “. . . he says the mantra of the end of the world. ‘WE LIKE TO 
THROW EVERYTHING AT IT. That’s all we know how to do.’ And I say, ‘The only 
problem is that IT is attached to ME.’ And I swear he doesn’t flinch. Me is irrelevant. Me 
is personal and specific. Me is what has to be passed through to get where he is going” 
(71-2). 
Continuing from my discussion in chapter one of the history of criticism against 
the medical establishment for its reductionist, biomedically-oriented view of human 
functioning, I would like to focus here on medicine’s reaction to that criticism. As 
discussed, early theorizing on how medical practice might reorient its perspective is 
seen in the influential work of George Engel whose 1977 article in Science was one of the 
first to blatantly express the need for a biopsychosocial model of human health—a 
model that extends the “somatic parameters” of the medical model to account for how 
psychological and social factors, such as mood, behaviour, lifestyle, philosophical 
worldview, cultural norms, etc., should be regarded alongside (and not secondary to) 
physical and biochemical “proof” of disease. Engel’s argument, at this time, can be seen 
as intervening in an increasingly more technologically advanced medicine; the precision 
with which data had begun to speak for the patient (a precision considered infinitely 
more trustworthy than the experiential expressions of the individual, herself) made it 
all too easy for practitioners to overlook psychosocial influences on health. 
The contemporary movement toward “whole person care” takes up the mandate 
of the biopsychosocial model in its interest in understanding the multifaceted way in 
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which all parts of a human life interact to produce our particular conditions of 
embodiment. As Tom A. Hutchison describes in his introduction to the edited collected 
Whole Person Care, “whole person care is not knowing all about the patient in all 
dimensions . . . . Such an undertaking is doomed to failure and would probably be 
perceived by patients as overstepping the bounds of the medical mandate and even as 
invasive. . . . [A]t the same time, nothing that comes up can necessarily be ruled out of 
bounds as a potential avenue for addressing the problem” (3). Central to understanding 
the practitioner’s role here, as Hutchison goes on to explain, is to see his or her purpose 
as serving both a curing and a healing function. While curing involves “eradicat[ing] 
disease or fix[ing] a problem,” “healing is a process leading to a greater sense of 
integrity and wholeness in response to an injury or disease that occurs within the 
patient” (4). Thus, as evidenced in other articulations of whole person care, the health 
professional’s investment in the patient’s wellbeing involves fixing or addressing the 
problems that contribute to somatization (the physical expression of ‘disease’), 
whatever that might be. 
Here, in the language of whole person care, we see emerging the idea that 
medicine ought to repair the fractured wholeness of the patient; that along with 
physical disruption or disintegration comes a break in the previously integral body-self. 
In many ways, it seems that two approaches to teaching whole person care, both 
medical humanities and, within it, narrative medicine, also work to reinforce this notion 
of healthcare that heals the self or self-narrative, alongside the body.  
 
Humanistic medicine 
In the midst of the debate over paternalism and autonomy, objectification and 
empowerment, the concept of medical humanities began to emerge in the United States 
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between 1960 and 1970 (Brody 1). In 1977, the Committee on Humanizing Healthcare, 
established by the American Sociological Association, “defined ‘humanized healthcare’ 
as ‘care that enhances the dignity and autonomy of patient and health care professional 
alike,’ through treating patients as unique, whole, and autonomous persons” (qtd in 
Mishler 436). Since then, professional and scholarly voices have coalesced to articulate a 
predominant desire for medicine to move away from the current accepted system, in 
which patients are merely cases, to a mode of engagement that implements this 
humanized brand of healthcare (Brody 2, Polianski and Fangerau 121, Shapiro et. al 192-
3, Macnaughton 928). Prioritizing empathy and compassion as necessary facets of the 
doctor-patient relationship, much of the scholarship in this area revolves around 
teaching physicians-in-training how to be more ‘humane’ doctors—that is, more caring, 
more observant, and more invested than their forbearers. Presently, 69 of the 133 
accredited medical schools in the United States list required courses in the medical 
humanities, while many of the 17 Canadian medical schools have started to integrate 
elective medical humanities courses (Banaszek 1). 
Medical humanities curricula have taken a few different approaches to fulfilling 
this mandate and there is, of course, no consensus on the way in which the central goal 
of humanized healthcare ought to be achieved. For Dr. Allan Peterkin, head of the 
Program For Narrative and Humanities in Healthcare at Mount Sinai Hospital in 
Toronto, the medical humanities is as simple as “an experienced surgeon listen[ing] to 
the Mahler Second after a particularly difficult case” or a young internist asking her 
residents to discuss a poem rather than a medical case (648). Peterkin defines the 
medical humanities as a practitioner’s “exposure to literature, the fine arts, theology, 
history, philosophy and anthropology [that] broadens a doctor’s cultural competence 
and encourages the linking of both cognitive and affective approaches to the physician’s 
!! 75!
task” (648). His definition seems particularly focused on how the addition of the 
humanities to medicine allows for an increased value placed on “curiosity and the role 
of aesthetics” (Peterkin 648).  
In attempting to distill the various elements of a medical humanities approach 
like Peterkin’s, Howard Brody’s 2011 review of medical humanities education develops 
a tripartite definition that illuminates three recurring themes in scholarly discussions of 
the discipline’s role. His definition responds to an expressed uncertainty among health 
professionals, educators, and students with regards to what medical humanities means. 
Mirroring Peterkin’s definition, Brody’s notion of a robust medical humanities 
combines the three different conceptions he identifies, which include, first, medical 
humanities as a list of disciplines reflecting the ideals of a liberal arts education; second, 
medical humanities as a program of moral development, dating back to Petrarch’s 
humanistic philosophy of university education; and, third, medical humanities as a 
supportive friend, drawing on the work and life of renowned physician Sir William 
Osler, who sought the wisdom and beauty of the arts as a remedy to the emotional 
anguish of the physician’s duties (4-6).  
What Brody, Peterkin, and others of the same pedagogical persuasion fail to 
address in their definitions is the problematic popular conceptualization of medical 
humanities as ‘tacked on’ to medicine, a critique that many humanities scholars level 
against an approach that unjustifiably dismisses the value of humanities-based forms of 
inquiry within medical practice itself. Indeed, both authors seem to endorse the notion, 
critiqued by Johanna Shapiro, et al. (2009), that the scholarly pursuit of medical 
humanities should be simply a disciplinary addendum or “an intriguing sideline in the 
main project of medical education” (193). Igor Polianski and Heiner Fangerau (2012) 
cite the findings of Shapiro, et al. that a large number of medical students respond to 
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the existence of humanities courses in their degree program as “pointless, boring, 
worthless, or just plain stupid” (192). They suggest that the negative reaction to medical 
humanities stems from dominant conceptualizations of the initiative that perpetuate a 
“two cultures” dichotomy; this approach continues the debate, which emerged in the 
1960s, that polarizes scientific (hard) and humanistic (soft) educational pursuits in 
unproductive ways. They argue for a more integrated approach that simultaneously 
considers the culture and science of medicine and that is self-reflexive, rather than 
geared toward the goals that Brody identifies: liberal arts, moral development, and/or 
the mental health of the practitioner.3 
  This type of co-constructive mentality for envisioning the interaction between 
science and the humanities reflects the “Biocultures Manifesto” articulated by Lennard 
J. Davis and David B. Morris (2007) that centres around the following notion: “that the 
biological without the cultural, or the cultural without the biological, is doomed to be 
reductionist at best and inaccurate at worst” (411). Voicing what they observe to be “a 
grassroots, broadly distributed group of researchers who are treading the boundaries 
between science and the humanities,” Davis and Morris argue for the recognition of a 
community of researchers whose interpretations produce informed and engaged 
dialogue across disciplines. In this broad way, all articulations of medical humanities 
may be seen as partaking in a similar activity, however, as I have demonstrated, there 
are obviously vast differences in how each approach is conceived. Turning to explore 
the theory and practice of narrative medicine more closely, we can see how a biocultural 
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3 Schleifer and Vannatta offer a promising integrative model that uses “schema-based medicine” to 
complement evidence-based medicine and incorporate a “humanistic understanding.” One example is 
the practice of eliciting a patient’s chief concern, as well as her or his chief complaint, during the 
procedure of conducting the History and Physical Exam. 
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approach to healthcare interactions proposes to remediate an overly dominant 
biomedical approach to interpreting patients’ stories.  
 
Interpreting illness narratively 
The notion of a biocultural approach certainly resonates with the way in which 
narrative medicine has emerged within and without the medical institution. The 
narrative turn within various disciplines outside of literary studies began in the early 
1980s. At this time, practice and theory within “science and technology, philosophy, the 
human sciences, socioloinguistics, sociology, and anthropology” all began seriously to 
incorporate narrative concerns (Engel, et al. 41-2). In his chapter “Tell Me a Story: The 
Narrativist Turn in the Human Sciences” Martin Kreiswirth describes “the recent 
obsession with narrative forms of interpretation and understanding as a response to . . . 
our current climate of anti-foundationalism, poststructuralism, and/or 
postmodernism—a response, that is, to the breakdown of transcendental truth claims, 
to various overturnings or assaults on formerly hegemonic logico-deductive and 
patriarchal models of reason and knowledge” (63). Narrative, then, becomes an access 
point through which to counter and critique what Jean-François Lyotard calls master 
narratives—in the case of illness, an understanding of that experience endorsed by the 
biomedical apparatus. 
In the study of narratives of illness, within philosophy, psychology, sociology, 
medicine, and literary studies, similar concerns emerge, particularly in terms of 
understanding disease as socially and culturally constructed and illness as uniquely 
subjective. In the introduction to their edited collection, Unfitting Stories: Narrative 
Approaches to Disease, Disability, and Trauma, Valerie Raoul, et al. describe the three 
assumptions that provide common ground for the various interpretations voiced in 
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their text, assumptions that I believe guide the contemporary analysis of illness 
narratives across a broad range of humanities and social scientific disciplines: “The first 
is that disease, disability, and trauma, while often having physical or biological causes 
and effects, are socially and psychologically constructed and part of a life story which 
changes because of them. The second is that the exchange of stories is central to 
treatment, therapy, and advocacy for change. The third is that the stories exchanged 
(whether medical or personal, in the form of aesthetic or didactic accounts) are 
governed by cultural metanarratives that vary according to time, place, and socio-
political context” (5). The editors highlight a decidedly postmodernist understanding of 
illness narratives (whether spoken or written) as simultaneously constructing and 
constructed by an individual’s personal life circumstances, psychology, and 
sociocultural environment, but also influenced by the wider cultural narratives which 
dictate the discursive and generic constraints of storytelling. Sociologist Arthur Frank 
also points out that our storytelling is conditioned by the “rhetorical expectations that 
the storyteller has been internalizing ever since he first heard some relative describe an 
illness or she saw her first television commercial for a non-prescription remedy, or he 
was instructed to ‘tell the doctor what hurts’ and had to figure out what counted as the 
story that the doctor wanted to hear” (Wounded Storyteller 3). These expectations are 
generic ones, defined by Carolyn Miller as recurring rhetorical situations, which 
become solidified and sometimes adapted as they are repeated. Recognizing the 
presence of these rhetorical demands is also key to understanding how our 
interpretation of experience, through its representation in narrative, participates in 
various different discourses about the body. 
While narrators rely on certain generic conventions that are socially and 
culturally authorized, illness narrative as personal expression or testimony within a 
!! 79!
medical encounter, argues Anne Hunsaker Hawkins, “returns the voice of the patient to 
the world of medicine, a world where that voice is too rarely heard, and it does so in 
such a way as to assert the phenomenological, the subjective, and the experiential side 
of illness” (12). Hawkins terms this type of narrative “pathography,” a form of 
storytelling that “restores the person ignored or canceled out in the medical enterprise, 
[placing] that person at the very center” (12). Similarly to Hawkins, Frank, in his text 
The Wounded Storyteller, argues that individual accounts of personal illness can serve as 
a form of postcolonial emancipation from the medical colonization of the body and of 
bodily experience: “As a post-colonial voice, the storyteller seeks to reclaim her own 
experience of suffering. As she seeks to turn that suffering into testimony, the storyteller 
engages in moral action. The themes of body, voice, and illness culminate in the ethics 
made uniquely possible in postmodern times” (18). The moral action to which Frank 
refers points to the way in which storytelling engages both teller and listener in a space 
that is “for the other,” the teller in offering forth her experience as a model or guide, and 
the listener in bearing witness (Wounded Storyteller 18).  
Frank, in attempting to describe illness as actually necessitating narrative suggests 
that this experience is “a call for stories”; these stories are uniquely embodied narratives 
in the sense that they arise as a response to the phenomenological experience of illness. 
Frank identifies three different types of stories that illness sufferers tell: chaos 
narratives, restitution narratives, and quest narratives. Describing experiences which 
have not yet (or may never) take on the formal elements of an Aristotelian narrative, 
“chaos stories are antinarratives in that they are told from within dehumanized time—
time without order and thus without meaning” (213). According to Frank, the act of 
narrating an experience through tropes such as restitution or quest “humanizes the 
chaos of what has happened to [the patient]” (213). Thus, illness narratives function as 
!! 80!
empowering devices that allow “the ill,” as he refers to them, to “transform fate into 
experience”—to voice the bodily trauma and suffering of illness in a way that gives it 
meaning: that forms “empathic bonds” between teller and listener and thus has the 
potential to heal both self and other (xii). While restitution narratives, he argues, take 
up the dominant discourse of the medical establishment and its goal to return the body-
self to the “normal” state of functioning that preceded illness, quest narratives may be 
more productive for the ways in which they configure the experience of illness as a 
transformative process that ideally leads to a new identity, one which may depart 
significantly from an individual’s past sense of self (prior to illness). 
Throughout The Wounded Storyteller, Frank asserts a unique relationship or 
productive pairing between illness and storytelling, based on a few key arguments. 
First, he suggests that illness presents a unique opportunity to enter into the dyad of 
storyteller and listener, since the experience of illness facilitates a more acute receptivity 
to others’ suffering and a greater capacity for empathy. He argues that this is true in the 
case of illness “because the ill person is immersed in a suffering that is both wholly 
individual—my pain is mine alone—but also shared: the ill person sees others around 
her, before and after her, who have gone through this same illness and suffered their 
own wholly particular pains. She sees others who are pained by her pain” (36). Second, 
serious illness “is a call for stories” because being seriously ill causes damage to the 
suffering individual’s sense of identity, her life plan, and her illusion of both control 
and self-directedness. The sense of a whole narrative that connects past, present, and 
future becomes according to Frank, citing philosopher David Carr, disrupted, “as illness 
dislocates the relation of this whole: the present is not what the past was supposed to 
lead to, and whatever future will follow this present is contingent” (60). According to 
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Frank, narrative functions reparatively as “a way of redrawing maps and finding new 
destinations” (53). 
 
Narrative medicine 
Narratives of illness exist all around us, mostly outside of the clinical setting 
where they attain medical corroboration: in exchanges between friends and family 
members, or between sometimes-anonymous strangers in online forums; in 
newspapers, magazines, blogs, radio, television, and film; in published personal 
memoirs; in unpublished, private forms. The narrative turn within medicine theorizes 
that the richness of detail and meaning offered by an individual’s personal account of 
illness has the power to present a holistic view of his or her health, by illuminating the 
various biopsychosocial concerns of a more ‘humane’ medicine I discussed earlier. 
Various scholars across disciplines have contributed to this narrative turn, including 
most notably physician and philosopher Howard Brody, physician and anthropologist 
Arthur Kleinman, literary scholar Kathryn Montgomery Hunter, sociologist Arthur 
Frank, philosopher Hilde Lindemann Nelson, occupational therapist and 
anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly, and physician and literary scholar Rita Charon, to 
name a few. 
Drawing on this and other scholarship, narrative medicine or narrative health 
care is a disciplinary movement and healing approach—what John D. Engel, et al. call 
“both a philosophy of care and a set of skills” (54)—that emerged in conjunction with 
medical humanities in the early 1980s (Charon 4). Generally, these approaches to 
medicine take up the mandate expressed by Engel, et al. in Narrative in Health Care 
(2008) to 
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[stake] out a fundamental position on the relationship among sickness, life stories, 
and personal identity. With this ontology in place, narrative health care supports 
particular enactments of patient-physician encounters and overcomes barriers 
between patients and practitioners through emphasizing narrative features of 
care/caring and by encouraging the development and enactment of narrative 
competence in a variety of health care contexts. (55, original emphasis) 
One of the earliest articulations of the narrative nature of medicine comes from 
Howard Brody in his 1987 text Stories of Sickness, in which he argues that storytelling is 
a central aspect of medicine, the repression of which has instantiated the endemic 
inattention to personal psychosocial considerations as an essential component of 
healing (2-5). He goes on to argue that there is no single way of understanding illness 
through a biopsychosocial model, instead “showing how important the specific details 
(the story of sickness) are to any meaningful comprehension of the impact of sickness 
on the person” (Brody 144). Brody highlights the power of the physician, because of his 
or her specialized knowledge and authoritative social position, “to construct stories and 
to persuade others that these stories are the true stories of illness” (182). To do so in a 
respectful and compassionate way, he argues, healthcare practitioners must be trained 
to be open to and accepting of personal, subjective stories about illness told by 
healthcare seekers, a capacity that he believes the study of literature provides access to 
(183). In Brody’s words, “physicians can properly exercise that power only when they 
attend carefully to the stories their patients tell them and engage them in meaningful 
conversation, within the broader context of the range of life stories made available to us 
by our society and culture” (182). 
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Since the discussion of literature and medicine began with the work of Brody and 
others in the 1980s, many implementations of narrative healthcare have emerged.4 I will 
focus here on one of its most popular articulations, that being Rita Charon’s Program in 
Narrative Medicine at Columbia University Medical Center. Charon, a medical doctor 
and professor of medicine who also holds a doctorate in English literature, views the 
narration of illness within the clinic as a therapeutic and diagnostic tool for physicians, 
rather than exclusively for patients. Her work in Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories 
of Illness, which describes the theoretical and practical basis for the Program in 
Narrative Medicine, pays particular attention to the rhetorical expectations and 
interpretive frameworks that determine how illness narratives are created and received. 
Charon’s narrative medicine prioritizes the skills of “recognizing, absorbing, 
interpreting, and being moved by stories of illness” (4). It intervenes in the traditionally 
“impersonal, calculating” encounter to infuse the interaction between practitioner and 
patient with a higher degree of empathy, based on the assumption that “only when the 
doctor understands to some extent what his or her patient goes through can medical 
care proceed with humility, trustworthiness, and respect” (3).  
For Charon, narrative knowledge balances out the universalizing tendencies of 
scientific and epidemiological knowledge by facilitating a means by which to 
understand individual experience (10). In this model, the health professional takes on 
the role of Homer’s seer Calchas, who looks for subtle hints in the storyteller’s words, 
“notic[ing] metaphors, images, allusions to other stories, genre, mood—the kinds of 
things that literary critics recognize in novels or poems,”5 in order to interpret, 
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4 See: Engel et. al,  Narrative in Health Care; Schleifer and Vannatta, The Chief Concern of Medicine; Harter, 
Japp, and Beck, Narratives, Health, and Healing. 
5 These observations are also central to a psychotherapist’s assessment of patient stories, a connection that 
would be worth exploring in future analyses of narrative medicine theory and practice. 
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comprehensively, the scene of illness (66). Charon argues that the healthcare seeker’s 
storytelling before a health professional constitutes an autobiographical act; that the 
narrative produced by such a telling can, and should, be read by the listener as a 
literary text. In this context, the practitioner is “the interpreter of these accounts of 
events of illness that are, by definition, unruly and elusive” (5). Importantly, a skillful 
approach to narrative medicine involves the clinician’s ability to select the appropriate 
interpretative lens to read “a particular text or patient—for example, some texts need a 
forgiving reader instead of a skeptical one, and some patients need an authoritarian 
doctor instead of a collegial one. . . . The reader adopts his or her readerly stance toward 
the work—based in part on the makeup and behavior of the narrator but also based on 
the reader’s own makeup and behavior. . . .” (110). Charon’s attention to this point 
throughout the text is largely examined through the model of intersubjectivity, and her 
desire to promote medicine as “an ongoing intersubjective commitment in the face of 
vulnerability and trust” (215). This intersubjectivity is the defining element in the 
doctor-patient interaction that, she says, allows genuine understanding and empathy to 
arise.  
Differently from Frank and other scholars who explore the varied narratives that 
patients, themselves, construct in response to the trauma of illness, Charon and other 
proponents of narrative medicine present narrative analysis and creation as a valuable 
exercise for health practitioners. She explains, 
narrative medicine—and its cousins literature-and-medicine, relationship-centered 
care, patient-centered care, and the like—has developed means of encouraging 
clinicians to represent more fully what they learn about patients and about 
themselves. This new kind of writing . . . is not bound by the conventions of the 
hospital chart. It allows for the “I” of the writing subject. . . . What I have called the 
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‘Parallel Chart’ is an example of this kind of narrative activity—writing done in 
nontechnical language that captures the personal and metaphorical dimensions of 
meaning, for both the sick person and those caring for the sick person. (149) 
She argues that attention to the multifaceted elements of a patient’s clinical story is not 
fully achieved until it becomes manifested in representation—that is, through the use of 
a “Parallel Chart” to facilitate the act of reflective or creative writing on the part of 
health professionals. In this way, narrative meaning making can be instrumentalized in 
the service of clinical results. 
Interestingly, in the creation of a Parallel Chart, the patient’s story becomes 
rearticulated or interpreted through the authorial lens of the physician in the same way 
that the medical chart interprets a patient’s story through a medical lens. Indeed, the 
goal of such an exercise is to permit the physician space to understand the patient in a 
more holistic way; however, the patient’s story in this scenario becomes, 
problematically, appropriated by the medical authority figure. A more democratized 
approach to patient care might conceive of a “Parallel Chart” that is authored by the 
patient, himself or herself. While techniques, such as the ones proposed in Charon’s 
version of narrative medicine, aim to renegotiate the relationship between doctor and 
patient by honouring the personhood of the healthcare seeker, the conceptualization of 
the “patient” as, in some way, more vulnerable or less vital than the doctor, continues to 
persist. I will elaborate on this point, below, by analyzing the language used to 
construct the healthcare seeker in medical humanities literature. 
 
Humane medicine / humanistic medicine: the rhetoric of rupture and repair 
As discussed, both medical humanism and its sibling, narrative medicine, have 
attempted to intervene in a situation of dehumanized, depersonalized healthcare, 
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simultaneously with allopathic medicine’s search for a more holistic 
‘biopsychosociospiritual’ approach to understanding the functioning of the body-self. 
Despite the various ways in which medical humanities, as an emergent set of 
disciplines, is construed, one consistent thread that I argue seems to run through the 
various ways of understanding the project for more ‘humanized’ healthcare, is the way 
in which the individual at the heart of the question—the patient—is conceptualized. A 
literature review of the scholarship on medical humanities and narrative medicine—
whether endorsing, justifying, or criticizing its inclusion in medical curricula—reveals 
that articles on the topic frequently begin with a reactionary approach that sees the 
figure of the “whole person” as the ideal antidote to the traditional objectification, 
dehumanization, and powerlessness of the patient. M. G. Kidd and J. T. H. Connor, for 
one, worry that “without a humanist perspective, a patient might easily be 
represented—and treated—atomistically, as no more than a collection of organs and 
systems” (46). Along the same lines, Alan Petersen et al. note that in North America and 
the UK, “the medical humanities are conventionally seen to redress a deficit in 
medicine” (2). This deficit, observes Jill Gordon results from the “relentless 
reductionism of the biomedical sciences. . . . History, philosophy, and sociology,” she 
notes, “warn that the person with the disease is all too easily reduced to the non-
hygienic, non-rational, disordered ‘other’” (5).  
Following from these observations, medical humanities professor Jane 
Macnaughton suggests that the movement is—or should be—focused on systemic 
change. The medical humanities field emerged “as a result of a growing sense that there 
was something inadequate about medicine’s understanding of the human” (927). 
Macnaughton argues that despite challenging “depersonalization and molecular 
reductionism,” medical humanities have not sufficiently infiltrated medical teaching or 
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practice to achieve a more productive conceptual model of the human (930). The 
reimagination of the patient, these scholars note, must begin with a more robust, holistic 
understanding of the individual that extends beyond the physical markers of disease to 
account for the ‘whole person,’ an entity composed of idiosyncratic biological, genetic, 
emotional, psychological, social, and cultural aspects, and possessing highly subjective 
experiences of disease. 
McGill University medical faculty Helen Mc Namara and J. Donald Boudreau 
observe that whole person care requires skills generally fostered by a humanities 
education, and involves meeting all physical, psychological, and spiritual needs. In this 
model, 
healing involves reconciliation of the meaning(s) an individual ascribes to 
distressing events within his or her perception of personal integrity and 
‘wholeness.’ This suggests that suffering may be associated with ‘disrupted 
wholeness.’ Whole person care is not limited to only what the physician sees; it 
must also strive to peer into the suffering patient’s arrested, progressing, or 
otherwise evolving sense of self and wholeness. (Mc Namara and Boudreau 191) 
Similarly, in his introduction to the edited collection Whole Person Care, Tom A. 
Hutchison writes that the healing side of the medical encounter, which must be taught 
to future doctors, involves “a process leading to a greater sense of integrity and 
wholeness in response to an injury or disease that occurs within the patient” (4). 
Likewise, Moira Stewart, professor of family medicine at the University of Western 
Ontario highlights the role of doctors in “help[ing] patients put the fragments of their 
lives back together into a whole” and stresses the importance of medical teaching that 
“avoid[s] the reductionist perspective of breaking down caring into minute skills and 
behaviours without also re-integrating the parts into a whole” (793, 799). 
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The rhetoric of restored human wholeness as the ultimate goal of the medical 
intervention also seeps into proposed practical applications of narrative analysis within 
medicine. As I explained previously, understanding and interpreting illness through 
narrative has come increasingly to structure the ways in which health practitioners are 
encouraged to know healthcare seekers as complex, individuated persons. While plenty 
of scholarship speaks to the theoretical benefits of engaging with patients through 
applied modes of narrative analysis, there is little discussion about the way in which 
patients’ narratives within a clinical setting—despite their potential to infuse diagnosis 
and treatment with a more multifaceted perspective of the individual—nonetheless 
become medical objects, which continue to be instrumentalized in the service of 
understanding pathology. In this way, narratives, like bodies, are scoured for signs of 
pathology that are then diagnosed as causes or symptoms of the physical lesion. This 
situation is starkly illuminated by writing on illness narrative and narrative medicine, 
which consistently regards the ‘brokenness’ of the healthcare seeker’s narrative as 
pathological, as a sign of the fragmented body-self; both of these—fragmented story 
and fragmented body—fall under the purview of the medical intervention, which 
becomes aimed at repair. The danger inherent within medicine’s appropriation of an 
oversimplified form of narrative analysis, I argue below, stems from the potential for 
narrative to be integrated as simply another set of diagnostic criteria within an 
inescapably biomedical model. 
In line with the larger project of medical humanities, a fixation on protecting or 
restoring the wholeness of the healthcare seeker is overwhelmingly apparent in the 
literature on narrative medicine. The notion of illness as precipitating narrative rupture 
and a call for narrative repair is perhaps foregrounded in Frank’s writing in The 
Wounded Storyteller, the influence of which can be seen in subsequent literature 
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promoting narrative medicine techniques. For the most part, Frank’s argument is 
productively directed toward thinking about illness storytelling as a therapeutic, but 
also a political tool, which asserts subjective, creative, interpretive ownership over one’s 
own experience, much in the way that many patient activists currently assert this 
ownership in online spaces for narrating disease experience. However, in suggesting 
that the restitution of narrative wholeness through storytelling about personal illness 
experience can lead to ‘humanization,’ Frank’s work in The Wounded Storyteller also 
makes a number of uninterrogated assumptions about ‘normal’ bodies and experiences 
as juxtaposed against ‘ill’ or suffering or remissional (those who “were effectively well 
but could never be considered cured” (8)) bodies and experiences.  
Bluntly stated, I see a central contradiction in Frank’s reliance on the idea of the 
illness story as that which creates or reintroduces wholeness (or a sense of coherence) in 
an individual’s life. The argument for a return to wholeness during or after illness 
simply reinforces the values and narrative framework of a biomedical discourse that 
Frank wishes expressly to complicate. Indeed, even the quest narrative, supposedly a 
critical revision of the limiting restitution narrative, seems predisposed to an 
understanding of illness experience as an overcoming of fragmentation and chaos in 
favour of a restoration of wholeness (synonymous here with ‘health’ or ‘normalcy’). The 
idea of a coherent life narrative, itself, is absurd and Frank, himself, even points this out 
when he cites Mill’s acknowledgment “that even for the healthy person, ‘the narrative 
coherence of events and actions’ is never ‘simply a “given” for us. Rather it is a constant 
task, sometimes a struggle, and when it succeeds it is an achievement’” (60). I think this 
idea is central to the major problem with Frank’s argument, that being his assumption 
that ‘normal’ (read: illness-free) life experience is narratively coherent as opposed to the 
‘chaos narrative’ of illness. It relies on a romanticization of the healthy life, and, 
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simultaneously, what one might call a ‘pathologization’ of the narrative of the ill 
person. 
Indeed, there is also a risk, in subjecting a healthcare seeker’s narrative to 
medical scrutiny, that the very diagnosis of a narrative as broken could in some sense 
medicalize or pathologize any “broken narrative,” regardless of its status as a 
nonmedical problem. Preliminary evidence of such a tendency can be seen in the edited 
collection Health, Illness, and Culture: Broken Narratives, by Lars-Christer Hydén and Jens 
Brockmeier, in which (even as suggested by the title), the fragmentation, brokenness, or 
incoherence of narratives in various life spheres, including clinical experiences, but also 
the trauma narratives of 9/11 witnesses (Brockmeier), parents’ narratives about lost 
infants (Frank), and break-up narratives (Hydén), are all framed within the overarching 
disciplinary focus of illness and narrative (Hydén and Brockmeier, “Introduction” 1). 
The collection exhibits a tendency to view the narrative break or rupture as problematic, 
abnormal, and even dangerous, a tendency that idealizes the conversely unproblematic, 
unbroken narrative.  
In a chapter from the same collection, written by Lars-Christer Hydén and 
entitled “Broken and Vicarious Voices in Narratives,” the author asks the important 
question—one that is certainly not considered frequently enough in theories of 
narrative medicine that operate on the assumption of a normatively communicative 
healthcare seeker—“what happens in situations where the teller or author has some 
form of communicative disability leading to an inability to fulfill the roles of teller of the 
story, and narrator and character in the story? In short, what happens when we are 
unable to tell stories?” (38). While Hydén seems initially interested in critiquing 
normative assumptions about the act of narrative creation, most of his chapter revolves 
around how the “broken” authorial voice, which results from “diseases or injuries of 
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the central nervous system” or the psychological inability to “[maintain] memories, 
perceptions, and experiences,” becomes articulated through a “vicarious authorial 
voice” (40). The chapter discusses the breakdown in narrative ability as a symptom of 
disease or disability, such that Hydén terms those persons incapable of independently 
constructing an autobiographical story as “narratively disabled” (50). However, I would 
argue that in discussions of narratives of illness or disability within the field of medical 
humanities, narrative disability is presented as an outcome of any kind of biomedical 
complaint. And, indeed, in the collection I have referenced above, narrative disability is 
also produced as a condition of various nonmedical experiences and presented as a sign 
of abnormality or deviance. In both cases, as disability is always, in part, socially and 
culturally produced, narrative disability is constructed through social, cultural, and 
even medical expectations of narrative coherence that correspond to a normative 
understanding of communicative proficiency (including, perhaps, the way in which 
narratives within the clinical space are expected to take on the rather inaccessible and 
exclusive terminology and epistemological structures of biomedicine). 
 Through the disability studies lens employed above, we might see how the 
perception of illness narratives as broken ones, in some senses, authorizes the 
stigmatization of illness as a deviant experience, that is only amplified by the framing of 
the ill person’s narrated experience as inadequate or fractured. It seems, also, to obscure 
the role of the listener in constructing a coherent story; indeed, the absence of an 
empathetic, invested, intuitive, active, or accommodating listener (or social/cultural 
space) actively disables the narrator and his or her narrative. In a productive way, 
Charon’s account depicts the doctor as, not just a medical expert, but also a perceptive 
humanist who hears a fragmented, chaotic story and works with the patient-teller to 
produce meaning. She explains, “We clinicians donate ourselves as meaning-making 
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vessels to the patient who tells of his or her situation; we act almost as ventriloquists to 
give voice to that which the patient emits. I put it that way because the patient cannot 
always tell, in logical or organized language, that which must be told. Instead, these 
messages come to us through the patient’s words, silences, gestures, facial expressions, 
and bodily postures as well as physical findings, diagnostic images, and laboratory 
measurements, and it is our task to cohere these different and sometimes contradictory 
sources of information so as to create at least provisional meaning” (132). Here, Charon 
explains the unavoidable way in which a clinician exerts influence upon the clinical 
narrative that gets voiced and, separately, the one that gets heard. She also, however, 
perhaps unintentionally exposes the ways in which narratives attain coherence and 
validation within the clinical space—that is, through the discourse of biomedicine, a 
meticulous, specialized language of which the practitioner, and, typically, not the 
healthcare seeker, has attained professional mastery. 
To return to the central thread of my argument, the expectations of narrative and 
body-self wholeness, congruent with liberal humanist values of autonomy, bodily 
integrity, and self-determination are central to the narrative that Frank and other 
medical humanists believe must be constructed around illness in order for the self to 
remain stable. In his analysis of the various ways of understanding sickness as a 
phenomenological experience, Brody points to the tendency to view illness as a break in 
our experience of self; “if sickness leads us to see our bodies as being something foreign, 
thwarting our wills by their intransigence and unmanageability, then sickness has . . . 
introduced a sense of split and disruption where formerly unity reigned” (27). This 
understanding views illness as “an ontological assault, affecting our very being and not 
simply our activities” (29). While he disagrees with this assessment, stating instead that 
this reflects, specifically, Eric Cassell’s enumeration of suffering (which is not necessarily 
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coterminous with illness), this same perspective of illness as ontological assault is 
expressed elsewhere in the scholarship on narrative medicine, for example, by Engel, et 
al. in Narrative in Health Care. In their discussion of what they curiously term the 
“narrative features of the patient,” the authors explain, 
the person seeking care from the health care practitioner often approaches this 
relationship with some degree of brokenness or vulnerability, and in search of 
healing. Characteristically, such an individual has experienced disruption of 
what Bruner describes as the canonical baseline state of affairs in her life, typically 
as a result of illness or injury. . . . [The patient] approaches the caregiver with 
hope for redress in order that the state of affairs in her life might be restored, and 
that the plot of her life story might be reconstituted. . . . In the search for healing, 
the patient seeks to return to wholeness and a normal life, so far as that is 
possible. . . . The disintegrating force of crisis or illness in one’s life must be 
addressed in ways that restore the integrity of one’s living, as well as one’s 
meaning. (94-5) 
Engel et al. suggest here, and throughout their text, that the illness narrative is a 
primary source for understanding the person seeking care, but also a strategic locus for 
intervening in and repairing the disrupted integrity of the narrator’s body-self. 
 A similar perspective is put forth in a recent Journal of Medical Humanities article 
entitled “An Anatomy of Illness” by David Biro, a clinical professor of dermatology. 
Biro provides an account of illness as an individual and social experience, emphasizing 
the status of illness as a wholly negative process—something that alienates us from our 
bodies, selves, and society, as “a part of the body [becomes] abnormal and compromises 
the integrity of the whole” (44). Lamenting the separation of “the ill” from the rest of 
society, and the “silence that has for the most part been imposed on them by the 
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outside, healthy world and that has prevented doctors and caregivers and policy 
makers from fully understanding and responding to their needs,” Biro argues that both 
society at large and physicians, themselves, have a responsibility to engage more 
compassionately and with greater awareness to the needs of “the ill” (52). Specifically, 
this must involve practices of narrative medicine, starting with a realization that “. . . we 
can’t heal patients with surgery and chemotherapy alone. We must also repair their 
broken selves and broken connections to the world. Most patients need strategies to 
cope with the uncertainties of illness, to find hope in desperate situations, to bolster 
their vulnerable egos, to remake their self-narratives, and to alleviate their loneliness” 
(53). And yet, confoundingly, the majority of Biro’s essay perpetuates the very isolating, 
ostracizing, reductive language that he critiques as stigmatizing the experience of 
illness. The question I can’t help but ask when I read this and other generalizations 
about the capacity for illness to break all aspects of a once-healthy life is, How does a 
characterization of illness as an exceptional state in which, both an individual’s 
personhood and body become fractured (and, thus, become markers of deviance), in 
any way help to put forward a more nuanced, compassionate, and empowering image 
of illness experience? 
 Admittedly, on the surface, it seems slightly absurd to suggest that the 
wholeness of the suffering individual—a goal supported by the long legacy of liberal 
humanism that infuses our understanding of human wellness—is an unproductive goal 
for medicine to cling to. I certainly do not mean to suggest that respect for an 
individual’s sense of personal ‘normalcy,’ based on her life needs, expectations, and 
goals, as well as her apprehension of what it means to live the good life, is a misguided 
focus for medicine. I believe that medicine is inextricable from these social, cultural, and 
highly individual conditions and must necessarily answer to them. The problem, I 
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argue, is in constructing this type of care—care that sees the individual as not merely a 
medical object, but a complex assemblage of interacting entities and forces—through 
the language of wholeness. This value system is just one frame, and perhaps a reductive 
one, through which to conceptualize the human subject, and specifically the one 
experiencing illness.  
Importantly, Charon takes pains in Narrative Medicine to develop an 
understanding of patients as those who, far from broken-down, “enter whole—with 
their bodies, lives, families, beliefs, values, histories, hopes for the future—into sickness 
and healing, and their efforts to get better or to help others get better cannot be 
fragmented away from the deepest parts of their lives. In parts, this wholeness is 
reflected in—if not produced by—the simple and complicated stories they tell to one 
another, whether in medical interviews, late-night emergency telephone calls, or the 
wordless rituals of the physical exam” (12). However, while Charon avoids the 
problematic insinuation that those with illnesses live fractured lives that reflect 
normatively-scripted instances of deviance, arguing instead that the integrity and 
selfhood of the individual persist in spite of illness, just as much as the aforementioned 
writers, she relies on the notion of a de facto originary wholeness—the very idea that 
introduces the trouble of ability/disability in the first place.  
I am particularly concerned, here, with the tyrannical way in which wholeness—
allegedly ruptured by a crisis that affects first bodily integrity and then the integrity of 
the self (psychic, social, etc.)—becomes the central goal of humanistic medicine, the 
frame through which biomedicine recasts personal illness narrative. Certainly, Frank, 
Charon, and other medical humanists are eager to admit that, in Charon’s words, 
“human beings do not become—or create—themselves in autonomous and deracinated 
acts of will but instead develop over time in concert with others. Postmodernism’s 
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fragmentation here gives way to a quilt-unity of virtual wholeness made up of disparate 
but interweavable pieces” (75). And yet, they are all equally eager to elevate the status 
of the ‘whole person’—a virtual wholeness that Charon acknowledges—to the primary 
concern of a more ethical medical practice. My central question revolves around the 
possibility that a humanized understanding of the healthcare seeker is, conversely, 
threatened by the notion of a whole person. 
 
Eve Ensler’s broken narrative 
In this section of the chapter, I am concerned with critiquing the attitude within 
medical practice that views storytelling in the clinical setting as an opportunity to assert 
control over, not just a medicalized body, but, now, a medically appropriated life 
narrative. This approach to understanding healthcare seekers’ experiences, one that 
emphasizes the binary framework of broken versus unbroken, ill versus healthy 
narratives, seems radically divorced from the ways in which individuals speak about, 
write about, and think narratively about their own journeys with illness. Eve Ensler’s 
memoir In the Body of the World beautifully illuminates the way in which her illness 
experience cannot be extricated from the rest of her life story any more than it can be 
told in a way that reflects the orderly, structured, coherent narrative that Frank believes 
individuals must create in order to make sense of illness or to restore past wholeness. 
The memoir consists of fifty-three chapters that Ensler calls “scans.” Some present 
single memories of cancer or childhood, others are merely lists, such as “Here’s What’s 
Gone” or “Chemo Day Five,” and still others describe individuals from Ensler’s cancer 
journey, or from her work as a women’s rights activist in the Congo. While the reader 
may discern a loosely linear story of her cancer journey, the memoir is far from a tidy, 
organized retelling of her diagnosis, treatment, and survival. Instead, Ensler suggests, 
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“This book is like a CAT scan—a roving examination—capturing images, experiences, 
ideas all of which began in my body. Scanning is somehow the only way I could tell this 
story. Being cut open, catheterized, chemofied, drugged, pricked, punctured, probed, 
and ported made a traditional narrative impossible. Once you are diagnosed with 
cancer, time changes. It both speeds up insanely and stops altogether. It all happened 
fast. Seven months. Impressions. Scenes. Light beams. Scans” (9). The disorderly and 
disjointed time of cancer cannot meaningfully be translated into a form that reconciles 
the experience with a coherent life narrative. Instead, Ensler struggles with the various 
frustrations, confusions, suppositions, and rationalizations that arise as she attempts to 
fit this fate into a grand, overarching narrative of her life. Her scan entitled “How’d I 
Get It?” helps to illuminate her search for an appropriate way to understand the 
seemingly senseless appearance of cancer in her body, cycling through her own worries 
and paranoia about past mistakes and regrets, as well as the cultural myths that so 
stubbornly cling to our understandings of cancer. The scan consists of a series of 
questions:  
Was it tofu?  
Was it failing at marriage twice?  
Was it never having babies?  
Was it having an abortion and a miscarriage?  
Was it talking too much about vaginas?  
Was it worry every day for fifty-seven years that I wasn’t good enough?  
. . .  
Was it the city?  
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Was it the line of two hundred women repeated in hundreds of small towns for 
many years after each performance, after each speech, women lined up to show 
me their scars, wounds, warrior tattoos?  
Was it suburban lawn pesticides?  
. . .  
Was it my father dying slowly and never calling to say good-bye?  
. . .  
Was it bad reviews?  
Or good reviews?  
Was it being reviewed?  
Was it sleeping with men who were married?  
. . .  
Was it Froot Loops?  
. . .  
Not being breast-fed?  
Canned chop suey?  
TV dinners?  
. . .  
Was it in my blood?  
Was it already decided?  
. . .  
Was it that I didn’t cry enough?  
Or cried too much?  
. . .  
Was it not enough boundaries?  
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Was it too many walls? (54-7) 
Throughout the rest of the text, Ensler tries on some of these various lenses for focusing 
the perspective of her illness narrative, failing ever to choose just one as she reflects on 
the physical process of her body’s transformation through cancer, which is at the same 
time an emotionally volatile and transformative process. Each moment brings a new 
assemblage of reminiscences, changes, relationships, emotions, gifts, and challenges 
that combine to make Ensler’s articulation of a narrative entirely different in each 
“scan”; in documenting her imbrication in these mutating webs, she reveals how there 
is no single way to tell her story, no single narrative trope through which to string 
together a series of discrete but interconnected events. To my mind, this is the major 
revelation of her book, a way of articulating the complexity of the individual life that 
finds itself contending with a cancer diagnosis, the life that becomes no less 
multifaceted, messy, and complex through the experience of cancer and its telling. 
 While Ensler’s memoir is certainly written at least partially in the sense that 
Frank understands illness narrative, that is, as a way of making sense of her experience 
with cancer, her diagnosis does not enter the picture of her life as a narrative crack that 
disrupts the serene, stable wholeness of her life pre-diagnosis. Instead, she presents 
herself as one already divided, already traumatized, already scarred, already broken 
(as, indeed, we all are in some way). She is a survivor of childhood sexual abuse, but 
she still carries the guilt and shame of this trauma, a hungering for human connection 
that is never properly satisfied and the feeling of having been exiled from her own body 
(1). She has made a career traversing the globe in pursuit of other women’s stories of 
abuse and suffering, a career that landed her in the midst of the Congolese civil war, 
wherein extreme violence—systematic rape and torture in the pursuit of minerals and 
wealth—continues to be waged on the bodies of women and children (4-5). Carrying 
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the burden of these stories of violence alongside her own, she understands the Congo as 
having thrown her “deep into the crisis of the world”—the end of the body, the end of 
humanity (7). At the same time, her cancer throws her into the crisis of her own body—
a body from which she has been radically dissociated (7). As she, herself, writes, these 
two crises merge in her narrative because they are, indeed, inextricable from the way in 
which she has experienced her life and positioned herself in relation to the world 
around her. I would suggest that, while she does not set these two crises up as analogies 
for one another—her heady and complex treatment of both carefully highlights the 
particularities of each situation, such that a simple body-as-microcosm interpretation 
does little justice to her work—instead, Ensler’s narrative presupposes that these life 
experiences cannot be easily or, at all, disentangled. 
If there is any overarching way in which Ensler articulates this narrative of her 
life experience during a time of cancer, it is simply to focus on that experience as 
“messy, evolving, surprising, [and] out-of-control” (89) in a way that, for once, allows 
her to see herself as belonging to, with, and in a messy and chaotic world. In many 
ways, the time during which Ensler ‘battles’ cancer (she, too, is skeptical of this 
problematic metaphor), is rich and fulfilling in ways that do not get discussed in the 
oftentimes reductive narratives that circulate in our mainstream cultural spaces. 
Interestingly, we see how, in a completely realistic and unromanticized way, Ensler is 
transformed by her experience with cancer, an experience that, she says, turns her for 
that time into all “body, body, body” (7): 
There is something about the exhaustion of being poisoned, of your body fighting 
off the attack or just surviving the attack. There is something about being clutched, 
clenched, chemoed that is so deeply strenuous and catastrophic that it takes you to 
a mystical place where you are so deeply inside your body, inside the inside of the 
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cavern that is your body, so deep inside that you scrape the bottom of the world. 
That is where I began this burning meditation on love. (162) 
Against a backdrop of failed romantic relationships, and sexual abuse by her father, all 
of which formed for her a detached and sterile understanding of what love should be—
“something you succeeded or failed at” (163)—Ensler sees a new “alchemic dance” 
happening around her: “It was MC cooking me soft-boiled eggs at 5:00 a.m. to calm my 
stomach, Amy who I hardly knew stopping by unexpectedly to rub my feet, Susan 
appearing in my hospital room, my son sleeping on my couch, Nico coming from Italy 
for an entire month and turning my loft into a summer ashram . . . ,” and so on; “this 
daily, subtle, simple gathering of kindnesses, stretched out across the chemo days and 
months was, in fact, love. Love. Why hadn’t I known this was love?” (164-5). Indeed, 
the love that Ensler begins to perceive, profoundly, all around her helps to position the 
experience of serious illness as very much within the realm of ‘normal’ human 
experience. While the caregivers and friends she honours in this passage have always 
been present, caring for her in various ways throughout her life, it is only through the 
apprehension of her own vulnerability and the membrane of care that she begins to see 
forming through the understanding of that vulnerability as a shared experience, that 
Ensler truly sees this phenomenon for what it is. 
I am discussing Ensler’s narrative approach at length here because I believe that 
it productively complicates some of the assumptions that Frank, and others following 
his formulation of narrative medicine, have not adequately questioned. For one, 
Ensler’s experience with cancer—the during, not the after—not that mythical “return to 
wholeness” of the survivor—actually reconnects her with a body from which she has 
been dissociated due to a violent and gaping tear in the social fabric of her life, a tear 
that also disrupts her emotional life and hurls her down a path of self-destructive 
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behaviors including substance abuse, anorexia, and sexual promiscuity. This is the tear 
caused by repeated incestuous rape. Cancer, she says, brings her back to her body and 
to the meaning of real connection in her life.  
Certainly, her memoir is about violence and trauma, as well. Much of Ensler’s 
writing is dedicated to the exploration of holes—the physical ones that relate to her 
biological experience of cancer, such as the chemo port and the stoma, but also (and 
perhaps more urgently so) the holes that rupture “the social membrane” around her. 
The metaphor of the hole is best represented by a reality made clear to Ensler through 
her work in the Congo, that is the staggering incidence of rape-induced vaginal fistulae 
among Congolese women; she writes, “so many thousands of women have suffered 
fistulas from rape that the injury is considered a crime of combat” (42). Speaking about 
the perverse political and social circumstances that make this reality possible, Ensler 
goes on to meditate on the way in which “humans have become hole makers. Bullet 
holes and drilled holes, hurt holes, greed holes, rape holes. Holes in membranes that 
function to protect the surface or bodily organ. Holes in the ozone layer that prevent the 
sun’s ultraviolet light from reaching the Earth’s surface. . . . Holes, gaps in our memory 
from trauma. Holes that destroy the integrity, the possibility of wholeness, of fullness” 
(43). This meditation on holes, gaps, and ruptures offers forth an understanding of 
human experience in general, but also of the experience of illness, in particular, as 
belonging to a deep and tangled network of absences and excesses. To say that the 
diagnosis of disease, itself—in the case of cancer, the presence of pathologically 
dividing cells in the body—is sufficient to effect a traumatic rupture in a supposedly 
otherwise unmuddled life narrative is to overdetermine the varied ways in which the 
experience of illness might influence a life or its narrative expression. 
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A posthumanist intervention 
What strikes me as important in Charon’s representation of healthcare 
professionals as “meaning-making vessels” is her understanding of wholeness as 
produced by the narratives we construct around our experiences. I would like to bring 
this idea to the forefront in order to disrupt the reified notion of human wholeness as 
that which must be cherished, respected, maintained, or reestablished through medical 
humanism and narrative medicine. While the implication in narrative medicine 
scholarship is that ‘chaos’ or fragmentation—arguably rather unavoidable human 
experiences—are introduced into individuals’ lives through illness and that this 
experience is essentially ‘dehumanizing,’ I would like to present a different view. This 
view is less concerned with the overbearing agenda to contain deviance within a 
manageable framework than it is with exploring how the individual story/self resists 
the systematized control of medicine. Medicine cannot, at once, view the person as a 
fixed, stable entity whose care can be managed both biomedically and narratively, 
while simultaneously understanding the person as produced by a complex interaction 
of both internal and external factors that may be social, cultural, environmental, 
molecular, genetic, biological, chemical, psychological, technological, and that are 
subject to constant flux and reconfiguration. Indeed, to put it another way, medicine 
cannot possibly produce a “coherent, whole” narrative on behalf of a patient, any more 
than it can assert complete control over the complex interaction of actants that produce 
a somatic lesion (try as it might). 
It would be a trite oversimplification to remark that medicine must simply accept 
that death and vulnerability—the ultimate outliers it wishes to control—are always 
finally beyond medical control. Indeed, the entire biomedical enterprise is constructed 
around overcoming the body, and its goals are overwhelmingly positive ones; the 
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healthcare professionals that carry out this enterprise act out of an all-consuming 
compassion for suffering persons (regardless of how that care ultimately gets 
delivered), oftentimes, to the detriment of their own personal mental health. 
Inarguably, we can say that biomedicine will always reflect this goal of overcoming, 
that it will always view mortality as the ultimate weakness of the human, the ultimate 
call for intervention. Perhaps, though, medical care could stand to let go of that which it 
cannot possibly control—that is, the life narrative of the individual who appeals for 
care. As I am arguing, the current call of humane medicine to promote liberal humanist 
ideals like wholeness, integrity, and agency as key defining traits of the ‘fully human’ 
person, is concerned with controlling exactly that. The next part of this chapter argues 
that this mandate of humane medicine belongs to the tradition of liberal humanism and 
a continued understanding of the human as a self-contained system, whose social, 
cultural, interpersonal, psychological and other facets simply work toward the 
illumination of a predominantly biomedically understood human organism. In this 
chapter, my response to the call, by medical humanities, for the “intellectual co-
engagement” of science and the humanities, therefore, centres on questioning the 
humanistic focus of the articulations of medical humanism I have elucidated thus far. 
Returning to the 1977 statement made by the Committee on Humanizing 
Healthcare that defined its goal as promoting care that “[treats] patients as unique, 
whole, and autonomous persons,” we see an unequivocally liberal humanist 
conceptualization of the individual in the healthcare context (Mishler 436). The question 
that I will grapple with throughout the rest of this chapter (and in subsequent ones) 
asks: is humanization necessarily the answer to problems in the healthcare interaction 
identified above, or is there another avenue through which to understand the human as 
healthcare seeker? While medicine is evidently about the patient, while it places that 
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figure firmly at the centre of its regime, can we productively decenter this figure 
without reverting to the cold, calculating medicine of earlier times? To provoke this a 
step further, is it possible to think about health and the practice of medicine in a non-
anthropocentric way?  
Without getting too caught up in the inherent contradictions between the 
competing value systems of “humane medicine” and “posthumanism,” I would like to 
entertain the possibly far-fetched idea that we can, in fact, fruitfully decenter the human 
in the medical encounter. I cannot reasonably proceed, however, without placing all of 
my cards on the table, so to speak, and acknowledging the overarching contradiction in 
my project as a whole—that is, I have placed the question of the human at the centre of 
a project that seeks to disrupt that very tendency. In her study Vibrant Matter: A Political 
Ecology of Things, a project upon which my exploration in the rest of this chapter will 
partially focus, political theorist Jane Bennett offers full disclosure of the same problem 
inherent within her own philosophical analysis of vital materialism. For Bennett, this 
problem manifests itself through “the perfectly reasonable objection that the 
‘posthumanist’ gestures of vital materialism entail a performative contradiction: ‘Is it 
not, after all, a self-conscious, language-wielding human who is articulating the 
philosophy of vibrant matter?’ It is not so easy to resist, deflect, or redirect this 
criticism” (120). Bennett points to an overwhelmingly powerful drive—whether by way 
of “the voice of reason or habit . . . to again grasp for that special something that makes 
human participation in assemblages radically different,” a grasping that one encounters 
again and again wherever the question of the human arises (121).  
While the human-as-healthcare-seeker is where this project begins, my 
motivation in writing is to think beyond the self-enclosed, self-determining, 
autonomous, and monadic entity that liberal humanism has constructed for us, and 
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upon which medicine has traditionally based its practices. This is a posthumanist 
gesture, even if the very questions I engage make it impossible to abandon the centrality 
of the human entirely. This reorientation could open up, as other posthumanist 
theorists have suggested, some vastly more promising possibilities for beginning to 
understand how our world operates on the basis of what Bennett calls “agentic 
assemblages”; how our health as individuals extends far beyond the individual; how, to 
say that disease is biologically, socially, culturally, and medically constructed is to talk 
about only part of the story. The theorists I discuss in this section all take a horizontal 
view of the reciprocal relationships that form the world as we perceive it; rather than 
locating or fortifying boundaries that bolster our sense of humans as unique and 
therefore privileged, they seek out affinities and commonalities across species lines, 
even across the not-so-vast chasm between the living and non-living. 
Examining the philosophical leanings of liberal humanism, against which 
posthumanist theory reacts, we find an arguably quite admirable value system, one 
which evolved from Enlightenment thinking that sought to affirm the dignity and 
worth of each individual. Understandably, then, the impetus to reaffirm liberal 
humanist interpretations of the person as healthcare seeker extends from an equally 
positive aspiration to promote compassionate and empathetic engagement within 
medicine. Problematically though, upon closer examination, we see that humanistic 
“aspirations are undercut,” as critical theorist Cary Wolfe notes, “by the philosophical 
and ethical frameworks used to conceptualize them” (xvi). Indeed, through the 
assertion of allegedly ‘universal’ human qualities such as rationality and self-
determination, humanism sets out rather narrow expectations for human behaviour. 
The same thinking that idealizes completeness, holism, and autonomy also produces 
the very conceptualization that medical humanities says must be reimagined—that is, 
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what Wolfe identifies as the “fetishization of agency” and a view of the diseased body 
as something that can be taken apart and put back together (138).  
As disability studies scholars note, this “liberal humanis[t] preoccupation with 
autonomy and agency as conditions of human status and civic participation” excludes 
from the category of ‘human’ any body that fails to meet these criteria (Wolfe 138). 
While humanized healthcare and narrative medicine seek to reestablish body-self 
‘wholeness,’ no bodies, selves, or psyches ever will be—or ever have been—‘whole,’ in 
this sense, whether due to amputation, paralysis, cognitive impairment, developmental 
disability, psychological disorder, or any other ‘abnormal’ state (Sobchack 22). In 
addition to these categories, we might add what Frank calls the “remission society,” an 
idea he introduces in his book At the Will of the Body, about his own experience with 
cancer. The remission society  
describe[s] all those people who, like me, were effectively well but could never be 
considered cured. . . . Members of the remission society include those who have 
had almost any cancer, those living in cardiac recovery programs, diabetics, those 
whose allergies and environmental sensitivities require dietary and other self-
monitoring, those with prostheses and mechanical body regulators, the chronically 
ill, the disabled, those ‘recovering’ from abuses and addictions, and for all these 
people, the families that share the worries and daily triumph of staying well. (8) 
Frank’s point is that we certainly cannot assume indefinite health after recovery, 
particularly from serious illness; indeed, in the remission society, “the foreground and 
background of sickness and health constantly shade into each other” (9). Indeed, in 
some ways, the vulnerability of all of our bodies and the biological inevitabilities stored 
in our genes imply that each of us belongs to the society of “the undiagnosed.”  
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As disability studies scholars remind us, mortality and aging are common to 
every body; even for those in ‘perfect health’ who are lucky to live long enough, ‘able-
bodiedness’ is only ever temporary. The operating assumption within biomedicine, 
however, is that the ‘normal,’ ‘healthy’ adult person is whole, whereas the child or 
adolescent is ‘still developing’ and the older adult contends with the ‘slow decline’ of 
aging. Implicitly, then, the person with an illness or disability enters the category of the 
troubled or incomplete body that characterizes these so-called peripheral groups, both 
of which many of us will inhabit at some point. This is not to perpetuate a normative 
understanding of lifespan or bodily experience, but simply to trouble what we take to 
be even the most ‘uncomplicated’ body (that normative ideal which exists only in 
statistical form). As I will explain shortly, posthumanism provides the requisite 
framework to assert these important claims that no body—whether ‘normal’ or 
‘abnormal’—can or should be labeled ‘whole.’ 
Following from these contradictions, I argue that the antithesis of this so-called 
‘whole person’ model—that is, an atomistic view of the human—does not necessarily 
preclude or undermine the positive goals of medical humanities, particularly if it 
focuses on the shared vulnerability that is engendered through the very condition of 
incompleteness or fragmentation. This is not to say that the patient should be viewed, in 
the words of Kidd and Connor, as “no more than a collection of organs and systems” 
(46); indeed, as many scholars before me have noted, this narrow biomedical view of 
human functioning is far from productive. Instead, posthumanist theory can allow for 
the construction of a more nuanced model of the human being within medicine that 
deprioritizes goals of normative compliance and instead imagines the body as never 
complete in and of itself.  
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What is posthumanism? 
To narrow in, briefly, on this potentiality, we must first and foremost ask the 
very question posed in the title of Wolfe’s text What is Posthumanism? (2010). 
Acknowledging that posthumanism continues to be a highly contested term, Wolfe 
distinguishes between the terms posthuman and posthumanist. The posthuman can be 
defined as that which comes after human embodiment has been transcended and the 
“ideals of human perfectibility, rationality, and agency inherited from Renaissance 
humanism and the Enlightenment” have been taken to their utmost extreme (xiii). This 
is not the line of thinking that Wolfe wishes to develop, nor is it, in my articulation, a 
responsible model on which to base medical research and patient care. Instead, Wolfe 
formulates a notion of posthumanist theory as a critique of humanism, particularly its 
“fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy” (xvi). For the purposes of this paper, 
posthumanism signifies: 1) “a historical moment in which the decentering of the human 
by its imbrication in technical, medical, informatic, and economic networks is 
increasingly impossible to ignore” (xvi); and 2) an acknowledgment and acceptance of 
human materiality, embodiment, and mortality from which liberal humanism has 
striven to escape.  
Wolfe insists that to be truly posthumanist, posthumanist thinking must 
deconstruct itself in order to avoid reinscribing the hegemonic discourse and practices it 
rejects. However, I will focus here on what Wolfe’s thinking means, specifically, for 
medicine’s conception of the human. In contrast to the institutional imperatives of 
technocratic medicine that reinforce binaries and highlight the uniqueness of the 
diseased body as individuated through medical need, Wolfe’s posthumanism seeks to 
topple binary oppositions between nature and culture in order to reveal our inextricable 
and “constitutive prostheticity” (xxvi). This theoretical turn asks us to recontextualize 
!! 110!
the human in terms of how our entire sensorium is necessarily dependent upon and 
coextensive with our technical and social environments. According to philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler, our bodies and minds have evolved alongside our technical 
implements in a process of epiphylogenesis in a way that makes us always already 
decentered beings (175).  
Semantics notwithstanding, at first glance, the ‘humanization’ movement within 
healthcare is entirely compatible with the posthumanist perspective in the sense that it, 
too, rejects the Cartesian mind-body split perpetuated by the medical model. The 
contradiction in terms within the discourse on medical humanities has emerged, 
however, through writers’, scholars’, medical doctors’, and other commentators’ 
demonstrable fixation on reorienting medical practice to focus on the ‘whole person’; 
indeed, endorsing the wholeness and autonomy of the body-self while, at the same 
time, attempting to assert the interconnectedness of our bodies and our environments is 
both problematic and counterproductive.  
As Wolfe reminds us, the whole, autonomous human has never existed, despite 
the best efforts of liberal humanism to reject our vulnerability and other more 
‘animalistic’ qualities. Working within the field of animal studies, Wolfe’s 
posthumanism affirms these qualities, largely by pointing to the human being’s 
‘radically ahuman technicity,’ expressed through the co-constitutive nature of our 
psychic and social systems. This co-constitution is most evident through “our subjection 
to a technicity of a language that is always on the scene before we are, as a precondition 
of our subjectivity” (Wolfe 89). Both our dependency on that which is ‘external,’ 
language, for one, along with our inescapable mortality are, together, what Wolfe, 
through Jacques Derrida, calls our “double finitude” (88). Central to Wolfe’s 
!! 111!
posthumanism, this double finitude is the shared condition that unites humans with 
other forms of life.  
 Within the medical sphere, both of these facets of human finitude are adamantly 
contested through what Jeffrey Bishop calls “a dream as old as humanity itself—to 
defer death” (17). To this I would add medicine’s equally powerful dream to deny the 
inescapable co-dependency and vulnerability that bring that mortality into awareness. 
Whether or not medicine can practically conceive of the paradoxes of death—for one, 
that the threat of loss also creates value, meaning, and connection—there is certainly 
much to be gained by practitioners in adopting a posthumanist perspective that 
destabilizes the foundations of hegemonic power structures (Bishop 3).  “In the wake of 
this ‘after’ [of the posthumanist],” Wolfe suggests, “new lines of empathy, affinity, and 
respect between different forms of life, both human and nonhuman, may be realized in 
ways not accountable, either philosophically or ethically, by the basic coordinates of 
liberal humanism” (127-28). This perspective is central to conversations in animal 
studies, disability studies, and, to my mind, medical humanities—all areas in which 
hegemonic discourses of normalcy and difference result in the marginalization of 
particular experiences and voices. For the medical field, especially, the opening up of 
“new lines of empathy, affinity, and respect” is particularly pertinent, considering 
expressed criticism within the literature over a perceived lack of empathy in healthcare 
practitioners’ encounters with patients (Warmington 328). 
 
Vulnerable bodies and agentic assemblages 
Interrogating many of the same questions regarding ‘humanity’ as an exclusive 
category constructed through the devaluation of that which we deem ‘nonhuman,’ in 
her book Precarious Life, Judith Butler seeks to identify the conditions that make a death 
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grievable, as well as the implications of such value judgments that place certain deaths 
in the category of “ungrievable.” In her compelling exploration of violence and 
mourning in the context of Western, and specifically American, anti-terrorist 
aggression, Butler assesses reactions to experiences of loss, specifically those produced 
by the World Trade Centre attacks in 2001. At the heart of her inquiry is a desire to 
question what other reactions are possible to the traumatic apprehension of 
vulnerability, aside from retributive military violence. Butler’s argument elucidates 
how, in the wake of 9/11, various factors, including imbalanced reporting, the “raw 
public mockery of the peace movement,” “the characterization of anti-war 
demonstrations as anachronistic or nostalgic,” and the ambiguous and egregiously non-
self-referential use of the term ‘terrorist’ in public and political discourse, all worked to 
reinforce the message that “there is no excuse for September 11”—in other words, that 
there was no way in which the framework of American foreign policy may have created 
the global conditions of possibility for acts of terror such as this one (3-4). In this 
context, violent military responses were justified on the basis of fear and loss, with no 
critical attention paid to the status of that response, which “destroyed life and 
decimated peoples,” as, itself, an act of terrorism on the part of the US (6). Indeed, “the 
erasure from public representations of the names, images, and narratives of those the 
US has killed” establishes a “differential allocation of grievability that . . . operates to 
produce and maintain certain exclusionary conceptions of who is normatively human: 
what counts as a livable life and a grievable death?” (xiv-xv).  
In this argument, Butler posits, rather controversially, that the so-called terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 provoke a “dislocation from First World privilege [that], however 
temporary, offers a chance to start to imagine a world in which that violence might be 
minimized, in which an inevitable interdependency becomes acknowledged as the basis 
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for global political community” (xii-iii). While my research here explores a different 
context for heteronomous relationships than does Butler’s, I believe the common 
ground between our work lies in the decentering of the first-person experience in 
favour of a broader view that understands our inescapable imbrication in various other 
lives.  
In the subjective experience of bodily illness, the medical reaction is to shore up 
one’s defenses, so to speak, and, using a similar language of battle, deploy all potential 
resources toward the denial of vulnerability and the assertion of various liberal 
humanist values: self-control, agency, autonomy, self-determination, individuality, 
independence. Interestingly enough, the assertion of these values can be taken to such 
an extreme that—to return to Ensler’s discussion with her oncologist—the very “me” at 
the heart of the quest to protect or save is forgotten. When Ensler is forced to decide 
whether or not to subject her body to radiation when “it could destroy my intestines 
and make it impossible for me to eat or poop again,” a detached, unsympathetic doctor, 
in what the reader can only interpret as a feeble and ineffectual attempt to respect her 
autonomy as a decision-maker, merely gives her the hard data upon which to make a 
decision (71). In his response, “‘WE LIKE TO THROW EVERYTHING AT IT. That’s all 
we know how to do,’” the body is understood as an object of medicine and the militant 
desire to eradicate the body of disease in order to restore prior integrity or wholeness 
may actually result in permanent disability (71). At the same time that medicine, itself, 
is hurting the body in the process of trying to heal it, the personal narrative of illness, as 
I have been discussing, is directed toward a therapeutic goal of restoring wholeness. 
Thus, my work here, like Butler’s and Wolfe’s, is interested in a critical stance 
that “attend[s] to [the] frame” (Butler 5). The following long quote from Butler nicely 
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articulates the importance of examining the conditions of possibility that produce a 
particular understanding of the human and of human action: 
The point I would like to underscore here is that a frame for understanding 
violence emerges in tandem with the experience, and that the frame works both to 
preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds of historical inquiries, and to 
function as a moral justification for retaliation. It seems crucial to attend to this 
frame, since it decides, in a forceful way, what we can hear, whether a view will be 
taken as explanation or as exoneration, whether we can hear the difference, and 
abide by it. (4-5) 
Likewise, a frame for understanding illness and disability emerges through the 
language of a dominant medical discourse that precludes particular alternative 
narratives for conceptualizing the human in that context. “Attend[ing] to this frame” is 
central to “what we can hear” and what we can say about the experience of illness. And, 
in large part, this frame, as in the military context, considers vulnerability intolerable; 
rather than understanding it as an inescapably human experience that opens up a realm 
of possibility based on interdependence, medicine reads vulnerability, and its co-
conspirators grief and fear, as that which we must guard against. 
 We can think about grief and mourning in the context of losing another to whom 
one is attached, as in Butler’s exposition, but we can also think about it in the context of 
illness, of grieving or mourning a change or a perceived loss within oneself. When we 
become “dispossessed,” as Butler puts it, from a particular place, community, or in the 
context of illness, from our own bodies, “we may simply feel that we are undergoing 
something temporary, that mourning will be over and some restoration of prior order 
will be achieved. But maybe when we undergo what we do, something about who we 
are is revealed, something that delineates the ties we have to others, that shows us that 
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these ties constitute what we are, ties or bonds that compose us” (22). Here, Butler is 
speaking about a condition that is not specific to the experience of vulnerability, itself, 
but that vulnerability makes clear to us because it illuminates “the ties” that at least 
partially construct who we are, ties that are nicely articulated in Ensler’s meditations on 
love during her cancer journey. The tie is that which is “neither exclusively me nor you, 
but the way by which those terms are differentiated” (Butler 22). Butler explains, 
What grief displays, in contrast, is the thrall in which our relations with others 
hold us, in ways that we cannot always recount or explain, in ways that often 
interrupt the self-conscious account of ourselves we might try to provide, in ways 
that challenge the very notion of ourselves as autonomous and in control. . . . I tell 
a story about the relations I choose, only to expose, somewhere along the way, the 
way I am gripped and undone by these very relations. My narrative falters, as it 
must. Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other. And if we’re not, we’re missing 
something. (23) 
While Butler is largely concerned here with the notion of grief or mourning as 
instigated by a traumatic change in our relationships with others, I think that a similar 
emotional experience arises as a result of diagnosis. Particularly in the case of terminal 
or degenerative illnesses, diagnosis is described by many writers as an occasion for 
mourning, specifically mourning future losses and their inevitability. What Butler’s 
account contributes, for the purposes of my exploration here, is the importance of 
vulnerability to a more nuanced understanding of the norms against which we judge 
the subject position of the healthcare seeker. While the loss and grief attached to illness 
may thrust our vulnerability and interdependence into stark view, this perspective 
merely illuminates a shared condition that transcends the medical binaries of healthy 
and sick. 
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 What’s more, the act of perpetuating a false ideal of normative wholeness and 
subjective integrity against the alleged disorder, disintegration, and vulnerability of 
illness simply widens the already-artificial gap between health and illness, in effect 
dehumanizing those whom we label ‘broken-down’-bodies-become-‘broken-down’-
selves. Perversely, then, as Butler describes in the context of our self-definition against 
those we label morally and ethically different from us, the sick, too become casualties of 
a system in which “dehumanization becomes the condition for the production of the 
human” (91). Inasmuch as health, normatively understood, defines itself against illness, 
the affirming ideal of the wholeness and integrity of the well body produces the 
perceived fractured or disrupted wholeness of the sick body. To continue to emphasize 
the value of this illusory ideal within medical humanities is simply to perpetuate the 
dehumanization made possible by nineteenth- and twentieth-century medical practices, 
against which medical humanism has defined its mandate. 
What Butler’s argument fails to broach, a point which is also articulated by Wolfe 
in Before the Law, is the idea of shared vulnerability as an occasion for establishing 
affinities between human and nonhuman animals (Wolfe 18-20), and if we are to add 
Jane Bennett to this mix, between humans, animals, and non-living entities. Similar to 
Wolfe’s conception of the externalized self, political theorist Jane Bennett’s vital 
materialism sees the human actor as inextricably linked to his or her environment, and 
thereby both dependent upon and vulnerable to outside forces and processes. In her 
text Vibrant Matter (2010), Bennett expounds a theory of “thing-power,” which—rather 
than viewing agency as a definitively human quality—seeks to understand matter, 
itself, as invested with agency—that is, with the qualities of  “efficacy, trajectory, [and] 
causality” (31).  
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 In the introduction to her text, Bennett writes, “instead of focusing on collectives 
conceived primarily as conglomerates of human designs and practices (‘discourse’), I 
will highlight the active role of nonhuman materials in public life. In short, I will try to 
give voice to a thing-power” (1-2). She goes on to propose her political purpose in 
articulating a theory of distributed agency, which despite presenting a decentering view 
of the human, nonetheless reveals how such a perspective might actually work in 
favour of human flourishing, rather than, as some have argued, jeopardizing our well-
being by compromising our primacy in a hierarchy of life. Bennett explains: 
Vital materialism would thus set up a kind of safety net for those humans who are 
now, in a world where Kantian morality is the standard, routinely made to suffer 
because they do not conform to a particular (Euro-American, bourgeois, 
theocentric, or other) model of personhood. The ethical aim becomes to distribute 
value more generously, to bodies as such. Such a newfound attentiveness to 
matter and its powers will not solve the problem of human exploitation or 
oppression, but it can inspire a greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are 
kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations. And in a 
knotted world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be 
to harm oneself. Such an enlightened or expanded notion of self-interest is good for 
humans. (13) 
In her argument, Bennett is speaking about political agency and, more specifically, 
about how we can understand global events as being engendered by dynamic processes 
rather than individual human actors. In an attempt to diminish the cultural power of 
the ‘blame game’—of “a moralized politics of good and evil, of singular agents who 
must be made to pay for their sins (be they bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, or Bush) . . . 
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[that] legitimates vengeance and elevates violence to the tool of first resort” (38)—she 
locates the source of “political responsibility [in] a human-nonhuman assemblage” (36). 
 Bennett seems to reinforce the argument that Wolfe advances for the originary 
prostheticity of the human in her assertion that “there was never a time when human 
agency was anything other than an interfolding network of humanity and 
nonhumanity” (31). Rather, human agency is only ever articulated in and through 
‘agentic assemblages’—that is, “ad hoc groupings of diverse elements, of vibrant 
materials of all sorts,” each of which has its own vital force different from the agency 
proper to the grouping itself, but none of which autocratically governs the trajectory of 
the confederation (24). Bennett puts forward the Chinese concept of shi to describe the 
nature or ‘vibe’ of a potentiality that arises as a result of a particular spatio-temporal 
configuration. Shi denotes the “style, energy, propensity, trajectory, or élan inherent to a 
specific arrangement of things. . . . [For example,] a good general must be able to read 
and then ride the shi of a configuration of moods, winds, historical trends, and 
armaments” (35). 
As I interpret Bennett’s argument in Vibrant Matter, it won’t do to say that there 
exists for any entity, force, or assemblage an absolute whole, composed of a 
combination of its discrete parts. It is equally impossible in her theory of vital 
materialism to posit that the whole always exists, even if its boundaries are constantly 
changing. The assemblage, according to Bennett, is “an indivisible continuum of 
becomings whose protean elements are not only exquisitely imbricated in a flowing 
environment but also are that very flow” (92). Therefore, each element or part of the 
assemblage is constantly opening out to other elements and none can act independently 
of the various confederations into which it forms. The creative activity within each 
member-actant is what characterizes the collectivity as what Bennett calls an “open 
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whole” (35). I take this to mean that because agency is distributed and therefore only 
realized through an opening out of any particular actant to the possibilities of action, 
then neither the collectivity nor the singular member is ever, in itself, whole. In the case 
of the human, then, the very idea of discrete, clearly defined boundaries is inimical to 
what it means to have a body-self whose agency is enacted through multiple, morphing 
assemblages. 
 Returning to Ensler’s In the Body of the World, we see oscillating perspectives that 
embed the various manifestations and understandings of illness within the vast, 
complicated assemblages of the contemporary world. Her rendering of her intra-
abdominal abscess caused by post-surgical infection bleeds into her description of the 
Gulf oil spill, such that we begin to see resonances between the two simultaneously 
occurring incidents. Ensler writes: 
At Sloan-Kettering they show it to me on the CAT scan screen: a huge pool of 
blackness in the center of me—the same day as the Gulf oil spill, the now poisoned 
Gulf of Mexico somehow inside me. Sixteen ounces of pus. Two point five two 
million gallons of oil a day. An intra-abdominal abscess. Contamination from 
postsurgery, postexplosion leaking, the spread of infection to the bloodstream to 
the ocean. My body is rupturing, shit leaking from where they closed it up, 
gushing out of me from every orifice, leaking and spilling, purging—same 
moment, same day BP exploding rising up, gushing out of me from every orifice. . 
. . Symptoms may include abdominal pain, chills, diarrhea, oil penetration 
destroying the plumage of birds, making them less able to float in the water, less 
able to escape when being attacked, preening leads to kidney damage, altered 
liver function, ruptured digestive tracts, lack of appetite, nausea, dolphins 
spurting oil through their blow holes, rectal tenderness and fullness, seal fur 
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reduced in its insulation abilities, leading to hypothermia, vomiting, weakness. 
(68-9) 
This description can be seen as a way of disrupting our traditional routes to 
understanding both traumatic personal events and devastating global catastrophes. 
While the tendency that Bennett highlights in Vibrant Matter is to point the finger at 
“singular agents who must be made to pay for their sins”—in Ensler’s example, BP—
the author’s scan in this part of her book, as in others, is, I believe, a political act that 
draws the individual into the realm of the global, molecular, environmental, economic, 
and political through the parallel imagery of contamination and infection. In many 
ways, Ensler wishes to highlight how collectivities of forces that imbricate various 
actants, including “rapacious greed, the hunger for more and more, the tiny percentage 
of those who have everything, and the majority of those who have nothing[,] . . . 
corporations, industrial destroyers, rapists, corrupt leaders, and the arrogant and 
disinterested rich” (211), as well as the chemicals in our foods and cities, our good or 
bad intentions, the information in our genes, the microbes in our stomachs, the medical 
technologies that fuse with our bodies, and a vast multitude of other forces come 
together variously at different times to produce the conditions of both the individual 
body and the natural world. While she is strongly interested in targeting human 
responsibility for the declining health of the planet and its human population, for 
atrocities like the sexual abuse of thousands of women in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, her descriptions consistently invoke a cosmic view.  
 While vital materialism gives us an alternate set of terms for apprehending what 
healthcare has begun to understand as the biopsychosociospritual approach to healing, 
I think that in the context of medicine, the notion of vital materialism is especially 
beneficial because it unseats notions of the ‘normal’ or ‘complete’ human body that 
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underpin the contemporary medical mindset. As Bennett notes, “vital materiality better 
captures an ‘alien’ quality of our own flesh, and in so doing reminds humans of the 
very radical character of the (fractious) kinship between the human and the nonhuman” 
(112). This conceptualization of the human allows us to do away with myths of absolute 
wholeness, agency, and autonomy that actually work to marginalize the experiences of 
those with illnesses and to medicalize such deeply personal, often organic, and 
sometimes subconscious behaviours as the formation of a life narrative. 
This perspective is important to understanding the human in the context of 
illness and healthcare because it is interested in asserting the complexity of human 
embodiment and, as a result, I would suggest, the stubborn resistance of human 
experience to full expression or containment within the normative narrative tropes of a 
given society or culture. As Ensler says, “we make up stories to protect ourselves. I am 
not a cancer person. I am not someone who would die in a car crash” (158). However, 
the vulnerability of human life hurtles into view to remind us: “there are no rules or 
reliable stories. There is suffering. It is ordinary. It happens every day. More of it seems 
to happen the older you get, or maybe your vision for it just expands. It is as 
unavoidable as your ordinariness, your baldness, your [colostomy] bag” (Ensler 159). 
 
Disability studies, wholeness, and prosthesis 
 In my analysis above, the undercurrent of prosthesis—as both metaphor and 
materiality—must be acknowledged, particularly in order to bring important disability 
studies perspectives into the conversation. In particular, I want to emphasize the way in 
which the concept of prosthesis has been employed figuratively in critical theory as a 
way of thinking about connections between the body and technology, including 
Marshall McLuhan’s notions of media as extensions of the body, Donna Haraway’s 
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depiction of the cyborg, Bernard Stiegler’s ideas of the originary technicity of the body, 
and so on. In her introduction to the edited collection Artificial Parts, Practical Lives, 
Katherine Ott observes this trend, noting that “many scholars use the term ‘prosthesis’ 
regularly, and often reductively, as a synonym for a common form of body-machine 
interface. . . . Such assertions, while intellectually provocative and culturally insightful, 
hardly begin to comprehend the complex historical and social origins of prosthetics. 
Cyborg theorists who use the term ‘prosthesis’ to describe cars and tennis rackets rarely 
consider the rehabilitative dimension of prosthetics, or the amputees who use them” (3). 
Ott, along with the authors of the essays that compose the anthology, situate the 
history, design, use, and evolution of various kinds of prosthetics within the space of 
their material reality.  
While I agree that, as Ott notes, it is vital to ground discussions of bodily 
experience in the materiality of the body—to “[keep] prostheses attached to people” 
(4)—there is also an important critical valence to the concept of prosthesis. This crucial 
point is well elucidated by Jay Dolmage in his book Disability Rhetoric when he notes 
that the effect of post-Enlightenment medical science has been to extend disability 
“beyond actual impaired bodies to become an operative and essential element driving 
subject-object dualism—any body subjected to the medical gaze becomes disabled to 
some extent, through its positioning as passive object, and through the oversignification 
of bodily deviation” (28). As Ott, as well as David Serlin, Vivian Sobchack, and David 
Wills, elucidate, the materiality of prosthesis, designed as a physical appendage or 
device to compensate for a perceived bodily lack, is central to understanding how the 
disabled body has been constructed over time. However, the metaphorical and 
rhetorical meanings of prosthesis are also significant.  
!! 123!
Dolmage notes in his exploration of rhetorical history and the contemporary 
uptake of classical rhetorical teachings that bodily norms are present even in the ways 
that we talk about rhetoric—what it is and is not, or who can speak, write, and learn. 
Rhetorical history enforces normativity by asking us “to ignore our embodied selves 
and constrain our expressions of subjectivity” (92); the rhetorical theory we practice and 
teach restricts the ways in which we can communicate, limiting our available means of 
persuasion. In exploring the ways in which rhetoric, itself, can be “enabled by its 
prostheses, by the incoherence of its histories and the awkwardness of its positions” 
(92), Dolmage asserts that rhetoric must affirm, not just the body, but specifically the 
disabled body. In his argument,  
disability is a material state and identity, as well as a vital critical modality. This 
is not to say that we are all disabled, but instead to emphasize that no one is 
normal. . . . [and to advocate] for the view that the body’s partiality and 
completeness can be claimed as essential and generative. This is not to say that 
we are all disabled, or that rhetoric is disabled, but to embrace a nonnormative 
discourse/materiality, modestly proposing that such signifiers be tabled, not as 
the inverse of a privileged wholeness in a normative matrix, but rather as a 
valorization of alternative fleshing out and potential resignification, a shift of 
meaning and value that might also mitigate the oppression of bodies with 
disabilities. (91-2) 
In acknowledging that disability and prosthesis are both materiality and critical 
modality, Dolmage highlights disability as both a state of embodiment, as well as a 
conceptual lens through which to understand the way in which the normal body is a 
fictional and/or rhetorical construct. 
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As disability rights activists advocate, the unique subject position of disability 
identity is vital to political activism and social change, such that universalizing the 
experience of disability is not productive. Furthermore, denying the materiality of 
disability by challenging that all disability is socially constructed can, contradictorily, 
misrepresent or marginalize the lived realities of bodily difference. As Dolmage notes, 
and as I reassert here, a cultural turn in disability studies—not unlike postmodern 
analyses of disability—can maintain the materiality of disability, while at the same time 
“[trouble] the origins and sedimentations of this materiality” (100). In particular, the 
cultural turn is not just an alternative to other models—the medical, social, or 
postmodern—but one that both incorporates and critiques these perspectives by 
studying the central role of language as both constructing and constructed by bodies 
(100-1).  
Disability studies researcher Margrit Shildrick also pushes for new approaches to 
disability studies, looking to recent developments in feminist theory involving the 
uptake of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. She suggests 
that the contributions of these “philosophers of difference . . . [push] the problematic far 
beyond conventional meanings of the human and [open] up a celebratory positioning of 
difference and transcorporeality as the very conditions of life” (14). Shildrick notes that 
critical disability studies can benefit from a move toward the idea of the assemblage, 
iterated in my reading above by both Butler and Bennett, that productively troubles all 
distinctions, ”[throwing] into doubt the very sense of self and other as distinct entities” 
(14) and “[enhancing] our understanding of a fundamental hybridity that speaks to the 
coming together of bodies in difference that are never comfortably subsumed into a 
new unified whole” (16). Importantly, Shildrick suggests that there is no reason why 
one body should be any more absorbed within “the manifold interconnections and 
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transformatory entanglements. . . that mark all forms of embodiment” than any other 
body (16). Prostheses, she notes, are important signifiers, since they disrupt our illusion 
of the whole body, even as they attempt to reconstitute it (16). Usefully, she goes on to 
explain, 
The significance of prostheses is far in excess, then, of either therapeutic or 
rehabilitative intentions, and prostheses should not be read as solely material 
additions to the body. On the one hand functioning as utilitarian material 
artifacts, on the other, prostheses are rich in semiotic meaning and mark the site 
where the disordering ambiguity, and potential transgressions, of the interplay 
between the human, animal, and machine cannot be occluded. (17) 
I bring these disability studies voices into the conversation to acknowledge that, 
in order to dismantle humanist expectations of bodily wholeness or integrity, the notion 
of prosthesis is central. Cultural readings of disability by both Dolmage and Shildrick 
appreciate, not just the incompleteness of every body, but also the way in which the 
disablist lens we use to marginalize the experience of bodily difference is, in fact, 
counterproductive—or, rather, a dismissal of the potential of the disabled body to 
generate meaning. Instead, a fixation on wholeness sees disabled, or sick, bodies as only 
“surfaces reflecting the meanings of others” (Dolmage 95). Medical humanities would 
do well to acknowledge, just as feminist theory and critical disability studies have, that 
“a human body is not a discrete entity ending at the skin” (Shildrick 24). As Shildrick 
goes on to say, once we accept “that material technologies constantly disorder our 
boundaries, either through prosthetic extensions or through the internalization of 
mechanical parts, it is difficult to maintain that those whose bodies fail to conform to 
normative standards are less whole or complete than others” (24). 
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Conclusion: the posthumanist patient 
To say that the person—composed of body and self, corporeal and psychic, 
physical and cultural, social and environmental, personal and public—is never whole is 
not to say that there does not exist, for the individual, a ‘normal’ or habitual experience 
of the body. In the day-in, day-out embodied experience of the world, one comes to 
expect certain things from one’s body, to know its challenges and its desires, to 
maintain a certain status quo. Having eaten as a vegetarian for the past fifteen years, I 
can expect that my stomach is unfamiliar with processing the organic compounds of 
ground beef, that without the proper enzymes, digesting a hamburger is going to be a 
rather trying feat. But that is not to say that the composition of proteins in my stomach 
would not change were I to reintroduce such a food to my regular diet. 
This is an overly simplified way of saying that, even at a very basic biochemical 
level, my state of embodiment is not a fixed or even a stable one. For one, the body is a 
permeable space, subject to the living organisms that surround it, that pass in and out; 
subject to the non-living entities of its environments: the pollutants, the pesticides, the 
chemicals, the pharmaceuticals. In addition, when considered over the span of a 
lifetime, however long or short that may be, my body can never be said to be “the 
same” at any two points along that trajectory. Indeed, we would be wise to 
reconceptualize our understanding of healthy or able bodies, as disability studies 
scholars and activists since the 1980s have, as temporarily healthy or able bodies 
(Shapiro 34).6 
All of this to say that the act of ‘returning’ a person to wholeness, taken to be an 
ethical obligation of the healthcare practitioner within medical humanities, is simply the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Similarly, Deborah Marks uses the term “contingently able bodied” to describe the body’s ongoing 
vulnerability to impairment (18). 
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act of reframing or reformulating an individual’s expectations of the body within the 
context of her social, cultural, and spiritual life—something which we do on an ongoing 
basis because the corporeal part of us is not—and never has been—constant. Illnesses or 
disabilities developed over the course of a life thrust this fact, this morphability of the 
body, into stark view. While each experience is unique, and of course qualitatively 
different, the idea of a previously whole body before disability or illness, or one that I 
must return to after, is illusory; indeed, this conception of a whole body-self seems 
continually to be reified in discussions of narrative medicine’s role in healthcare. In 
addition to masking a biological reality of the physical body, this mentality also 
obscures the ways in which our personal, social, cultural, and narrative frames for 
understanding and living with and in the body are, likewise, unstable, evolving, 
contestable, negotiable, and non-totalizing.  
Fragmentation is the only constant. So why do we insist on wholeness as an 
explanatory, therapeutic, or meaning-making narrative? It would appear that narrative 
medicine attempts to formalize a natural process whereby individuals make sense of 
their life experiences, but through the mediation of a health professional’s guidance and 
expertise. In attempting to enrich medical practice through the application of narrative 
theory and analysis, narrative medicine oftentimes overshoots the mark to suggest that 
doctors are responsible for more than just the medical well-being of the patient, but 
should also come to understand the way in which this illness fits into the patient’s life, 
including their relationships, career, leisure, spirituality, and so on, to the extent that all 
of these things enter into the service of explaining and understanding a biomedical 
process. In some ways, it seems that this movement reflects a neoliberal impetus, with 
its imperatives of self-management, personal responsibility, and consumer power, in 
demanding that we ‘make use’ of the experience of illness—that we fit it in to a grand 
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life narrative, in which the lessons learned make us better, stronger, more capable, and 
more productive people. 
In a neoliberalist paradigm, the judgment attached to an individual’s inability to 
maintain a ‘healthy’ body or to the individual actions that contribute to illness or to the 
‘poor choices’ people make in the face of illness is connected to an understanding of 
health as the individual responsibility of an autonomous agent. Unfortunately, some 
practices within narrative medicine seem inflected with this approach; there is an 
element of judgment and alienation that enters into the discourse of narrative repair 
and the creation of narrative wholeness, since both concepts work to produce the idea 
of a deficit in an individual’s personal attempts at meaning-making. In assuming that 
the life narrative, too, is broken, narrative medicine runs the risk of making this deeply 
embedded and complex process into another biomedical category to be scrutinized and 
healed. 
In reaction to over-simplified, economically-motivated attributions of personal 
blame, Wolfe, Butler, and Bennett, along with Dolmage and Shildrick, can be seen, each 
in different ways, to illuminate how our lives and our agencies are dispersed across and 
through other lives—even across non-living matter—to argue that the vulnerability we 
have attempted to reject is in fact a shared condition of life (and non-living matter). This 
shared vulnerability introduces an element of chaos; it means that control is not ours 
alone; it frees us, in some ways, from the shackles of agency and autonomy, and in that 
way it is, perhaps, the enemy of the neoliberal agenda.  
At the level of the healthcare seeker and her story, an attunement to the 
inevitably fragmented nature of human life could free the illness self-narrative from its 
instrumentalization in a ‘healing process.’ Instead, narrative might reflect the complex 
ways in which illness enters into a life, as in the example of Ensler’s memoir In the Body 
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of the World. I think the importance of entertaining this complexity, of resisting the urge 
to fit all of the pieces of the story—a stand-in for all of the pieces of the patient—back 
together into a whole cannot be understated. Indeed this approach can be nothing other 
than reductive. There are many different illness narratives to be told, and many of these 
will not be about clinging to an illusory notion of wholeness. The most profound 
example for me, comes from the experiences of those with Alzheimer’s disease who see 
this process as producing, for them, a “new self” or a new identity whose freedom 
becomes limited or encroached upon by others who would have them fit a previous 
mold—expecting them to fulfill a perceived prior wholeness, based on former abilities, 
occupation, interests, and memories. I continue this discussion of the Alzheimer’s self-
narrative in chapter five.  
In addressing the problematic rhetoric of patient holism and autonomy central to 
many definitions of medical humanities, I have also attempted to open up new avenues 
for understanding the roles of healthcare practitioners and seekers. I have not sought to 
reject the laudable impetus of medical humanism toward promoting a higher degree of 
decision-making autonomy and freedom from paternalism for patients, which I agree 
should strongly guide the contemporary practitioner-patient relationship. However, as I 
have argued, the healthcare practitioner’s role should be, not to understand or maintain 
the patient’s wholeness or completeness, but to accept the philosophical implications of 
the human as always already incomplete, externalized, fragmentary, and coextensive 
with his or her environment. Disease does not mark a rupture in an individual’s 
wholeness and integrity; the vulnerability and ‘rupture’ are present, in each of us—
patient and practitioner, alike—from the start.  
Using the posthumanist theoretical foundation elucidated above as a 
springboard, my next chapter will examine how humanistic conceptualizations of 
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patienthood are being both reproduced and resisted in contemporary new media spaces. 
Increasingly, both health-related, but also generic, social media outlets are the primary 
spaces where individuals construct narratives about and thereby create meaning from 
their experiences of disability or disease. The user interfaces, generic conventions, 
political economic structures, ideological persuasions, and sociocultural norms that 
configure narrative creation in these spaces require critical attention since these 
elements exert insidious discursive control over the stories users tell about disease and 
disability, in terms of both what they tell and how they tell it.  
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Chapter!3!|!Patient!2.0:!Socially!Networked!Narratives!of!Illness!!
 
Hopefully waving goodbye to chemo forever. Im [sic] not sure I can ever 
put my body through all this again. Time to stop cheating death. 
Kate Granger (@GrangerKate), Twitter, 27 Feb. 2014 
 
“Can Google Solve Death? The search giant is launching a venture to 
extend the human life span. That would be crazy—if it weren’t Google.” 
Cover of TIME, 30 Sept. 2013 
 
In its most basic form, participatory health looks something like this: a distressed 
parent frantically Googling the description of his child’s emerging full-body rash; a 
young woman entering the doctor’s office armed with PsychCentral discussion forum 
postings on an anti-depressant medication she has been prescribed; or an individual 
with hypertension using the HeartWise Blood Pressure Tracker iPad app to monitor his 
blood pressure levels over the course of several months. When combined, these 
examples paint a picture of the various, and relatively new, ways that individuals 
within a participatory model of health understand, react to, explain, and manage 
disease.  
According to the Society for Participatory Medicine, participatory health can be 
defined as “a model of cooperative health care that seeks to achieve active involvement 
by patients, professionals, caregivers, and others across the continuum of care on all 
issues related to an individual's health” (“Welcome”). This focus on collaboration 
represents a shift in the practitioner-patient relationship, which involves increased 
attention paid to patient perspectives, experiences, opinions, preferences, and 
knowledge. According to some enthusiasts, this ‘revolution’ is drastically changing the 
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ways in which health practitioners and patients interact within the healthcare system. 
As medical doctor Eric Topol notes in his book The Creative Destruction of Medicine: How 
the Digital Revolution Will Create Better Health Care, digital media provide new 
opportunities for a departure from the heavily criticized methods of evidence-based or 
population-based medicine toward an individualized or customized healthcare 
experience “characterized by the right drug, the right dose, and the right screen for the 
patients, with the right doctor, at the right cost” (32). Topol’s work asserts the notion 
that, in an era of constantly emerging technological solutions, “medicine for the 
common good is not good enough” (32).  
More important than the biomedical paradigm shift currently underway are, 
perhaps, the changing conceptualizations of health and patienthood embodied by the 
emergent dynamics between healthcare practitioners and patients. In valuing the 
insight of patient knowledge acquired through personal, subjective experience, 
healthcare practitioners are en route to more fully adopting an understanding of disease 
as produced through a range of determinants, rather than conceived narrowly as 
individual pathology. This development is not solely connected to a changing 
technological landscape, but to a variety of factors that I introduced in chapter one and 
that I will explore in more detail below.  
This chapter shifts the discussion from a focus on movements within medicine 
and medical education outlined in chapter two toward an examination of the activities 
of contemporary digitally-engaged healthcare seekers, whose participation might be 
seen as extending from a combination of web democratization and the broadly 
distributed and peripherally organized activity of patient activist groups beginning as 
early as the 1950s (Williamson 35). I turn to address the impact of new media 
developments on patienthood, and, conversely, the role that personal accounts of illness 
!! 133!
play in shaping the structure of health-related new media. I am interested in critically 
assessing the interplay between new modes of patienthood and new, specifically, social 
media in order to develop a nuanced understanding of how technological and cultural 
change interact within healthcare. What new expectations, roles, affordances, and 
constraints arise for the individual healthcare seeker in the current technocultural 
milieu? In spite of the hype surrounding the democratization of medical information 
and the empowerment of the patient, what new limitations have emerged? Which 
established structures of power remain intact? These are questions I will begin to 
address presently, and return to repeatedly throughout the final two chapters of this 
dissertation.  
I begin with a discussion of the technoenthusiast rhetoric that has surrounded 
the emergence of health-related social media, offering an attempt at briefly historicizing 
the development of such spaces. In chronicling the emergence of health-related social 
media, I establish a context for critically analyzing the language used to talk about 
online health communities in mainstream media coverage, by patient activist groups, 
and by the communities themselves, a discourse that is overwhelmingly celebratory, 
enthusiastic, and optimistic. The second part of this chapter will map the terrain of 
contemporary health-related social media, exploring the structures, discourse, and 
affordances of such media as they pertain to the creation of personal illness narratives. I 
will explore how the possibilities enlivened by such media might facilitate a more 
robust understanding of health, shifting the burden of disease to a collective or 
community concern and disrupting some of the problematic humanistic tendencies I 
outlined in chapter two. I am interested in how the creation of alternative personal illness 
narratives—narratives that unsettle received biomedical and mainstream media-
endorsed readings of illness experience—proliferate in online spaces for narrative 
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creation, specifically on health social networking sites (SNSs), personal blogs, and 
individuals’ Twitter feeds. 
At the same time, there is evidently an insidious side to the operations of some 
online health communities, particularly those operating under a profit motive. In the 
next chapter, I will delve into the example of the “free” for-profit health SNS 
PatientsLikeMe to uncover how the potential to create alternative narratives of illness 
becomes constrained and contradicted in light of the website’s techniques of data 
collection. In the case of PatientsLikeMe, the narrative creation facilitated on the site is 
overwhelmingly geared toward the management and control of deviance, introducing a 
drastic contradiction between the experiences of chronic illness articulated by members 
in the discussion forums and journals, and those visualized through the narrative 
devices of the site’s patient profiles. 
My overall motivation in critically analyzing health-related social media stems 
from the reality that, increasingly, these are the primary spaces where individuals 
construct narratives about and thereby create meaning from their experiences of disease 
or disability. The user interfaces that structure narrative creation require critical 
attention since the generic conventions and ideological persuasions of these frameworks 
exert varying degrees of discursive control over the stories users tell about disease and 
disability, in terms of both what stories they tell and how they tell them. Firsthand stories 
about illness, disability, suffering, and pain matter, not only for their writers who fulfill 
a human need to make sense of experience through communication, but also because 
they constitute a space where what it means to be human is negotiated. As Cheryl 
Mattingly writes in her introduction to Healing Dramas and Clinical Plots, “attention to 
human suffering means attention to stories, for the ill and their healers have many 
stories to tell… The need to narrate the strange experience of illness is part of the very 
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human need to be understood by others, to be in communication even if from the 
margins… Illness… reveals much about how a culture conceives of life in time, being as 
a kind of becoming marked by transitions, transformations, and the inexorable progress 
toward death” (1). The stories of illness that we find in various corners of social media 
are important for the function they serve in helping us to relate to and understand one 
another; but they are also important because they constitute a mirror that reflects back 
to us the imaginings, expectations, anxieties, and stigma that we construct around 
certain human experiences—in this case, the reality of bodily finitude.  
In addition to the way in which “pathography… helps shape our mythology 
about illness,” as Anne Hunsaker Hawkins asserts, it also “embodies dynamic 
constructs about how to deal with disease and treatment: its images and metaphors and 
myths are not just decorative and fanciful but highly influential models of how to 
negotiate an illness experience” (11). How these stories are narrated, what rhetorical 
situations they are produced in, who tells their experiences and who can exert 
ownership over them, when and where these stories are permitted to be told—all of 
these conditions of production influence the narratives that are produced and, thus, 
their meaningmaking power. Audre Lorde expresses this reality when explaining her 
motivation, as a postmastectomy woman and African American lesbian, for publishing 
The Cancer Journals. She writes, “I do not wish my anger and pain and fear about cancer 
to fossilize into yet another silence, nor to rob me of whatever strength can lie at the 
core of this experience, openly acknowledged and examined” (9). Since “imposed 
silence about any area of our lives is a tool for separation and powerlessness” (9), we 
must pay attention to the stories that are told about illness, as well as those that are 
silenced. 
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Defining Health 2.0  
As my participatory health scenarios reveal, increasingly, the contemporary 
mode of patienthood involves leveraging the affordances of digital media platforms, 
that is, implementing user-oriented, participatory strains of online media—whether free 
web-based or mobile applications, or consumer market proprietary software—to 
achieve objectives of “collaboration, participation, apomediation, and openness” 
(Eysenbach). The digital media saturation of the healthcare sphere is often referred to 
by the name Health 2.0, a trend that promotes the goals of participatory medicine by 
viewing individuals as healthcare consumers or ‘e-patients’ in the market for 
knowledge translation, health management tools, social networking opportunities, and 
so on, all of which promote the ideal of the empowered patient (Eysenbach). As 
Charlotte Williamson notes, however, the truly emancipatory element of patient 
activism—in this case through participatory medicine—is not about patients’ power as 
consumers, alone: “consumers or customers want sellers of goods to offer them access, 
information, choice, safety, representation and redress: the principles of commercial 
consumerism. But patients also want the health service to offer them support, equity, 
shared decision making and respect. These principles are irrelevant or antithetical to 
commercial consumerism” (2). The philosophy behind participatory health is about 
equality in power relationships between practitioners and patients, not simply the false 
freedom of consumerism, which is exploitative at its core.7 
In this dissertation, I am specifically concerned with social media that fall under 
the Health 2.0 mandate. These media can include both generic and health-related social 
networking sites, blogs, vlogs, and microblogging sites, and, though I do not discuss !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Williamson also notes that the persistent use of the term “consumer” in this context relates to the 
unfortunate lack of agreed-upon terminology for patients and those who support their interests (94-5). 
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them here, even online role-playing games (RPGs) or massively multi-player online 
games (MMOGs). I am not particularly concerned with health-related content made 
available through proprietary websites, but instead intend to examine Health 2.0 as a 
socially leveraged phenomenon characterized by personal illness narrative creation.  
Indeed, in the spaces where illness experience meets social media, there occur 
not only the activities of social support and information sharing that have been 
thoroughly analyzed by researchers like Jenny Preece, Barbara Sharf, Michael Hardey, 
and others, but also the less-rigorously examined creation of personal illness narratives. 
I follow the lead of Shani Orgad in seeking to “expand the research focus on 
information seeking and social support, to include a significant activity that has been 
largely overlooked: storytelling, i.e. patients’ configurations of their experiences into 
stories” (“Patients’ Experiences” 3). This creative action cannot be separated from the 
aforementioned empathic and informational qualities of social media in the context of 
illness; but this is a component I hope to hone in on, namely, to determine what kind of 
cultural work these digital illness narratives perform. 
But first, what are we to make of the so-called “digital media revolution in 
healthcare”? The language of revolution, of course, connects this discourse to other 
uncritical and overblown reactions to technological development in general, stemming 
as far back, perhaps, as Plato’s distrust of the recorded word and its potential threat to 
memory in Phaedrus. The byline of a March 2013 Macleans article entitled “The 
smartphone will see you now” declares, “Putting medical technology in the hands of 
patients could revolutionize medicine” (McMahon 46). Speaking about consumer health 
devices, medical diagnostic smartphone apps, and health-related social media, the 
author makes the grand, largely unqualified statement that “the days of relying on your 
family doctor to figure out what’s wrong with you—a diagnostic process virtually 
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unchanged for generations—are quickly coming to an end” (46). Indeed, the popular 
press would have us believe that our computers are outdoctoring our physicians; that in 
very little time “Dr. Google,” in combination with a burgeoning consumer healthcare 
industry, will have replaced the practitioner of family medicine altogether. Going to 
even greater heights of hyperbole, a September 2013 TIME article entitled “Google vs. 
Death” announces Google’s latest venture to “solve death,” by creating a mammoth 
pool of human health data through its forthcoming Calico project (McCracken and 
Grossman).  
The opposite sentiment—one of alarmism and fear mongering—also proliferates 
in mainstream and scholarly writing at the prospect of handing so much information 
over to the patient. Writers warn of the potential dangers of inaccurate medical 
information found online or misinterpretation of the “real thing” (Benigeri and Pluye; 
Theodosiou and Green; Cline and Haynes; Shalom). Certainly, the picture painted at 
each end of the spectrum overstates the case; the language of revolution and risk 
attached to consumer health technology necessitates a more critical, historically situated 
reading of the current technocultural milieu.  
Is it possible, for example, that the emergence of contemporary self-care 
practices, such as participation in online health communities represents, not a 
revolutionary change in patienthood or a risk-laden breeding ground for the spread of 
misinformation, but a technocultural-medical moment that is also a harking back to or 
reinstating of a historical mentality toward illness? One that viewed the responsibilities 
and obligations attached to suffering, caretaking, and curing as a communal burden, 
which extended beyond the realm of the nuclear family and productively blurred the 
line between public and domestic space? While this is not the central claim I am 
making, the historical account offered in chapter one might point to this possibility. I 
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raise the question because it, in turn, begs another question as to whether the Web 2.0 
‘self-help’ approach to healing is really all that new. As Lister, et al. observe, “there is a 
strong sense in which the ‘new’ in new media carries the ideological force of ‘new 
equals better’ . . . . These connotations of ‘the new’ are derived from a modernist belief 
in social progress as delivered by technology” (11). Indeed, the use of the term new 
media to name the artifacts, tools, and strategies of our particular technocultural-medical 
moment is bound up with the technoenthusiast rhetoric of Health 2.0 discourse. 
 
The digital revolution in healthcare 
 Perhaps the largest issue with much of the rhetoric surrounding the emergence 
of new technologies is the way in which it subscribes to a technological determinist 
model of social and cultural change. Technological determinism asserts that the impetus 
of technoscientific innovation and the introduction of new technological artifacts are 
what drive revolution in other arenas of human life. It overstates the role of new 
technologies in transforming society, rather than understanding the emergence of 
technology as unavoidably embedded in cultural dynamics that shape and are shaped 
by the production of new media (Williams 5). This inclination is certainly present in 
much of the discussion surrounding Health 2.0 technologies, in the sense that media 
such as mobile applications, health records-related software, assistive devices, and 
social media in both personal and medical settings are heralded as tools that will 
revolutionize healthcare and improve the overall health of the populations fortunate 
enough to have access to such technologies.  
Nowhere is this sentiment more apparent than in Eric Topol’s The Creative 
Destruction of Medicine, which argues that the antiquated and historically slow processes 
of medical-scientific discovery will face an overhaul in the coming decades through 
!! 140!
“the active participation of consumers” who will, essentially, be capable of “digitizing” 
themselves (vii). Topol argues that “we now have the technology to digitize a human 
being in the highest definition, in granular detail, and in ways that most people thought 
would not be possible” (vii). As he describes, 
digitizing a human being is determining all of the letters (‘life codes’) of his or 
her genome . . . . It is about being able to remotely and continuously monitor 
each heart beat, moment-to-moment blood pressure readings, the rate and depth 
of breathing, body temperature, oxygen concentration in the blood, glucose, 
brain waves, activity, mood—all the things that make us tick. It is about being 
able to image any part of the body and do a three-dimensional reconstruction, 
eventually leading to the capability of printing an organ. . . . And assembling all 
of this information about an individual from wireless biosensors, genome 
sequencing, or imaging for it to be readily available, integrated with all the 
traditional medical data and constantly updated. (vi-vii) 
With its obvious overtones of surveillance and control, this “digitization,” of course, 
depends upon the willingness of “consumers” (the term Topol consistently uses to 
describe health-conscious individuals) to adopt habits of compulsive self-monitoring 
and digital recordkeeping. Topol refers to this type of engagement as a 
“democratization of medicine” (vi), though it more likely reflects a future of 
overmedicalization—indeed, a dangerous retreat away from a posthumanist 
understanding of health and back toward a limited medical model supported by the 
promise of clean, unambiguous data. 
 Although there are a number of issues with the course that Topol navigates for 
medical-technological development, one of the main ones is his reliance upon the 
argument that the new technologies he glorifies—biosensors, imaging technology, 
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social media, etc.—are propelling changing modes of medical research and innovative 
dynamics in medical care, most notably through the allegedly revolutionary 
participation of patients in their own care. If we look at the way in which layperson 
involvement in medical settings has evolved over the past half century or more, we see 
that more active patient involvement emerged out of advocacy movements attached to 
questions of patient and caregiver rights, as well as issues of paternalism and consent—
for example, rules surrounding parental visiting rights in pediatric wards, obstetric 
policies and practices, the policing of female sexuality with regard to contraception and 
abortion, and so on (Williamson 48-9, Dubriwny 18-9). This patient activism was 
certainly connected to technological developments, as well, such as the work of the UK 
patient activist group RAGE, founded in 1991 to protest unsafe radiation practices and 
advocate for the reduction of potential side effects (Williamson 52). However, in order 
for patient activism to emerge surrounding medical care, there also had to exist 
particular conditions of possibility and, for the most part, these were not technologically 
driven.  
Understanding changes in patient roles and healthcare delivery must involve 
analyzing social and technological change in a more robust way. Some such 
approaches—antidotes to technological determinism—have been proposed by 
Raymond Williams, Daniel Chandler, Langdon Winner, and Andrew Feenburg, among 
others. Here, I take the methodology of Brian Bloomfield, Yvonne Latham, and Theo 
Vurdubakis in using the concept of “affordances” to navigate the problematic gap 
between “undersocialized and oversocialized conceptions of technology” (416). The 
authors argue that “the affordances of technological objects need to be understood in 
terms of the sociohistorically contingent folding(s) of the body and the artefactual world 
into one another” (417). We cannot understand the affordance(s) of a particular artifact 
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as emanating out of the materiality of the object, itself; instead, what we can do with an 
object is a product of “the ever-changing relations between people, between objects, and 
between people and objects” (420). Bloomfield, et al. use the example of fire as an 
element that we cook our food with; however, “‘cook-with-ability’ is not a property of 
fires; rather humans have developed practices and equipment for making fires which 
are ‘cook-with-able’ and, importantly, keeping them this way and thus preventing them 
from becoming house fires or forest fires” (417). The focus is on action potentialities that 
emerge from various and shifting assemblages of agents and materials.  
According to this logic, then, it would be misleading to attribute a “digital 
revolution in healthcare” solely to the availability of new technology. Indeed, many of 
the contemporary changes in healthcare are far more complex than this, and stem also 
from a particular mindset toward the social dynamics of healthcare delivery, the status 
of patient and doctor, the accessibility, sanctity, or locus of medical information, the 
status of medical-scientific theories about the body, social and cultural views on the 
privacy of personal information, and so on. Recalling Foucault’s exposition on the 
shifting medical epistemology of the late eighteenth century (discussed in chapter one), 
we can see how the generally accepted theory of medical technological innovation only 
partially explains the emergence of the clinical gaze.  
With regard to health-related social media, in particular, my analysis takes its 
cue from the language of activism surrounding patient use of social media and 
consumer health technology by commentators, but also by patients themselves. I 
understand this discourse as directly connected to the patient emancipation movement, 
the development of which Charlotte Williamson traces in her book Towards the 
Emancipation of Patients. According to Williamson, the movement began in, roughly, the 
1950s when patients and their partners in care began to form groups in order to self-
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advocate and to criticize certain unethical or paternalistic medical practices and policies. 
She argues that three simultaneous factors have contributed to the inception and 
continuation of patient activist groups: 1) a shift in social values, beginning in the mid-
twentieth century that caused individuals to question traditional sources of authority; 2) 
the poor quality of medical care and disparaging writing on such issues by dissatisfied 
patients; and 3) critical sociological research on the medical institution beginning in the 
1960s (Williamson 34-5).  
While Williamson does not address this in detail, the women’s health movement 
and the work of feminist health activists were a driving force in the growth of patient 
advocacy and the critique of expectations of, specifically, female (but also male) 
passivity in the medical environment. As Tasha Dubriwny writes in The Vulnerable 
Empowered Woman, through various actions, such as the abortion speak-out by radical 
feminists the Redstockings in 1969 and the creation of women’s health initiatives in 
American universities throughout the 1980s, “the women’s health movement laid the 
groundwork for significant changes in the U.S. healthcare industry” (19). And yet, the 
patient rights movement as a whole, as Williamson traces it, similarly to the dispersed 
activity of women’s health activism, is characteristically undefined, varied, and 
informal in nature (3). Nonetheless, it is certainly an emancipation movement, since the 
dispersed activity of those seeking to strengthen the voices and decision-making power 
of patients are attempting to remedy a vast power differential between patients and 
health practitioners. As Williamson explains it, patient “emancipation does not mean 
rejecting what is good about a dominant social group, those of its ideas and actions that 
free people from hardship, want, fear, disease or pain. It means altering the relationship 
between dominant and subordinate social groups, lessening the opportunities for the 
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one to harm the interests of the other. . . . In that, it benefits the social group that is more 
powerful as well as the group that is less powerful” (1-2).8 
Groups that promote patient empowerment through social media and 
information technology understand this kind of action as improving health 
management and social support for both patients and practitioners. The central 
conclusion of the e-Patient Scholars Working Group, founded by Dr. Tom Ferguson, 
reflects the idea that contemporary ‘e-patients’ are striving for greater autonomy, 
“managing much of their own care, providing care for others, helping professionals 
improve the quality of their services, and participating in entirely new kinds of 
clinician-patient collaborations, patient-initiated research, and self-managed care” (ix). 
The negotiation of these opportunities is an important concern in patient forums on 
health SNSs, where individuals share strategies for addressing antagonism in the 
clinical setting, preparing for medical appointments, and navigating difficult 
conversations with doctors. The twin mantras of self-education and self-advocacy are 
strong within these spaces, where individuals (some more vocally than others) 
challenge one another to be in control of what happens to their bodies. 
According to Williamson’s work, the discussions and concerns of pre-Internet 
patients were strikingly similar to those found online today; what we are likely 
witnessing then, is the mainstream adoption of what were once radical attitudes toward 
health and healthcare. In part, these conversations have flourished because of the 
availability of online spaces to connect, but the adoption of Internet communication and 
digitally supported self-care strategies certainly does not mark the origin of patient 
participation in healthcare. Taking the patient emancipation movement into account, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The disability rights movement might be seen as equally integral to the movement for patient 
emancipation, since it challenged the medicalization of deviance and sought to critique ableist attitudes 
regarding health and rehabilitation (see Shapiro, Charlton). 
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could be argued that the social circumstances generated by early patient activist groups 
created an opening for other modes of patient engagement to emerge and that, in 
combination with developments in networked information technology, an affordance 
(or set of affordances) arose. If we look at this history alongside that of social media, we 
can see how the social opportunities presented by networked technologies assembled 
with the social needs of individual patients and patient activist groups.  
Listservs, for example, are one of the earliest Internet-enabled social media 
through which patients connected and formed communities. Barbara Sharf’s early 
study of the Breast Cancer List (BCL), based on research conducted between 1994 and 
1995, offers insight into the way in which listservs facilitate information exchange, social 
support, and personal empowerment among list subscribers. As Sharf notes, the BCL 
was created by Canadian molecular biologist Jon Sharp as part of his work on the 
advisory committee for the Atlantic Breast Cancer Information Group, a grassroots 
patient advocacy organization (67). Users of the BCL consisted of individuals with 
breast cancer, their friends and families, physicians, and researchers, and the mandate 
of the list reflects its origins in patient advocacy. Indeed, the description of the list, as it 
appears to new subscribers, reflects the focus of many such patient communities:  
While some of the list will be devoted to discussions of medical advances, as well 
as possible therapeutic treatments, both mainstream and alternative, the list 
should also have a less rigorous side to it. . . . It will also be a forum for breast 
cancer patients and their loved ones to vent frustrations and offer alternative 
strategies in dealing with the patriarchical [sic] medical-industrial complex, and 
to offer help and insights into the psychosocial management of the disease. 
Finally, the list will offer a venue for the discussion of the work of various 
grassroots breast cancer advocacy groups worldwide, to announce events, to 
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exchange ideas related to breast cancer activism, and, more broadly, to discuss 
the politics of breast cancer and health care. (Qtd in Sharf 67) 
As Sharf notes, the advisory group had been seeking out a way to connect its diverse 
audience and engage them in information sharing, and discovered the value of a 
listserv strategy in meeting these needs. This form of interaction, with its clear 
framework for participation, quite obviously lays the groundwork for the development 
of web applications like discussion forums and social networking sites, which 
developed simultaneously to users’ desires to connect with one another in more 
contextually rich ways. 
 Another early way in which healthcare seekers connected online was through the 
Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link (WELL), popularly documented by Howard Rheingold in 
his book The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. The WELL was 
“a computer conferencing system that enable[d] people around the world to carry on 
public conversations and exchange private electronic mail (e-mail)” (“Introduction”). 
As Rheingold notes, this “virtual village of a few hundred people” in 1985 had 
expanded to eight thousand members by 1993, becoming a space where people, 
identifying with various subcultures, met to share special interests and hobbies, discuss 
news and ideas, play games, and find and offer support. In her 1997 discussion of 
electronic narratives of illness, Faith McLellan studies the exchanges of one such 
discussion group on the WELL. Also mentioned by Rheingold in his book, McLellan’s 
focus is on the conversations that emerged, and were ongoing for more than three 
years, when Phil Catalfo, the father of a ten-year-old boy from California, posted a topic 
called Leukemia to the parenting conference, announcing his son Gabe’s diagnosis. 
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that Phil opened on the subject of his son’s illness up until September 1994, there are 
over 1500 postings (89).  
McLellan analyzes the narrative qualities of the co-authored story of Gabe’s 
illness, noting that such electronic narratives disrupt traditional expectations of 
authorship and genre, allowing for a powerful narrative and supportive community to 
form around an experience of illness. While this way of writing may have been new, the 
way in which individuals came together on the WELL to support the Catalfos can be 
understood as a virtual instance of a support group. The desire to reach out to “expert” 
strangers is, indeed, not new or revolutionary—though the platform, scope, and 
“virtuality” are.  
In another of the early studies of illness life writing in online spaces, Michael 
Hardey analyzes personal home pages created by individuals and their family members 
to share information about their illnesses. While the decline of the personal home page 
can perhaps be attributed to the explosion of the blogosphere in the late 1990s, 
beginning in the mid-1990s, the web provided access to more user friendly web-based 
publishing tools from AOL, Tripod, GeoCities and other companies, resulting in “tens 
of millions of personal home pages, with photo galleries, flashing text and graphics, 
personal journals, and lists of noteworthy links to other sites” (Standage 225). In his 
analysis, Hardey creates a fourfold typology to categorize how and why people create 
thematic homepages on the topic of their illnesses, all of which resonate with the ways 
in which users contemporarily create illness narratives in online spaces like SNSs, blogs, 
and Twitter: 1) in order to familiarize readers with the various emotional, physical, 
social, and other challenges they face because of their illness; 2) in order to provide 
advice to others diagnosed with their condition; 3) in order to advocate for particular 
healing philosophies, treatments, or procedures; 4) in order to promote business-related 
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interests, such as selling consumer health products (34). In her study of women’s breast 
cancer home pages, Victoria Pitts critically analyzes another aspect of self-disclosure in 
such spaces, looking at how writers “create personal web pages on the Internet as sites 
for generating new forms of knowledge, awareness and agency in relation to the 
illness” (34). Specifically, she wonders whether Internet spaces might allow for more 
subversive forms of illness representation to emerge, a question that I, too, pose in 
relation to personal blogs.  
Awareness of the history of writing and community-formation surrounding 
illness on the Internet, as well as the persistence of such scholarly concerns, I think, 
helps to disrupt the notion that “new” twenty-first-century modes of carrying on such 
conversations, through social media like Twitter or online communities like 
DailyStrength, have emerged independently, detached from any history of remediation, 
to propel changes in contemporary patienthood (Bolter and Grusin). Indeed, such 
mutually constructive changes in the social role of patients, the development of medical 
technologies, and innovations in communications media far pre-date the first uses of 
the Internet by healthcare seeking individuals and communities. We could say that the 
keeping of “a well-stocked medical chest, and its adjunct the household book of medical 
recipes” with its “miscellany of medicinal and culinary recipes”—a fixture in many 
homes since the beginning of the seventeenth century—is one early, though 
anachronistic, example of participatory medicine (Digby 292).  
In the twentieth century, the growth of the consumer health industry was both a 
cause and symptom of increased self-care; in some instances, consumer, and not 
market, pressure strengthened the role of individuals in the medical sphere. As Jeana 
Frost notes in her article on the blood glucose monitor as an innovation in participatory 
medicine, this historical example “illustrates how technological developments and 
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patient advocacy combined to produce a treatment breakthrough that represented a 
major improvement in the life expectancy and quality of life for the millions of people 
living with insulin-dependent diabetes” (“Innovations”). Frost chronicles how changes 
in diabetes care emerged, not because of technological developments in blood glucose 
monitoring, but because of the activism of one individual with diabetes, Dick Bernstein, 
and his advocates. Bernstein’s efforts to combat medical paternalism eventually led to 
legally sanctioned patient access to the technology and its widespread distribution. 
In the case of the “digital revolution in healthcare,” the driving force for such 
change (whether it is, indeed, revolutionary or not) is not the digital technology itself, 
and neither is it solely the social movement of patient activism. The technologies we use 
to write about, track, manage, and understand our health do not exist in a vacuum, 
independently from the ways in which they are produced, used and, in turn, 
manipulated by human actors. Many of the new opportunities for patient participation 
in health-related settings are connected to the technologically-facilitated activities of 
seeking out sympathetic others on a site like DailyStrength, accessing hard-to-find 
medical information through WebMD, storing and analyzing personal health-related 
data on PatientsLikeMe, purchasing genetic sequencing and connecting online with 
other sequenced users through 23andMe, or monitoring one’s vital signs, including 
temperature, heart rate and blood oxygenation level through the palm-sized Scanadu 
Scout device. However, none of these affordances would be such without the social and 
cultural space for this kind of activity. Beyond this prerequisite are economic concerns; 
for, perhaps if our healthcare systems functioned flawlessly and our physicians had the 
time and resources to provide highly attentive and focused care to each healthcare 
seeker, individuals would not feel personally responsible for or compelled to self-
advocate for their health. Beyond economic concerns, an epistemological shift (such as 
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the one that may currently be underway) to understand health as far-reaching and 
multifaceted, rather than merely biomedical, is spurring greater individual awareness 
of personal wellness that involves mental, emotional, socioeconomic, and physical 
health—an awareness that may encourage some people to spend more time trying to 
understand their unique, individual needs. The more insidious side of this shift is, of 
course, the neoliberal strategy to capitalize on the dictum of individual responsibility 
for wellness, so that health self-management and the reduction of risk become 
commoditized activities (Dubriwny 27-8).  
Furthermore, there are specific social realities that must be acknowledged in 
relation to how technology becomes integrated into pre-existing cultural practices. For 
example, while healthcare seekers are now only a few keyboard strokes away from a 
cornucopia of health information, the result may be information overload. In some 
ways, doctors now function as medical editors. As Toronto physician Dr. James Aw 
writes, “My patients tend to come into the examining room overloaded with health 
information. It’s my job to act as the trusted translator, to filter the signal from the 
noise.” Of course, what counts as “health information” also changes in the complicated 
contemporary health-media landscape I am attempting to describe. What we find when 
we look more closely is that the “health information” individuals exchange online does 
not necessarily equate to medical information, the alleged purview of the medical doctor, 
but instead to personal illness experience, embedded in its complicated biopsychosocial 
context. In the quotation above, Aw betrays his allegiance with the old vanguard, in 
suggesting that he continues to represent the “trusted” authority. In reality, he can only 
call himself an expert on the medical side of things, while the rest is the domain of the 
“expert patient,” a figure whose emergence is tied to the affordances of a moment at 
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which meanings of health, access to information, and notions of expertise are being 
renegotiated. 
Turning now to look at some contemporary developments in social media, as 
they are deployed to represent, discuss, or understand illness, I draw from the 
affordances-based analysis of sociotechnological change in healthcare to explore what 
new opportunities have arisen in and through the context of health-related social 
media. The rest of the chapter introduces how three kinds of spaces—health social 
networking sites (SNSs), blogs, and Twitter—function as arenas for the negotiation of 
experiences of illness and, specifically, for the construction of personal illness 
narratives. 
 
Socially networked narratives of illness 
When then-29-year-old British doctor Kate Granger was diagnosed with a rare 
form of terminal cancer in 2011, she decided to use the experience as an opportunity to 
talk about illness, suffering, and death in a public forum. These topics, she had 
observed, were particularly taboo in modern-day Britain, a fact that was made apparent 
to her on a daily basis in her role caring for the medical needs of the dying. In an 
interview with The Times, Granger describes her motivation for tweet-broadcasting the 
personal ins and outs of her cancer journey, and her plans to, eventually, share the final 
days of her life on social media: “I tweet what I’m feeling now, like when I am going 
through scans, but it would be really interesting to tweet how I am feeling at the end 
and how it is going. I think that people don’t want to accept that dying comes to us all. 
There is this reluctance and inability to contemplate dying” (3). Her decision to tweet 
from her deathbed under the unsanctimonious hashtag #deathbedlive emerged from 
one of the many irreverent Twitter conversations between Granger and her legions of 
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social media friends and followers. For her pragmatic and public approach to her own 
death, she has been called “morbid” and “dark” (Fitzharris, “Dying the Good Death”). 
Indeed, the proposed hashtag campaign made international headlines for its profane 
treatment of what is most often regarded in Western cultures as a deeply personal, 
serious, emotionally-charged, and, therefore, necessarily private event. But, according 
to Granger, echoing the message of renowned critics Elizabeth Kübler-Ross and 
Philippe Ariès, the avoidance of topics like cancer and death, deemed unmentionable 
by implicit social norms, is preventing us from experiencing these for what they are—
inevitable and deeply human experiences. NPR broadcaster Scott Simon echoed a 
similar sentiment in 2013 when he, controversially, tweeted his experience of the last 
seven days of his mother’s life (Bisceglio). The resistance to opening up the conversation 
surrounding illness and dying, Granger notes through her tweets and on her personal 
blog, is also preventing us from approaching our own deaths like other moments in life, 
as times during which we can make certain deliberate, albeit limited, decisions about 
the nature of our experience—about how and where (if not when) we will die (Granger, 
“A Good Death”). 
While Granger’s concerns are certainly tilted in the direction of patient activism 
(her viral hashtag campaign #hellomynameis reminds doctors to introduce themselves 
to patients, as a gesture of humanity and compassion), I am interested in how Granger’s 
Twitter narrative represents a particularly high profile instance of the personal illness 
narrative authored via social media. Of course, Granger’s story has attracted media 
attention for her intentionally outspoken approach to her experience, as well as her 
unique perspective as a specialist in elderly medicine whose job often involves easing 
her patients’ transitions into death. (Indeed, there is also an element of irony in her 
story that may account for a great degree of the visibility she has received.) She is also 
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an active blogger and commentator, and has written two self-published, fundraising e-
books about her journey. But, this sort of self-disclosure is certainly not unique or new. 
It is happening on the ordinary Twitter feeds of ordinary sick people who have chosen 
to share, rather than to omit, their experiences of illness and vulnerability. These 
ongoing narratives are, likewise, present on social networking sites and online 
communities where individuals participate specifically for the purpose of talking about 
illness-related concerns.  
There are two things to address with regard to what I am calling the alternative 
personal illness narratives, like Granger’s, that emerge in social media spaces. First, as I 
have partially developed above, what sorts of affordances establish the necessary 
conditions for these narratives to come to life on social media? And, secondly, what is 
new about these narratives, by which I mean to say, how are these different from the 
ones that Arthur Frank elucidates? (And, indeed, how are they uncategorizable by his 
terms?) More generally speaking, in the relatively new context of Twitter and other 
social media, what sort of cultural work do these particular illness narratives perform, 
both online and offline? My argument is that spaces like health SNSs, personal blogs, 
and Twitter constitute fertile ground for, first, the expression and representation of non-
normative experiences and, second, the opportunity for those shared non-normative 
experiences to become occasions for conversation that is stifled or difficult to 
accommodate in other spaces.  
My work continues the discussion taken up by Victoria Pitts in her research on 
the potential for subversive illness narratives to be constructed on women’s breast 
cancer home pages. As she explores, while “women’s web pages might offer potentially 
critical opportunities for women’s knowledge-making in relation to what are often 
highly political aspects of the body, gender and illness . . . , the Internet is not an 
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inherently empowering technology, and it can be a medium for affirming norms of 
femininity, consumerism, individualism and other powerful social messages” (Pitts 34). 
Pitts concludes, ambivalently, that the tendency toward the reassertion of hegemonic 
ideas about femininity and a female “sick role” persists in women’s online 
representations of their illness, as well as in Internet marketing geared toward 
individuals with breast cancer; but, at the same time women seem to be empowering 
themselves through the “taking in and re-distribution of medical power” (53). Here, I 
take up Pitts’ conclusion that “the prospect of health and illness empowerment through 
the Internet is far from certain, and calls for more thinking and research about how 
people actually use the Internet for ‘empowerment’” (53-4). Specifically, I look at how 
the construction of personal narratives about illness experience, in an important way, 
allow conversation and community to emerge surrounding the marginalized subject 
position of sickness. As I will explore, those conversations are valuable, in spite of the 
way in which corporate interests often intercede or weaken the potential power of such 
online action. 
The social, emotional, and informational support present within patient 
communities is noteworthy for many reasons, and has been discussed extensively in the 
literature. Expanding on this research, I argue that the transgressive space created by 
the existence of such groups allows different narratives of illness to emerge—ones that 
are not necessarily geared toward “getting better” or “being normal” (although these 
are certainly expressed concerns), but toward a whole range of other goals, the most 
radical of which, perhaps, in contrast to medical narratives of overcoming, is the goal of 
living (well) with a particular, sometimes undiagnosed, incurable, or chronic, condition. 
As I discussed in chapter two, there is little opportunity, even within newer approaches 
to healthcare delivery, for the emergence of personal illness narratives that accept 
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sickness or disability as a tolerable, expected, or unavoidable part of life. Certainly, we 
all wish to minimize the pain, discomfort, suffering, and loss of perceived autonomy 
that come along with bodily ‘abnormality,’ however, in many people’s lives, this is not 
possible. It is simply a reality of day-to-day experience. We need space for life stories 
that reflect this reality—that don’t filter experience through a trope of normalization or 
overcoming. These stories exist variously on online patient communities, blogs, and 
non-health-related social network sites like Twitter. In the following sections I discuss 
the specific generic expectations, material affordances and constraints, and social 
contexts of each medium that create slight variations in the ways that illness narratives 
are authored and received, and the social functions they serve. 
 
Personal illness narratives on health SNSs 
Since Pitts’ study of personal home pages in 2004, much research in the field of 
health studies has emerged to address the social use and function of health social 
networking sites (SNSs) in the context of disease management and social support, 
mostly for the ways in which they facilitate a wide sharing of knowledge across 
geographical, social, and economic boundaries that is virtually impossible offline or in 
interactions with physicians (Hoch and Ferguson; Preece; Gallant et al.; Fox and Jones; 
Ancker et al.; Frost and Massagli; Foster and Roffe; Bonniface and Green). Some 
examples of popular health social networking sites include PatientsLikeMe, Alliance 
Health Networks, Inspire, DailyStrength, CureTogether, and PsychCentral, among 
many others. The makeup of these sites is varied but, generally, all are structured 
according to various ‘disease communities’ that an individual may join for free once he 
or she creates a profile. Profiles usually allow users to share their diagnoses, track their 
health, and connect with other users. For persons with disabilities or persons 
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experiencing illness, whether temporary or terminal, health social media represent 
unique arenas in which users can safely transgress ableist norms and engage in 
emancipatory activity.  
In more mainstream spaces, such as Facebook and Twitter, individuals with 
illnesses, physicians, and partners in care come together to share emotional support and 
knowledge through designated Facebook groups or hashtag communities. The latter 
“community interactions are made possible by use of the simple # symbol (known as a 
hashtag) that is used to indicate a topic, conversation, or event on Twitter [or Facebook]. 
This allows connections to be formed, for example, in disease-oriented communities 
such as the rheumatoid disease group that Kelly Young organized around the hashtag 
#rheum” (Young and Harmel). These hashtags may be used when the occasion arises, 
but are also deployed to generate “‘conversation communities’ for a concentrated hour-
long ‘Twitterchat’ that can develop into an ongoing discussion about the topic” (Young 
and Harmel). Similar conversations and communities emerge in the comments sections 
of blogs about personal illness, which are often networked through blogroll links, 
followers’ and commenters’ blogs, and so on.  
The kind of collaboration happening in health-related uses of social media falls 
under the purview of much new media scholarship, particularly that of Henry Jenkins 
and Jane McGonigal. Both researchers provide valuable approaches for considering 
how participatory media, crowdsourcing, and grassroots movements help to combat 
hegemonic discourse present in mainstream, commercialized cultural sites. As in the 
case of online disease communities, participatory media can create spaces where 
difference can be safely enacted or where subjective experience and ‘unauthorized’ 
individual expertise can be translated into what Pierre Lévy terms “collective 
intelligence” (quoted in Jenkins, Convergence Culture 4, 26).  
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According to enthusiastic commentators on the digital revolution in healthcare, 
online spaces for disease management and community formation provide a platform 
through which healthcare seekers can empower themselves against the highly 
technologized medical sphere discussed in chapter one, which functions best when 
individuals’ bodies—their complaints and symptoms—are interpreted by diagnostic 
machines that look deep inside the body to places that subjective experience may 
neither conceive of nor understand. Thus, in this narrative, socially-leveraged media, 
characterized by bottom-up processes, experiential expertise, individualization, 
networked communities, personal relationships, and easily accessible, mobile 
information, combine to produce what Kate Lorig and colleagues at the Stanford Patient 
Education Research Center call the “expert patient,” popularly termed patient 2.0 (Lorig 
et al. 248). This individual becomes the source of expertise on her own illness as it is 
lived subjectively—that is, as it exists in a world of particular social, cultural, familial, 
psychological, economic, and environmental conditions that are unique to the 
individual, and that no medical diagnostic machine can meaningfully interpret.  
In addition to knowledge creation engendered through the aggregation of 
patient-reported experience, sometimes informally and sometimes more empirically (as 
we will see in the case of PatientsLikeMe), health social media also attend to an 
emotional need that may be unaddressed elsewhere in patients’ lives. In her 1998 study 
of online communities, Jenny Preece coined the term “empathic communities” to 
describe the nature of online interaction between groups of individuals seeking, not just 
informational, but also emotional support during particular shared life circumstances. In 
her review of over one hundred online communities, Preece “found that empathy is a 
key ingredient in many support groups covering a wide range of topics” (“Empathic 
Communities: Reaching Out,” 33). These empathic communities are different from 
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more factually concerned or information-based groups, in that they “generally have a 
strong focus on medical or personal problems, and their members want empathy and 
emotional support” (33).  
Within health social networking sites (SNSs) like PatientsLikeMe (PLM), Inspire, 
and DailyStrength, one inevitably finds (in most, if not all, sub-communities that are 
organized around a particular disease or condition), discussion posts in which members 
express their gratitude for the support they have found on the site, often using the 
language “family” and “friends” to describe fellow community members. In addition, 
online disease communities have the potential to be spaces where the 
“biopsychosociospiritual” approach to understanding health, endorsed in current 
articulations of patient-centred and whole person care can be accessed, articulated, and 
realized by healthcare seekers, themselves. While physicians are increasingly trained to 
interact with patients according to a holistic health paradigm, in which factors like 
income and occupation are just as, if not more, powerful determinants of health than 
genetics or physiology (see chapter two), there are many important conversations that 
can happen only between healthcare seekers, for these conversations require access to 
shared experience. Such conversations involve side effects and/or determinants of 
illness related to personal relationships and day-to-day living; for example, in a PLM 
discussion post about the emotional strain that Christmas creates, the topic creator 
shares with other MS community members her stressful experience with the holiday 
season, prompting others to share their own difficulties and to offer strategies for 
lessening the emotional strain during these times. Interestingly, in this thread, when 
one user interjects to offer medical diagnostic opinions that are peripherally related to 
the topic creator’s problem, the poster’s words are met with hostility; it would seem 
that in conversations like these, members are looking for specific kinds of advice that 
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are not medical, but based in personal experiential knowledge regarding social, 
emotional, and psychological health.  
Occasionally, online conversations between healthcare seekers are ones that 
physicians, while they may have the required knowledge base, do not have the time, to 
address; for example, problems relating to socioeconomic barriers to health or the 
difficulties of negotiating the financial side of the healthcare system. In a PLM 
discussion thread of over 2,000 posts, on the topic of living alone with MS after age 65, 
members converse about the financial and social issues associated with aging 
independently with MS, discussing strategies, financial assistance programs, assistive 
technologies, and personal successes, failures, worries, and goals. The struggle to 
qualify for disability among persons with MS is also a constant topic of discussion on 
the PLM group; using the search string “SSDI” (Social Security Disability Insurance) at 
the time of writing brings up 1,396 discussion threads. These discussions reveal the 
intricate ways in which social, economic, personal, and cultural circumstances 
interweave to produce the particular conditions of an individual’s illness.  
Perhaps because of the way in which user belonging to or participation within 
the online group is predicated upon the uniting force of ‘difference,’ SNS members’ 
discussion contributions, journal entries, and personal biographies disclose a high 
degree of unqualified vulnerability. By ‘unqualified’ I mean that writers do not seem 
compelled to justify their admissions, or even to attribute narrative significance to these 
moments. In large part, this is related to the temporal conditions of self-disclosure on 
these sites, which is oftentimes not subsumed under a primary goal of representing 
experience for its own sake, but of sharing relevant details as they pertain to the 
concerns of the community as a whole. Nonetheless, a narrative emerges for each user, 
fragmented though it is between journal entries, discussion posts, status updates, 
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images, etc. Looking at a user’s profile on PLM, for example, one can understand her 
story (as much of it as she has chosen to disclose) by viewing an aggregated, 
hyperlinked feed of all of her contributions to the site. But following discussion threads 
on health SNS forums also tends to produce a disjointed narrative for each contributor. 
Narratives extend beyond any one site, as well, as in the case of members posting 
journal entries that link to their personal blogs and reference listserv, Twitter, and 
Facebook presences. 
On SNSs, self-narratives appear, as Gillian Whitlock and Anna Poletti observe, as 
“auto-assemblages,” rather than traditionally written narratives (xiv), since they emerge 
out of the technological structure of the space. As Aimée Morrison notes in her study of 
the Facebook status update function, “to account for the ‘auto’ of this ‘assemblage’” 
means that  
we must begin to consider the style sheets that organize display of user-
generated materials; the input prompts that coax and restrict user action by 
turns; the ever-shifting privacy settings that dramatically and continually reset 
the boundaries between personal narrative and public dissemination; and the 
automated algorithm-driven recitation of users’ actions across their social 
graphs. Each shapes the resulting digital life writing ‘text’ as much as do the 
more traditional authorial practices of a typing subject deliberately arranging her 
life into a story. (“Facebook” 113) 
In this context, Morrison suggests, individuals’ self-disclosure on SNSs is sculpted by 
what she calls “coaxed affordances” that are “both discursive and material” 
(“Facebook” 117). As I will explore in greater detail in the context of PLM, the 
commercial interests of the website create particular material conditions that coax the 
sharing of specifically biomedical data that tells a patient’s story. This also influences 
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the discursive space of the site, which is constructed differently on the form-focused 
profile than it is within the open-ended “free space” of the community discussion 
forums. 
As I describe in chapter four, while the design of a space like PLM may be 
heavily guided by the company’s financial motives in ways that are, to my mind, 
unethical, such online spaces are nonetheless highly engaging and valuable to users. 
Health SNSs are significant for their role in validating the various and highly individual 
aspects of illness experience. This affirmation is socially produced through the 
discourse of communities whose members are mutually invested in a process of 
understanding, coping with, living well with, and, sometimes (when possible), 
overcoming their illnesses. Above and beyond the lauded access to medical and health-
related information made possible by the internet, spaces designed or used specifically 
to negotiate the complicated ins and outs of personal or familial illness can be seen as 
transgressive, in the sense that they create space for certain kinds of dialogue, personal 
expression, and narrative creation that are socially impermissible in other cultural 
spaces. The notable exception to this point is, of course, the genre of published illness or 
disability memoirs, which bring marginalized experiences into mainstream cultural 
spaces (although these narratives cannot always be classified as transgressive portrayals 
of illness or disability). However, the creation of these narratives is limited to those with 
the writing ability, financial freedom, professional connections, and/or education 
necessary to access this relatively exclusive field of cultural production.  
Certainly, access to the Internet and to socially networked platforms that 
facilitate the creation of personal illness narratives is also restricted by cultural and 
socioeconomic constraints. The fallacy of describing the Internet as a democratized 
sphere of communication with equal access for all has been thoroughly critiqued in the 
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literature and I do not wish to replicate that same mistake here. While not everyone 
possesses the resources required for participating as an “expert patient”—including 
Internet access, digital device ownership, free time, and technological literacy—the 
opportunity for narrating one’s personal experience online is certainly available to 
greater numbers of writers than the contemporary publishing industry can 
accommodate. This is particularly true in the context of digital life writing (on blogs, 
vlogs, and SNSs), “a realm,” as Morrison notes, “with no gatekeepers, editors, or 
canons, producing texts to excess on a scale of production and publication that 
completely overwhelms the boutique reading practices of literary scholarship” 
(“Facebook” 112).  
Keeping these important limitations in mind, I contend that the online story-
writing of persons with illnesses (and their partners-in-care) certainly belongs to the 
transgressive space created by online disease communities, which opens up 
opportunities for otherwise silenced conversations. While those who join social 
networking sites like PLM, CureTogether, DailyStrength, and Inspire do not necessarily 
set out with the goal of writing a personal illness narrative, the interactions on these 
sites are predominantly story-based. The community forum exchanges of individuals 
on these sites are rooted in the idea that personal illness experience is a powerful source 
of information. Sharing experience in this way—whether through brief anecdotes or 
lengthy expositions—becomes a way for writers to craft a particular interpretation of 
their own experience that may then become a source of new knowledge for the reader. 
Stories told on health SNSs cannot be described as narratives in the traditional sense, 
partially because the explicit intentionality of “writing the story of my illness” is not 
present. However, the goal for individuals who (depending on the affordances of the 
site) share profile information, author journal entries, and write and respond to forum 
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posts is to fully represent their illness journey. This representation becomes articulated 
in narrative ways and it also becomes interpreted narratively by the reader/viewer. 
 
Blogging illness 
While similar conversations happen within the comments threads of blogs as 
those that take place in community forums, there is a very different dynamic at play on 
personal blogs. On each of these sites, one individual’s story comes to the fore, and the 
genre reflects autobiographical life writing; the writing is directed equally toward 
therapeutic self-reflection and documentation for both personal and altruistic purposes. 
On the blogs of persons with Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias (ADRD), 
examples I will discuss in chapter five, many writers indicate having started a blog to 
support readers, specifically those experiencing similar life circumstances, using their 
own personal stories.  
As other scholars have argued, social media like blogs (and, as I will discuss 
below, Twitter) create new opportunities to productively tweak or navigate certain 
social conventions, in this case those related to personal illness. As danah boyd notes, 
the asynchronicity of some social media can act as a social buffer. For an HIV-positive 
man, she writes, keeping a blog where his friends could go to read about 
his ups and downs of his illness . . . allowed him to negotiate social boundaries 
with friends in new ways. He no longer had to gauge the appropriateness of the 
situation to suddenly declare his T-cell count. Likewise, his friends didn’t have to 
overcome their uncertainty in social situations to ask about his health. He could 
report when he felt comfortable doing so, and they could read when they were 
prepared to know. This subtle shift in how he shared information with friends 
and how friends consumed it eased all sorts of tensions. (75).  
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boyd uses this anecdote to suggest that “technology doesn’t simply break social 
conventions—it introduces new possibilities for them” (75). In this example, it becomes 
possible for the individual writing about his illness to manage both information and 
relationships in a way that minimizes social anxiety and maximizes social support. 
The counterargument to boyd’s view posits that these so-called affordances of 
social media—asynchronicity and the resulting alleviation of social burdens, such as the 
face-to-face, “real-time” expression of care—actually weaken our social and emotional 
ties, holding people less accountable to one another. This line of reasoning suggests that 
an asynchronous exchange in an individual’s blog comments does not carry the same 
supportive value as, say, a face-to-face conversation, ostensibly because of the way in 
which such communication is mediated. This is the line of reasoning Hubert Dreyfus 
pursues in On the Internet, in which he argues that 
when we enter cyberspace and leave behind our animal-shaped, emotional, 
intuitive, situated, vulnerable, embodied selves, and thereby gain a remarkable 
new freedom never before available to human beings, we might, at the same 
time, necessarily lose some of our crucial capacities: our ability to make sense of 
things so as to distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, our sense of the 
seriousness of success and failure that is necessary for learning, and our need to 
get a maximum grip on the world that gives us our sense of the reality of things. 
(6)  
Dreyfus argues that online interaction is physically detached, written (and, thus, more 
calculated or “editable”), and far less socially and emotionally risky. Indeed, because of 
the mediation of potential discomfort (because the stakes are much lower), online 
interaction is “easier” in a negative way; according to Dreyfus, it could signal the 
decline of important human emotional and psychological capacities. On the contrary, a 
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face-to-face social encounter, because of the potential for discomfort, also carries with it 
the capacity for a greater reward.  
Sherry Turkle expresses similar anxieties in her latest book Alone Together, in 
which she suggests, “Virtual places offer connection with uncertain claims to 
commitment. We don’t count on cyberfriends to come by if we are ill, to celebrate our 
children’s successes, or help us mourn the death of our parents. People know this, and 
yet the emotional charge on cyberspace is high. People talk about digital life as the 
‘place for hope,’ the place where something new will come to them. . . . Now, when 
there is a lull, we check our e-mail, texts, and messages” (154). Turkle makes the case 
that technology preys on our human vulnerabilities—our loneliness, our fear of 
intimacy—and presents us with an appealing offer: “the illusion of companionship 
without the demands of friendship” (1). The implication in Turkle’s work is that 
relationships founded on digital modes of togetherness are necessarily weaker than 
those that rely on physical proximity. 
In the context of illness-based online communities, and the relationships that 
form around the shared experience of illness, I am particularly struck by the way in 
which “cyberfriends” do, indeed, “come by [our virtual ‘homes’] if we are ill,” just as 
they celebrate with us and help us mourn our losses. Perhaps these relationships should 
not serve to replace those based on “in-the-flesh” interaction, which is the point I believe 
Turkle makes; however, there is certainly evidence in these friendships of true care and 
interdependence, an idea that I will expand upon in the next chapter in light of the SNS 
communities that form around shared disease experience. 
In terms of the cultural work that blogs about personal illness produce, beyond 
their functions as coping mechanisms, arenas for knowledge dissemination, and ways 
to mediate difficult conversations with acquaintances or loved ones, these are spaces for 
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ongoing reflection and narrative writing that chronicles the illness journey in ways that 
necessarily disrupt conventional narrative structures, such as those outlined by Arthur 
Frank, whose work I will return to shortly. While writers self-consciously construct a 
narrative about their experience, using many of the same tropes of battle and 
overcoming, the way in which a narrative evolves temporally—that is, the way it is 
written in serial fashion—pre-empts the kind of deliberate framing of the overall illness 
journey and its reduction to a simplistic story of re-normalization. As Jill Walker 
Rettburg notes, although we are used to episodic narrative in formats such as television 
shows, comic books, and novel series, blogs do not create the same kinds of narrative 
effects (such as “the cliffhanger,” for example), because of both the brevity of blog posts 
and the conventional lack of continuity between posts (112). In addition to this is the 
potential boundlessness of a blog; it does not really have a conclusion, unless it reflects 
what Rettburg calls a “goal-oriented narrative,” which sets out a particular project, 
parameters, and conclusion for the blog (113). Indeed, even in personal journal-style 
blogs, some writers may decide to delete a blog, “conclude” it by signing off, or be 
unable to continue writing because of illness or death. In this last scenario, if he or she 
was the only author, the blog will no longer be updated, although a friend or relative 
may publish a post to inform readers about the blogger’s status (Rettburg 119). Unless 
the website is removed, though, the blog will continue to generate hits, perhaps even be 
linked to or commented on. The hyperlink could be seen as a way in which a blog 
becomes a part of other stories on the web and continues to generate a narrative of 
sorts—to be implicated in others’ illness journeys or to serve as a space for continued 
conversation. In a way, the story goes on and on, even after it loses its author. 
More to the point, however, structurally speaking there is no defined end to a 
blog, and indeed, no need to conceive of an ending, a generic convention that cannot 
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possibly be sidestepped in a traditional memoir or autobiography. The pressure to 
produce any kind of narrative “arc,” then, is relieved. As Rettburg notes, “When blogs 
tell stories . . . that story is usually partial and incomplete, and does not form a narrative 
whole as well-formed stories in mainstream literature and cinema do. Instead, the 
overall story as gleaned from reading a blog is likely to be pieced together from 
fragments, perhaps supplemented by bits of stories from other places” (115). These 
other places could be social media spaces, such as the writer’s Twitter feed, PLM 
profile, or another personal blog.  
Certainly, the fragmentary quality of blog narrative does not preclude smaller 
episodes within the larger fragmented story from adopting classical narrative 
structures. Furthermore, there is an unavoidably high degree of self-fashioning on 
blogs, as is the case on other social media like health SNSs, Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook, 
Instagram, and so on. Writers of blogs self-consciously project a particular vision of 
personal identity when they represent their experiences online, and they may even 
work to realize a particular narrative framework or mythology for their illness 
experience. However, attending to the generic qualities of the blog reveals that the 
piecemeal nature of the medium constitutes space in which to tell a story that does not 
reach a resolution, that dwells in the messiness of human life, and that articulates the 
complexities of an experience like cancer or multiple sclerosis or Alzheimer’s disease. 
This very open-endedness, even if it is limited by the unavoidable narrative 
expectations we impose on our own experiences and identities, nonetheless influences 
stories of illness, particularly since they are told as works-in-progress.  
In her discussion of the Leukemia journals on the WELL, McLellan makes an 
observation that could apply equally to the personal illness blog: 
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the Leukemia journals, like many on-line narratives, are a long work in progress, 
presumably finished only when participants stop posting. For the participants, 
the ongoing nature of the story is crucial. There is a rawness and emotional 
power in these postings that is hard to sustain on the printed page, especially 
considering the usual lapse of time between experience and book publication. 
The freshness and lack of self-consciousness of electronic postings can provide 
rare glimpses of less-mediated experience. While deceit is certainly possible, 
vulnerability can also be magnified when the masks and defenses of on-line 
writers are all but absent. In that respect, the on-line narrative may come closer 
to actual experience than any other kind of illness story. (103) 
While this sort of narrative form has been assessed by some critics as, indeed, anti-
narrative—a product of what “[Frederic] Jameson predicted [as] the loss of narrative 
resolution and the descent into cultural schizophrenia at the hands of highly informated 
capital” (Bassett 6)—Caroline Bassett argues that new media have not, in fact, replaced 
“the logic of narrative” with “the logic of information” (2). Indeed, the alignment of 
narrative as inherently human against information, which is inherently technological, 
institutes a false binary. Despite the nature of contemporary narrative as characterized 
by fragmentation, discontinuity, rupture, in-process-ness, and non-linearity, Bassett 
argues, “narrative lives because it is contingent and mutable, because it is changing and 
transforming rather than fading in response to alterations in the material conditions 
under which we live . . .” (3). I will return to the nuances of this discussion in chapter 
five when I analyze the blog writing of persons with Alzheimer’s disease. 
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Illness “auto/tweetographies” 
The affordance to author online narratives of personal illness, of course, happens 
in a moment when the social exigence for public self-disclosure about personal illness 
experience (for whatever reason—empathic support, information sharing, therapeutic 
writing) arises, in combination with the capacities of networked technologies to provide 
user-friendly and accessible web applications for self-publishing. A similar set of 
circumstances has produced the chronicling of illness experience on the social 
networking site Twitter. The medium has been referred to as “micro-blogging” for the 
technical constraint of permitting writers only 140 characters per tweet and the reverse-
chronological ordering of posts; the differences between a blog and a Twitter feed, 
however, seem substantial enough that such a designation demands reconsideration. 
More so than the blog, perhaps, the medium of the tweet seems to draw out amplified 
anxieties and suspicions, namely the argument that the predominance of fragmentary 
snippets of information over the longer, cohesive, sustained, and self-enclosed narrative 
heralds the rise of information and the demise of narrative. Indeed, this observation has 
been met with alarm by commentators such as Nicholas Carr who calls the Internet “an 
interruption system, a machine geared for dividing attention” that has already begun to 
produce a waning of human capacities for sustained attention, complex thought, and 
deep concentration (131). 
At the forefront of this debate are thinkers like N. Katherine Hayles and Bernard 
Stiegler whose work theorizes the ways in which contemporary technoculture 
infiltrates, disrupts, and rewires cognition. While debate over the effects of our 
dominant cultural form—the information tidbit—are ever-expanding in importance, it 
also seems imperative that we explore how narrative does, indeed, persist despite the 
ongoing and radical changes to how we receive it. The production of illness narratives 
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in online spaces reflects a desire, on the part of the individual, to make sense of an 
experience through written representation, and also to make that experience widely 
available to an audience of, oftentimes, anonymous readers for a variety of reasons. This 
particular use of a space like Twitter complicates disparaging analyses of the medium 
as dumbed-down, easily digestible drivel that chronicles the mundane and 
inconsequential details of users’ lives. It makes possible an understanding of this space 
as facilitating important, socially engaged modes of self-representation, a possibility 
that becomes illuminated through the example of Dr. Kate Granger’s widely publicized 
use of Twitter to broadcast her illness journey. 
As in the case of the personal blog, it is, perhaps, the very open-endedness of 
Twitter—it’s framelessness—that establishes the conditions for this kind of self-
disclosure. Of course, this “framelessness” creates a kind of frame: the writing of a 
tweet is an occasion to say something—anything; an entreaty for frequent, excessive, 
sometimes obsessive sharing. In many ways, Twitter sharing differs from blog writing 
because, as Antti Oulasvirta et al. observe in their study of microblogging on Jaiku and 
Twitter, the practice is defined by frequent sharing of “current activities and 
experiences,” which “creates pressure to continue sending status updates even at very 
mundane moments, as the sender’s presence is constantly being created and recreated 
through these messages” (238). This means that the content of tweets often reflect what 
is happening at the moment of writing, although this is not always the case. Laurie 
McNeill surmises that “blogging remains popular, and is the place for longer entries 
(and not the banal), while microblogs and social networking sites call for these rapid-
fire but often quite trivial life installments” (150). Writers, of course, selectively decide 
which of their life moments are worth sharing and, by doing so, they “may be 
constructing the social meaning of those events” (Oulasvirta et al. 248). Twitter, 
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Facebook, and other social media have built-in systems for responding to and affirming 
the sharing of others, so through “favorites,” “likes,” “retweets,” “tags,” and 
“mentions,” other users decide which topics receive favourable attention, thus 
“engag[ing] in a communal act of auto/biographical reflection and affirmation” 
(McNeill 150). In this way, sharing is sculpted by the user’s social circle of followers and 
takes place according to whatever expectations arise as a result of the culturally 
embedded nature of such communication. These “auto/tweetographies,” as McNeill 
calls them, also alter our offline practices, “with users on the alert for the ‘reportable,’ 
thinking of how to shape experiences into status updates or tweets” (151). This is 
connected to “the communal pressure to keep producing and consuming” these micro-
stories, which helps to “embed auto/biographical acts in cultural consciousness. The 
modes of auto/biography become part of millions of people’s daily routines” (151). 
As the technology continues to define itself, conflict arises over what is the 
“appropriate way” to use it, the proper etiquette, and the acceptable topics of discussion 
and contribution. This, as Gitelman and Pingree elucidate, is the case for any new 
communication medium: “new media, when they first emerge, pass through a phase of 
identity crisis, a crisis precipitated at least by the uncertain status of the given medium 
in relation to established, known media and their functions. . . . [T]heir place is at first ill 
defined, and their ultimate meanings or functions are shaped over time by that society’s 
existing habits of media use, by shared desires for new uses, and by the slow process of 
adaptation between the two” (xii). It would be naïve to argue that Twitter does, in 
practice, fulfill its function as a forum in which to “say anything.” A person’s 
participation in any Internet space is unavoidably susceptible to real-world social 
norms, including the same (or more pronounced) harassment, discrimination, shaming, 
bullying, and any other kind of violence that exists in offline spaces (Dery 1). When 
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other Twitter users and journalists report that a user like Kate Granger is breaking a 
taboo about “what we should talk about online,” they are both identifying and 
questioning the authority of those proscriptions. The viral nature of this sort of activity 
on social media means that if enough individuals decide that they, too, see the 
importance of demystifying the experience of illness and death online, then a small 
space opens up for that kind of conversation to happen (conversations that are, of 
course, already happening in niche social networking sites and communities like 
PatientsLikeMe and DailyStrength).  
The importance of this discussion happening in a generic, mainstream space like 
Twitter cannot be understated. While the attention paid to human vulnerability and the 
sharing of empathic support is certainly valuable on health-related social networking 
sites, the subversiveness of such a space is limited in the sense that the transgressive 
activity is confined within a community of (generally) likeminded people with similar 
experiences; the site name “PatientsLikeMe” aptly demonstrates this point. When these 
conversations shift to mainstream spaces, the potential arises for wider attention to be 
paid to human vulnerability. In a small way, this fissure, this provocation, might 
represent an alternative to understanding the Internet as a space for shameless self-
promotion, posturing, and narcissism, as some critics have figured it. At the same time, 
the sharing of any kind of personal experience, whether negative or positive may be 
construed as a way of seeking to validate the ego through Internet conventions like the 
Twitter “retweet,” the Facebook “like” or “share,” or the blog comment or “trackback.” 
I will attempt to address this tension in chapter four through my discussion of PLM 
users’ deployment of the concept “new normal.” Here, the discussion of personal 
illness-related challenges serves as an opportunity for individual and social acceptance 
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in the face of radical life changes and not necessarily narcissistic attention-seeking 
behaviour (though there is the possibility that both motivations might be at play). 
 
Kate Granger and #deathbedlive 
 Thus far, I have sketched an outline of how the structural and social affordances 
of SNSs, blogs, and Twitter, each in their own way, carve out space for the performance 
of difference and for the construction of alternative personal illness narratives that 
disrupt received thematic frameworks. Returning to my discussion of Arthur Frank’s 
The Wounded Storyteller in chapter two, these traditional frameworks include: chaos, 
quest, and restitution. Frank’s theory presupposes that, as individuals think about, talk 
about, write about, and otherwise creatively express their experiences of illness, we 
assert an overarching narrative about what the illness means in the grand scheme of our 
lives. This framework helps us to cope with the perceived loss of control, self-direction, 
and autonomy that comes along with any threat to ‘normal’ living. As I argue, the 
approach that Frank forwards—that is, the restitution narrative—still heavily asserts a 
reading of illness or disability as a temporary, abnormal state that needs overcoming; it 
accommodates neither the experience of chronic illness, nor terminal illness, nor the 
simple reality that human beings are unavoidably susceptible to pain and suffering—
experiences that are consistently framed as negative, undesirable, and even unusual in 
the received narrative structures. 
Where does a tweet narrative about personal illness fit into Frank’s model, 
taking, for example, Kate Granger’s ongoing self-narration of her cancer journey? 
Granger has expressly reacted against the metaphor of battle, expressing on her blog, as 
well as on Twitter, that the notion of a person losing her battle against cancer 
“somehow lays blame with the patient and seems very unfair. . . . [W]hen I die I will be 
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turning in my grave if anyone says ‘she lost her brave fight’. I would like to be 
remembered as a fairly successful, fun-loving and ambitious individual, not as a loser” 
(“Cancer in the Media”). As a scientist and doctor, she notes, “I quite admire my 
cancer” for its beauty and mystery at the cellular level (Granger, “Is cancer inherently 
evil?”). She has made very public her ambivalence toward aggressive treatment, after 
experiencing the destructive effects of chemotherapy, and has shared with readers her 
difficult choice to continue chemotherapy, despite her apprehension (Granger, “Dear 
Chemo” and “Dear Chemo Part 2”). And she repeatedly turns to humour to spread her 
positive outlook because it “normalises this huge life event that is approaching for me” 
(Granger, “Dying – can it ever be a laughing matter?”). Her narrative takes its 
overarching structure from the axiomatic appeal to live in the present, to enjoy the 
moment, to make each day count for something. As a physician, Granger is in a better 
position, at least than the average cancer patient, to know the biological intricacies of 
how her own story is likely to end. And while the decision to tweet her illness is 
certainly “to open up discussion,” it is also a definitive provocation of social media-
related anxieties surrounding what is an appropriate topic for a 140-character tweet or 
Facebook status update; how personal, how “morbid,” how bodily, how human are we 
permitted to be in these spaces?  
When scholars theorize about illness narrative, they often position it as a 
therapeutic form of storytelling—a situation of crisis that may be resolved through 
creative expression (see Frank, Kleinman, Lorde). In the context of Twitter, however, we 
see illness become embedded in what is already a pre-existing stream of self-disclosure. 
Illness is not necessarily a call for stories, but it becomes a part of the story. Looking at 
Granger’s Twitter feed, we see that her more autobiographical tweets shift between 
anecdotes about day-to-day living, work, family, special occasions, mundane moments, 
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and noteworthy events, some of which include hospital visits, chemotherapy, scans, 
medical procedures, and sick days. 
These individual tweets can be strung together to produce a narrative, though 
the immediacy and real-time nature of these 140-character “blurbs” mean that they are 
generally not imagined by the writer to belong to a larger, overarching telos. Instead, 
the cohesiveness of these pieces of text might owe itself to the conscious way in which 
individuals construct an online identity and conform to social expectations about their 
online contributions. The reader may be likely to connect the dots of a friend’s serially 
received tweets to understand his or her experience narratively. Indeed, an individual’s 
profile of tweets and retweets composes a micro-blogged story, one that is read live, or 
nearly so. However, the format of the Twitter profile certainly does not lend itself to 
backward narrative analysis. Attempting to dig months and years back into the archive 
of Granger’s tweets during my research made Twitter’s status as a compulsive and 
always-on technology abundantly clear. Indeed, the structure of the interface compels a 
live or only moderately asynchronous reading, especially on the profile pages of heavy 
users who tweet several times daily. 
And yet, the micro-stories that combine to form larger stories on Twitter are 
often unavoidably narrative and autobiographical in nature. Kate Granger’s Twitter 
presence is explicitly constructed to represent her experience—it is a space of sharing 
and self-expression. This is, of course, an unsurprising way to use social media. Perhaps 
obviously, the attention surrounding Granger’s narrative choices on Twitter is not a 
result of her being a woman with cancer who tweets, but a result of her being a woman 
with cancer who tweets about her cancer (and her eventual death); the controversy is 
over her decision not to omit the taboo details of her life from her Twitter presence. 
Indeed, as I mentioned before, in the “wild, wild West” of newer social media spaces, 
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the boundaries are constantly being defined, negotiated, and renegotiated, so discussion 
over “should we really talk about that online?” seems prominent in the popular 
imagination. One of Granger’s expressed goals is to push the envelope over what we 
consider to be the appropriate way to deal with, understand, and manage dying and 
death. This is undoubtedly a subversive move, particularly in a space where the focus is 
on life-logging, defined (though implicitly) against the alternative—mortality, or 
reminders thereof (suffering, illness, injury, bereavement, or anything that might be 
characterized as a threat to one’s vitality). If, as Marcel O’Gorman argues in Necromedia, 
using the work of Ernest Becker and others, contemporary technoculture serves as an 
immortality engine through which to reaffirm the uniqueness and worth of the 
individual, then Granger’s powerful campaign can be read as subverting this collective 
hallucination. At the same time, Granger’s tweets about death serve as a 
memorialization of the final years of her life in the form of an archive that will outlast 
her earthly presence, just as individuals’ blog and SNS presences function. Granger’s 
archive of the self, while it certainly works toward a goal of demystifying the human 
experience of dying, nonetheless serves as a means of immortalization that may protect 
Granger (and others who document their experiences of terminal illness) against the 
finality of death. 
Granger’s use of Twitter reveals an interesting interplay between the expected 
ways in which users engage with a platform like Twitter and the more subversive 
appropriations of the space. In this case, a writer like Granger is able to act 
provocatively, through the emergence of affordances that are created when various 
elements converge: a social network, an interface for self-documentation, a social 
exigence to share one’s personal experience, and a cultural taboo that needs 
deconstructing. A similar assemblage of factors establishes affordances for writers in 
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other Internet spaces to engage in this kind of activity. Many of the personal narratives 
of illness that I will discuss in the last two chapters, authored by individuals living with 
illnesses, self-consciously assert the importance of rejecting hegemonic understandings 
of what it means to live a normal life. Their narratives provoke readers to reorient 
expectations surrounding the performance of a “sick role” and to question prefabricated 
narratives of overcoming and renormalization, particularly in the case of chronic 
illnesses like multiple sclerosis (chapter four) and degenerative ones like dementia 
(chapter five). 
Of course, even in the Twitterverse, where Kate Granger offers forth her personal 
story of human vulnerability, there exists a baffling contradiction that originates deep in 
the core of the corporate social media. That is, even as Granger in her own small way 
takes a swing at the behemoth of death anxiety that lurks in every shadow of human 
cultural activity, the denizens of the corporate Internet lay out their plans to “conquer 
death.” Indeed, the attempt to do so, according to commentary on Google’s 
forthcoming public health project Calico, capitalizes on the very user-contributed data 
that Tweeters, Facebookers, Googlers, bloggers, YouTubers and all the rest of us, 
Granger included, make so readily available (Farr). 
In another display of the limitations to user expression in commercialized 
Internet spaces, in this case on Facebook, we see the repeated censoring of the 
mastectomy photo, an attempt to shame women’s bodies (particularly those physically 
scarred by illness) and suppress the conversation surrounding the politics of breast 
cancer.9 The case to which I’m specifically referring occurred on the Facebook page of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 A user named Scorchy Barrington used the social justice website change.org to create a petition to Mark 
Zuckerberg entitled “Facebook: stop censoring photos of men and women who have undergone 
mastectomies.” As of 27 Feb. 2014, the petition was declared a victory, despite the deletion of photos on 
The SCAR Project website that day. 
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The SCAR Project, a photography project geared toward the documentation and 
destigmatization of post-mastectomy bodies. Facebook deleted images displaying the 
mastectomy scars of a woman who had passed away that very day; as the first person to 
be photographed for the project, the post was meant to memorialize her life and pay 
tribute to her courage. As the moderator notes, “It was the sight of Vanessa’s remaining 
nipple (the entirety of her other breast having been removed in a mastectomy) that sent 
Facebook’s censors into an infantile frenzy to protect the public from the horror of 
seeing a female nipple” (The SCAR Project). After users protested the decision, 
Facebook authorized the reposting of three of the deleted images—but only the ones 
depicting Vanessa after her remaining breast “and its offensive nipple” had been 
surgically removed (The SCAR Project).  
This tension, between subversive cultural action and our entanglement within 
the deep commercial and ideological substructures of the web, is a concern I take up in 
greater detail in the next chapter in the context of the health-related SNS 
PatientsLikeMe. 
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Chapter 4 | “Big Power and Big Money”: Social Networking the Clinical Gaze 
 
je participe 
tu participes 
il participe 
nous participons 
vous participez 
ils profitent 
Atelier Populaire (1968)10 
 
The odds are always good that big power and big money will find a way 
to control access to virtual communities. . . . What we know and do now 
is important because it is still possible for people around the world to 
make sure this new sphere of vital human discourse remains open to the 
citizens of the planet before the political and economic big boys seize it, 
censor it, meter it, and sell it back to us. 
Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community (1993) 
 
Accessibility in the context of the Internet has traditionally examined how online 
media have the potential to overcome socially constructed barriers to communication, 
social participation, and access to information. This is the approach taken by Paul T. 
Jaeger in Disability and the Internet, wherein he contextualizes the enthusiasm with 
which the emergence of the web was met by disability rights activists who envisioned 
this virtual space as ripe with potential for individuals who were (and are) limited by 
ableist restrictions in the public sphere (40). Interestingly enough, a similar sort of 
emancipatory rhetoric characterizes the discourse on patient activism and participatory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This text belongs to a poster created by students who formed the Atelier Populaire during the May 1968 student 
and worker protests in France. 
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medicine in relation to new media. Much of this activity has catalyzed around the use of 
social networking sites, Internet forums, web-based or mobile health management 
applications, and e-patient communication tools. These media are seen as avenues for 
“patient-driven medicine” whereby individuals can empower themselves with 
knowledge, community support, and individualized health plans, all of which, 
enthusiasts suggest, will amplify patient voices and facilitate the creation of 
collaborative partnerships with health practitioners.  
In the same way that Jaeger problematizes the rhetoric of emancipation related to 
disability and the Internet by revealing how a whole host of real-world barriers to 
participation for persons with disabilities have simply been replicated online, I also 
wish to problematize the technoenthusiast, emancipatory rhetoric of patient activism in 
the context of digital media (60-61). On the one hand, the manifesto of the e-patient 
movement as articulated by the Society for Participatory Medicine states: “Participatory 
Medicine is a movement in which networked patients shift from being mere passengers 
to responsible drivers of their health, and in which providers encourage and value them 
as full partners” (“Welcome,” my emphasis). On the other hand, some online spaces that 
claim to support participatory medicine continuously reinforce the identity of the 
individual as patient. This designation perpetuates the positioning of users under the 
scrutiny of a clinical gaze, separating body from subjectivity and creating a new 
entity—“the object of the gaze” (Foucault 83). Furthermore, on sites where the rhetorical 
exigence is explicitly connected to narratives of normalization, user involvement, in 
terms of how individuals can communicate and discuss experiences of disease or 
disability, is undoubtedly restricted. 
Therefore, I am concerned here with a different kind of accessibility, something 
we could perhaps call discursive access. By this I mean the degree to which the 
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discursive and rhetorical framing of a site of participation affirms the needs and 
identities of its users. This is an important type of accessibility that measures the rules 
of engagement according to which users can participate against the expressed or 
implied goals of that group. The design of a site of participation is crucial to this 
analysis since it dictates the generic structures, frames of reference, and modes of 
interaction that are available to users in that space.  
While online health-related media achieve this objective with varying degrees of 
success, in this section I turn to the example of the health social networking site (SNS) 
PatientsLikeMe (PLM) to explore how the commercialized health social network frames 
and solicits user participation in ways that constrain the lived experience of disease or 
disability. In light of the palpable benefits of health social media to facilitate 
transgressive conversations about illness experience, some of which I discussed in the 
early part of this dissertation, in some instances, the potentially emancipatory activity 
that takes place on commercialized health social networks—PLM, for one, and others 
that may develop as health social media proliferate—is paradoxically, subject to rigidly 
defined boundaries. These spaces, where the “sick role” and the patient identity are 
enacted, allow for the temporary subversion of norms only insofar as user involvement 
corresponds to ableist logic and maintains a goal of eventual normalization. 
Furthermore, user practices within these spaces are rooted in the notion that the body is 
a source of data that will provide potential answers to physical ailments. As Olivia 
Banner notes in her study of the “informatic subject” on PLM, “these sites are points of 
biomediation, where a digital representation of an illness is accepted as corresponding 
to the truth of the body,” while at the same time, they are also sites “where the social 
construction of an illness is contoured as well as challenged by people with the illness” 
(198). Banner connects this biomediation to the obsessive practices of lifelogging, self-
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tracking, and the “transformation of affect into data” that “advance a process of 
informatic subjecthood” (199). 
While this is currently not the case with most other online personal health 
forums, such as Inspire, DailyStrength, and CureTogether, the framing of user 
experience within the coordinates of a biomedical norm or ideal is unavoidably 
persistent on PLM, currently the largest health SNS, where the cultural space of the site 
is susceptible to the governing logic of its commercial agenda. Thus, my argument in 
this chapter takes quite seriously Eric Topol’s concern “that online health communities 
will be exploited or controlled by entrepreneurial interest or the life science industry” 
(237).11 
Indeed, the nature of the participatory space on PLM is highly influenced by the 
involvement of various corporate customers, the presence of which establishes an 
environment of Foucaultian disciplinary control. The central question that persists 
throughout this investigation must be examined in light of the heavily political 
economic influences of the site’s existence and growth, that question being: is 
PatientsLikeMe a locus for the democratic sharing of information, or instead, an 
opportunity for large corporations to voyeuristically monitor consumer behaviour and 
attitudes? Perhaps even more importantly, can it be both? On one hand, the arguably 
useful tools designed for tracking and monitoring health function to prescribe user 
disclosure through a myopic focus on soliciting information that can be leveraged as 
sellable data. This greatly impedes the emergence of a productive dialogue surrounding 
experiences of ill health or disability because it restricts the expression of personal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 The health SNS CureTogether is one example of an ethical approach to Health 2.0 that could be 
compromised by its recent acquisition by the genetic testing corporation 23andMe. CureTogether is a 
two-person startup, described on its website as a “social business, currently funded by its founders and 
angel investment” that shares aggregated, anonymous user data for free with only a handful of reputable 
universities and research groups. Unlike PLM, the website shares only aggregated, anonymous user data 
with other users of the site and individual profiles are kept private. 
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experience to the confines of biomedical categories. By contrast, the site’s discussion 
forums seem to reject the enforced normalization that occurs in other parts of the site, 
namely the patient profile. 
In her study of the chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia communities on 
PLM, Banner observes that the “practice of self-quantification” required by the patient 
profile tool “amplifies a dynamic whereby together patients generally accept the terms 
offered by biomedicine through which to understand their illnesses” (200). In this 
study, however, I turn to a different PLM community—the multiple sclerosis (MS) 
forum—to explore how individuals generally resist this dynamic. Indeed, the content of 
members’ contributions and their responses to others’ experiences on the SNS reflect a 
transgressive understanding of illness as a “newly normal” state of being. Therefore, in 
the first part of this chapter, I focus on the member profiles and activity of the MS 
community. I chose this segment of the PLM user population because it represents a 
high percentage of the total members and posts on the site as a whole.12 In addition, 
because of my interest in analyzing how communities facilitate an individual’s 
negotiation of his or her “new normal,” it was important to study the disclosure of a 
community of healthcare seekers and partners in care whose lives were affected by an 
incurable, chronic, and poorly understood, not to mention highly idiosyncratic, illness. 
Because of these characteristics, discussions of normalcy—both social expectations and 
personal norms—are important to the MS illness community on PLM.  
As the Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada explains on its website, MS is a 
highly variable and, in many cases, unpredictable disease of the central nervous system. 
While little is understood about what precipitates MS, it is a process whereby the 
myelin, which protects the nerves of the central nervous system, begins to break down. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 As of 29 Nov 2013, the PLM MS community has 35,714 members and 946,913 discussion forum posts. 
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Current research on the causes of MS points to a complex interaction between 
environmental and genetic risk factors, although it is believed that neither is the sole 
contributing factor. While MS occurs at any age, it is typically detected between the 
ages of 15 and 40, and is three times as likely to occur among women than men. Because 
it disrupts the functioning of the central nervous system, MS can result in problems 
with balance, mobility, hearing, vision, and memory—however, each individual will 
experience these symptoms differently (“What is MS?”). Due to this reality, much of the 
discussion surrounding the disease on PLM is focused on dealing, not only with 
symptoms, treatments, and procedures, but also with the total disruption that the 
illness creates to one’s illusion of control and sense of normalcy.  
Following this analysis, I discuss how the affordances and constraints of the 
website, itself, can also be seen to account for the sorts of conversations that are 
permitted to thrive in these online spaces. The second part of the chapter seeks to 
expose the complexities and ambiguities generated by the various interests represented 
on the SNS—the individual users, the corporate partners, and the corporation, itself—
with an eye to uncovering the ways in which individual experiences of disease and 
disability are constructed in the online sphere of PLM. If patient care under the 
participatory health rubric tends toward a holistic approach, does a site like PLM, 
which uses a predominantly biomedical model in framing user experience, contribute to 
or hinder the amplification of the individual patient’s voice? 
 
A note on methodology in cyberethnography 
Current standards in new media studies regarding the analysis of user-
contributed content from SNSs, online communities, personal blogs and homepages, 
and so on are at the centre of ongoing debates in academic research. As the contributors 
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to Annette Markham and Nancy Baym’s edited collection Internet Inquiry explore, these 
are, of course, related to much larger grey areas regarding ‘personal’ space, privacy, 
intellectual property, and participation on the Internet, the boundaries and definitions 
of which remain under negotiation. My research on the MS forum of PLM has taken the 
form of what is popularly known as ‘lurking,’ in which I am neither a participant, nor 
an identified observer of the community. My choice to study the SNS in this way is 
related to the nature of my research—that is, grounded in textual analysis and close 
reading of users’ written contributions, as well as rhetorical analysis of the web 
interface, including its layout, structure, and visual composition.  
The analysis that follows is not a social scientific study, in which I factor in 
personal data about contributing participants in order to make conclusions about the 
users, themselves. Through humanities-based methodologies, I engage in what Shani 
Orgad calls qualitative Internet research: “the study of the multiple meanings and 
experiences that emerge around the internet in a particular context. These meanings 
and experiences can relate to contexts of use (by individuals, organizations, networks, 
etc.) and/or contexts of design and production processes. The task of a researcher is to 
inquire into those meanings and experiences and explore their significance” (“Question 
Two” 34). In my study of the PLM MS discussion forum, I focus on the substance of 
users’ contributions—that is, their writing, image sharing, and other interactions with 
the site’s tools—as representative of their experience; I am studying the way in which 
they construct their experiences through the structures of PLM, and how they respond 
to each others’ self-disclosure. I assume that the individual writers on the sites that I 
study are, indeed, who they say they are and have not attempted to collect data on 
these writers because I see their participation as representative of their experience.  
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The obvious downside to this online-only methodology, as Orgad notes, is its 
impact on the sample of participants, since it “is limited only to those who actively 
participate (e.g., those who post messages) and therefore are visible. However, many 
online participants are lurkers, but their participation and practices can be extremely 
significant and highly consequential for understanding an internet-related context. Yet 
from a discursive point of view, the ‘silent’ are difficult to incorporate into the analysis, 
as they leave no observable traces” (“Question Two” 43). Obtaining more information 
on these sorts of users would require contacting participants directly and using surveys 
or interview questions to discover more about their use practices on PLM. For the 
purposes of my research question in this chapter, however, I do not believe that this 
extra contextual information is pertinent or necessary. While it might provide an 
interesting additional layer of meaning to a larger study, my interest here is in critically 
analyzing the discourse of participants and the way in which that discourse is framed 
by the website for various intents and purposes.13 
The user-contributed content on this site, considered collectively, produces a 
particular shared experience; it also reinforces or denies certain portrayals or 
understandings of illness experience, through social processes of validation or dismissal 
(i.e. what gets written online, but also what goes unwritten or unresponded to). While I 
certainly do not consider this space as divorced from the other ways in which illness is 
lived (but, instead, as a part of this process), my scope is limited to the space and 
content of the PLM website. Like Orgad in her study of breast cancer patients online, I 
have no interest in comparing and contrasting online narratives with offline ones, since 
this move simply “reproduces the conceptual and methodological separation between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Although, it would certainly be valuable to know why users choose to lurk and what value they extract 
from the website, since they are not concerned with its storytelling and relationship-building 
components. 
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the online and the offline. It also constrains our ability to recognize the potential 
distinctive qualities of storytelling online that are not necessarily comparable to other 
modes of storytelling” (69). Instead, I understand individuals’ participation on PLM as 
one of many spaces in which they live the reality of their illness and construct meaning 
around it. Indeed, the structures of the website and the contributions of participants are 
deeply connected to and “embedded in a wider culture of health and illness” (Orgad, 
Storytelling 20). 
With regard to the issue of user privacy, I have chosen to de-identify user-
contributed content by altering usernames and paraphrasing (instead of directly 
quoting) users. Not only is this necessary because of the corporate control that PLM has 
over user content (over which it claims ownership), it is also important to the privacy of 
individual users who most likely regard the spaces of their profiles and disease 
communities as safe spaces, separate from more public parts of the Internet. Therefore, 
all usernames that I include in this study have been replaced with fictional ones and, as 
such, they do not reflect the actual names of participants. Additionally, since direct 
quotations are searchable and could potentially identify users, all original phrasing has 
been reworded, albeit with great care, to express the substance of each user’s writing. 
While I have made these methodological choices in the interests of respecting users’ 
rights to privacy, PLM is quite transparently a space where user involvement is subject 
to various kinds of “eyeballs,” including PLM’s corporate partners, as well as other 
industry representatives who may be lurking on the site. This suggests that the SNS is 
actually a semi-private space, in which users are required to register, but anyone can 
register and the surveillance of users is considered a part of the site’s governing agenda. 
It is, therefore, important to keep in mind how users’ awareness of the “lurking 
researchers” (like me) might influence how they participate and what they choose to 
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share, since, as danah boyd aptly notes, the collapsing of social contexts online 
“change[s] the rules about how people can and do behave” (“A Response” 30). 
 
Negotiating a “new normal” on the PatientsLikeMe discussion forums 
 A significant amount of discussion in the MS forum stems from the uncertainty 
and fear experienced by individuals with new diagnoses or symptoms. Thus, my 
analysis of users’ contributions to PLM MS discussion forums centres around the 
deployment of the term “normal,” as users attempt to redefine the shape of their lives 
after diagnosis.14 The recurring question, particularly in MS communities, is: “is this 
[my experience] normal?” In the case of MS, the notion of “normalcy” is particularly 
complicated, in the sense that there is no single predictable or even “average” way in 
which persons experience the illness. At the same time, there are a range of expected 
symptoms that people with MS often deal with, as well as a common cache of 
medications, procedures, and treatments that individuals may be prescribed. These 
introduce secondary sets of side effects and symptoms that MS sufferers may 
experience in common.  
A frequent type of discussion thread on the MS forums on PatientsLikeMe might 
begin with an individual expressing concern over a new symptom or impairment that 
they are experiencing and issuing an open question to other forum participants asking 
whether or not this phenomenon is normal. That is, is it something that others have 
experienced or been warned about? Is it a sign of something else? In these types of 
threads, respondents often provide accounts of their own similar experiences, offering 
advice or a story about how they coped. The response may give practical guidance 
about a symptom, treatment, or side effect, or simply serve a sympathetic and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 As of 4 December 2013: 10,136 results from PLM, MS group topics. 
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supportive function. In one such example, only a few users respond to Antonia’s 
concern over an unusual recurring arm twitch, and all seem to agree, based on their 
own experiences, that Antonia simply overexerted herself and that, unless it gets worse, 
she does not need to see her doctor. In typical fashion, another user, Maria, provides 
links to further information, in this case on the topic of twitches typically associated 
with MS. Of course, Maria self-consciously places quotation marks around “usual” 
when she refers to these symptoms, in an effort to signal the unsuitability of such a term 
in the context of MS.  
 It would seem that a large part of the anxiety surrounding MS in the discussion 
forums is the very nature of the disease as multiplicitous, unpredictable, and 
idiosyncratic. While other types of illnesses might allow the afflicted at least the minor 
comfort of ‘normalcy’ through group belonging to a legion of similarly ‘abnormal’ 
bodies or psyches, diseases like MS are perhaps even more stigmatizing in the sense 
that they prohibit group identification to a large degree—instead, sufferers are joined 
by the confoundingness of an illness that, at times, alienates them even from one 
another.  
 
“New normal”15 and “living with” 
 While metaphors of battle are, of course, central to the way in which many 
health-related SNS users understand their experiences of illness, a counter-rhetoric also 
emerges in stories in which members empower one another to think beyond the notion 
of mere survival. Particularly in the case of diseases like MS, a chronic illness for which 
there is no cure and no definitive way of predicting the speed of progression, members 
seem particularly attuned to the necessity of finding a way to live with their condition—!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Many thanks to Natalee Blagden for directing my attention to this terminology. 
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and, even, to thrive in spite of it. One discussion thread in particular, created as a way 
for individuals to talk about their hobbies and talents, provides a fitting example of this 
positive group psychology. Posters to the thread share anecdotes and photos that 
describe the skills, activities, and creative projects that they either continue to practice 
or have newly taken up since their diagnosis with MS. These include activities as 
diverse as painting, photography, home renovation, carpentry, piano-playing, cake-
making, acting, crafting, juggling, camping, gardening, cooking, writing, and so on. The 
topic originator’s goal is blatant from the beginning—to combat the dangerous and self-
defeating fixation on the overwhelming physical and/or cognitive losses sustained by 
those diagnosed with MS. The thread presents an opportunity to refocus attention on 
personal success and to promote the self-worth of contributing members. While the 
space of the PLM discussion forums certainly provides an arena in which it is okay to 
be ‘broken-down,’ ‘sick,’ ‘unproductive,’ and ‘whiney’ (all deprecating, culturally 
constructed labels that sufferers of chronic illness contend with), this space also presents 
an arena for asserting alternative (and perhaps decidedly non-Western) values 
regarding what it means to live well.  
These two dynamics of the MS discussion forum on PLM are mutually 
reinforcing, in the sense that they allow contributors to: 1) acknowledge the way in 
which their new bodily or cognitive states pose a threat to socially acceptable ways of 
living in Western society; 2) share personal stories about sickness, frailty, unhappiness, 
disorder, alienation, confusion, and frustration that are unacceptable or unwelcome in 
other, more mainstream spaces of daily life; and 3) collectively imagine and promote 
alternative modes of living and finding self-actualization that may resist master 
narratives of success. All of these affordances are accessed through the conceptual lens 
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or framing device of a “new normal” that users define for themselves through the 
reflective and interactive community space of the PLM discussion forum. 
Indeed, as I discovered through countless hours of reading through discussion 
threads in the MS forum, many contributors to PLM couched the experience of 
reorienting their lives in relation to an MS diagnosis in the language of normalcy and 
difference. The ever-shifting terrain of MS, as lived by those diagnosed with the illness, 
has led many to refer to new sets of symptoms (or even the very unpredictability of 
symptoms) as constituting their “new normal.” This deployment of the concept of 
“normalcy” is worth investigating in greater detail, since it actively disrupts the very 
notion of a norm. It implies that normalcy is, indeed, as idiosyncratic as the experience 
of MS. It points to the notion that an individual body dwells in its own, individually 
articulated realm, in which there persists the reference point of a personal norm. This 
doesn’t square up so nicely with the notion of a hegemonic norm against which, socially 
and culturally, we delineate the boundaries between ability and disability, normalcy 
and deviance. I suggest that use of such language represents a political stance. Indeed, 
in referencing “my new normal,” individuals actively resist the expectation that their 
bodies, their minds, their work, their relationships, and so on, conform to the accepted 
and culturally endorsed standards that define the norm.  
Therefore, I argue that the deployment of the term “new normal” is a subversive 
move that works to disrupt the notion of bodily normalcy. The new normal that users 
describe is, in fact, a resistance to the norm—it acknowledges the idiosyncratic nature of 
the body (in this case, the body with MS), the flexibility and mutability of bodily states 
from day to day or month to month, and the lack of control that one can assert over 
one’s embodiment. That is to say, the new normal is an ongoing process of continually 
adjusting one’s expectations of the body, of self, and of others according to constantly 
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shifting (and unpredictable) conditions of existence in a way that honours personal 
values and wellbeing. In contrast to the personal profile charts that I will discuss in the 
next section, which unilaterally assert a biomedical norm, users’ personal stories 
communicate the importance of asserting and accepting the abnormal (that is to say, 
doing away with the norm altogether). 
In one telling discussion thread, Sankavi writes about her resistance to thinking 
about the future or trying to make sense of what is happening to her. She comments 
that every time she seems to grasp a new understanding of her reality, it quickly 
changes once again. The unpredictability of the illness, as well as the feeling of loss that 
accompanies a diagnosis—particularly a loss of hope for the future—is an experience 
that many posters write about through the language of bereavement. Stacey observes 
that she and her friends with MS experience the grief of a lost sense of self and the 
disruption of future plans. Henrietta writes of her life before MS as a former life that she 
now mourns. Maria notes that each new change brings about this same experience, so 
that, as Ankita expresses in a different thread, the grieving process is ongoing as 
physical and emotional states fluctuate. As many point out however, this is a “normal” 
part of the experience of, not just MS, but of life itself. As Roisin elucidates, all humans 
must accept change as an unavoidable condition of existence—it just so happens that 
those with MS face the threat of mortality at an earlier life stage than most of us expect.  
This “dilemma,” as Roisin aptly describes it, of facing how to function in a 
transforming body, is prevalent in many of the MS threads. In one revelatory example, 
in a discussion thread about embracing one’s “new normal,” Wenchao describes the 
difficult decision she made to donate all of her clothes and shoes that she could no 
longer wear due to MS-related changes. She had been holding on to these personal 
items for the past five years, with the hope that her body would one day return to its 
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former state. As she explains, the act of giving away these possessions felt symbolic of 
having given up her determination to be an “old self” and moving toward acceptance of 
her new reality. At the same time, she sees this new self, who cannot fit into her clothes 
and shoes, as a stranger whom she is still getting to know. 
Wenchao’s self-disclosure regarding her experience of abandoning an obsolete 
sense of self highlights the tensions at play in many individuals’ experiences of MS—the 
desire to protect the sense of a stable identity, while at the same time finding the 
flexibility to adapt certain parts of oneself, including those markers by which we often 
define “the self,” to new physical and cognitive states. Her discussion thread and other 
similar ones create a space in which writers can negotiate the constraints and 
opportunities that arise in the gap between an “old” and a “new” self. Pat opens up 
about this process of redefining in the context of her retirement, explaining how she 
once saw her work as a large part of her identity. The transition to retirement is 
challenging both because of her self-judgment and because of the ways in which she 
feels others regard her. The crisis these individuals describe is not simply one of health, 
but also of compromised identity and a flagging sense of self-determination. 
The uncomfortable space between an “old” and a “new” normal can be seen as a 
product of the social category that Susan Wendell suggests young and middle-aged 
people with chronic illnesses inevitably inhabit. In an article that puts forward the 
necessity of understanding chronic illness as disability, Wendell, a disability 
activist/scholar and chronic illness sufferer, explains that this social group is 
not easily understood or accepted. We are considered too young to be ill for the 
rest of our lives, yet we are not expecting cure or recovery. We cannot be granted 
the time-out that is normally granted to the acutely ill (or we were given it at first 
and have now used it up, over-used it), yet we seem to refuse to return to pre-
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illness life. We are not old enough to have finished making our contributions of 
productivity and/or caregiving; old people with chronic illnesses may be seen to 
be entitled to rest until they die. And we are not expected to die any time soon, 
so we are going to hang around being sick for a long while. Cheri Register calls 
us ‘the interminably ill.’ (“Unhealthy” 164) 
The discussion forum participants in the PLM MS community repeatedly grapple with 
their status as “interminably ill.” In their journey to understand their experiences and to 
continue to live well with MS, many of the posters to the MS forum are collectively 
working through the social, emotional, interpersonal, and psychological challenges that 
are attached to the unstable conditions of their embodiment. As their bodily states 
collide awkwardly with the normative structures established within their physical and 
social environments, environments that produce new kinds of disability in their lives, 
the individuals who seek community interaction on the PLM threads are also actively 
involved in resisting ableism. They question the norms that may have, at one time, been 
applicable to their lives—or that they failed to meet when their bodies, prior to 
diagnosis, manifested mysterious symptoms; the ones that continue to carry the 
oppressive weight of a past instantiation of the self, of some ideal but unachievable way 
of being. 
Negotiating a new normal means not only adjusting one’s expectations of self, 
but also managing others’ expectations. As Jorge points out, contemporary Western 
society does not exactly cultivate an attitude of caring compassion among its members. 
In one thread, the user suggests that this situation relates to empathy, or a lack 
thereof—a failure by those “outside of MS” to understand the challenges of the illness. 
Indeed, one of the most painful challenges is not the physical, phenomenological 
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experience itself, but the social alienation produced by deeply ingrained ableist biases 
that friends and family members may hold.  
In a discussion related to managing social stigma in the transition to medical 
retirement, Aren begins the conversation with a relatable anecdote about one person’s 
naïve question: what does Aren, who is medically retired, do with all of his free time? 
This discussion thread is noteworthy because it begins with a mostly ironic question. 
The central problem is that “free time” is an illusion with MS, since meeting one’s own 
basic needs becomes a full-time job and activities that may once have occupied one’s 
free time are oftentimes inaccessible. As Aren explains, his daily activities revolve 
around managing his extremely tight disability income, attending medical 
appointments, preparing insurance paperwork, sleeping, grocery shopping, and doing 
a host of other mundane tasks that are now extremely time-consuming and physically 
or mentally strenuous because of his illness. The thread evolves into an interesting 
discussion about the sick role, in particular, allowing users to express a shared 
understanding of the daily limitations to ‘normal’ productivity that MS instates.  
For some, success is measured by “just surviving.” Others communicate the 
importance of performing daily tasks according to one’s own schedule in order to 
protect physical and emotional wellbeing. As Maria notes, her day is very average, 
except that she does not work in a “real job” and all of her daily tasks must be done at a 
pace that is healthy for her. As Andrzej expresses, everything on his “daily chores” list 
takes much longer than it used to and this is something he and those around him have 
simply had to accept.  
Evidently, much of the anxiety expressed in the discussion stems from having to 
answer the questions “what do you do?” or “what have you been up to?” and not 
having anything acceptable to say. While the thread certainly becomes a space to vent 
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about a lack of support from self-interested, naïve, or willfully ignorant friends and 
family who don’t understand the often-invisible symptoms of MS, more solutions-
oriented contributors encourage other members to focus on meeting personal goals and 
to disregard what is socially acceptable in favour of what is personally necessary. Many 
posters encourage positive psychology among the group, choosing to interpret their 
illness experience as an opportunity to slow down and enjoy the elements of their 
lives—friends, family, pets, nature—that they consistently took for granted during their 
hectic pre-MS lives. Buddy suggests that the obligatory slowed pace of life with MS 
allows for new opportunities to take a leisurely stroll through life—something that the 
“old normal” did not permit. Sharon, reiterating Buddy’s sentiment, says that although 
she would never wish for an MS diagnosis, she chooses to interpret it as a blessing that 
has allowed her the freedom to enjoy life at a relaxed pace, observing things she might 
otherwise have missed.  
The acknowledgement by some MSers of their counter-cultural ways of living in 
the world vocalizes one of the greatest challenges of chronic illness, while also 
facilitating a discursive space for reimagining ideals of success and happiness. At the 
same time, they face the pressure—which they often regard as a pragmatic social 
need—to fit in, to “pass,” to be accepted as capable, to have others respect their 
limitations without dwelling on them. Wendell addresses this pressure by pointing to 
the tendency within disability activism to resist medicalization through various 
strategies, one of which is “to downplay the realities of fluctuating impairment or ill 
health” (165). This tendency to promote the figure of the ‘able-disabled’ and the 
“reluctance among disability activists to admit to weakness or vulnerability” only helps 
to perpetuate the “pressure to conform to an inspiring version of the paradigm of 
disability. Those people with disabilities who can best approximate the activities and 
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appearance of nondisabled people (that is, those who can make others forget they are 
disabled) will be allowed to participate most fully in the activities of their society” 
(Wendell, “Unhealthy” 165). Ultimately, this also influences the chronically ill, those 
who straddle the tenuous line between “illness” and “disability” that many disability 
activists wish strongly to assert. As Wendell notes, the step to distinguish one type of 
vulnerability (illness) from another (disability) only works to further stigmatize the 
subject position of those with chronic illnesses, including chronically ill disabled people. 
In the discussion threads, individuals share their anecdotes about their ongoing 
efforts to manage how family, friends, and strangers perceive them and their abilities (a 
distinction that seems difficult to make when so much of personal identity seems 
subsumed by “what we do”). Many put forth stories that trace conflict to others’ faulty 
assumptions about the storyteller and his or her illness. One extremely popular thread 
is full of examples of individuals facing expectations that are incongruent with their 
abilities. The discussion is one of the longest threads in the PLM MS forum, with over 
6,000 posts since its inception, when it was originally created as an all-purpose space to 
“say anything” about MS. In his introductory post, the topic creator suggests a number 
of writing prompts, one of which challenges respondents to discuss how others react to 
their MS. One respondent writes of her frustration over the inappropriate expectations 
that others have of her, which are sometimes overly high and sometimes insultingly 
low. She relates an anecdote about a friend for whom she’d promised to bake a birthday 
cake. Having sold her cakes for many years, Margy takes pride in this work and 
considers it one of her special talents, an activity that she continues to pursue happily in 
spite of numbness and tremors in her hands. When her friend attempts to cancel the 
order, worrying that Margy has too much on her plate, Margy is forced to convince her 
friend that she can and wants to create the birthday cake; her friend’s paternalistic 
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attempt to ease her burdens instead becomes a stressful conflict in which she must 
defend her abilities. Margy writes about the frustration of having to prove herself. She 
writes of her desire to be given the opportunity to make her own decisions about what 
she is capable of achieving, noting that her limitations change from day to day. Having 
a goal to accomplish, even if it causes a degree of physical or mental struggle, seems 
more integral to Margy’s personal wellness than the admonition to rest. The gist of her 
post addresses the problem of negotiating a sense of normalcy with other people in her 
life while she adjusts to MS. Her friend’s well-meaning attempt to support her actually 
creates an obstacle to her efforts to live well. Margy expresses the root of the issue well 
when she identifies the enforced invalidism that her friend seems to promote; however, 
there is evidently a drive on Margy’s part to prove herself capable—undefeated by her 
MS. Ultimately, her own expectations of herself, and not others’ expectations, based on 
normative social roles, will determine the shape of her life with MS. 
The persistent tension in MSers’ web forum stories, between defiantly asserting 
their right to be ‘unproductive’ (in a capitalist sense) and their social prerogative to pass 
as normatively able-bodied, is especially salient when probed in relation to the structure 
of the PatientsLikeMe website, in particular, its system of data collection. This is mostly 
for the reason that the focal point of the site—the users’ entered data in the form of 
profile charts—attempts to map illness relative to the common or average user’s 
experience of a disease. In certain parts of the profile, PLM is also interested in 
comparing an individual’s emotional or physical state to “unstated but determining 
norms” (Garland-Thomson 7). In this context, problematic questions arise. For which 
metrics is it important that a user compare herself/himself against an “MS norm” and 
when is it important to compare oneself against a “healthy norm”? While users express 
some appreciation for the PLM tools that allow them to track their own personal 
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medical record—flareups and regressions, new symptoms or relapses—there also exists 
some tension between the “norm” that individuals allegedly deviate from and the fact 
that there is no “normal” MS. Another important question regarding the profile charts 
is, how well or poorly (to what degree of effectiveness or holism) does the data actually 
reflect the full experience of an individual’s illness? Comments in the discussion forums 
suggest that the profile chart data is heavily tilted in favour of biomedical metrics, to the 
detriment of other data related to personal, social, and emotional states—factors which, 
users assert, are equally instrumental in determining well-being. In one thread, Martina 
compares how she feels on a day-to-day basis to how PLM asks her to rate her 
disability, noting that she would rate herself entirely differently if the scale reflected her 
personal sense of wellbeing, rather than a medical one. Similarly, Andy writes that, 
while he reports his MSRS16 for the purposes of PLM, there are other rating scales he 
uses, such as the subjective ‘good MS days’ versus ‘bad MS days,’ or, at a more spiritual 
level, an everyday ‘rating’ of feeling blessed.  
As I will discuss in the next section, the picture reported by a user’s profile 
charts, then, is a rather incomplete account of their illness experience, tied to a 
biomedical understanding of illness. The PLM profiles reflect an instance of what, in 
2007, Wired magazine editors Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly heralded as the “Quantified 
Self” movement (Wolf). This perspective on the body’s functioning upholds an 
antiquated model of health, in which the human body is seen as a complex machine or 
computer that can be monitored, tuned, modified, or even hacked. Indeed, the PLM 
profile charts might be seen to mimic the medical notes of a mid-twentieth-century 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Multiple Sclerosis Rating Scale, a tool developed by PLM to facilitate “patient-reported assessment of 
functional status” that would “accurately quantify the level of MS-relevant disability experienced by 
patients across a range of domains affected by demyelinating lesions” (Wicks, Vaughan, and Massagli). 
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doctor. As I will argue, this is a backwards step and a missed opportunity for PLM to 
support its users’ needs—a decision made to protect neoliberalist economic interests. 
 
Producing a statistical “norm” on the PatientsLikeMe profile 
PatientsLikeMe is a social networking site directed specifically toward the end of 
accruing a vast body of collective intelligence; by linking individuals experiencing 
various forms of ill health or disability, the site has become a veritable data pool of 
experiential expertise. While the marketing of the site to individual users most strongly 
emphasizes its social purpose, ostensibly, its primary function as a for-profit 
organization reflects, more accurately, this data collecting impetus. The statistical 
collation extends far beyond the social networking needs of its users in the sense that 
data disclosed by patients is collected for commercial profit—that is, sold to various 
partners, including research, pharmaceutical, and insurance organizations. While PLM 
is fairly transparent about this practice of anonymized data sharing,17 the site’s 
economic imperative suggests that the tools and methods for communicating 
information that are provided to ‘patients’ on the site are developed, not necessarily to 
facilitate the sharing of experiential knowledge, but first and foremost, to maximize 
profitability. 
PatientsLikeMe was co-founded in 2004 by Benjamin Heywood, James 
Heywood, and Jeff Cole, all engineering graduates from MIT (“About 
PatientsLikeMe”). At the time of writing, PLM is a free service composed of over 
250,000 members. Prior to 2013, user profiles on the site used one of two privacy levels: 
“visible” (only PLM members could see the user’s profile and contact them) or “public” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 In its “Openness Philosophy” and associated “Privacy Policy” linked from its homepage PLM informs 
users that “Shared Data” (from profiles, forums, and other places on the site) is de-identified and shared 
with third parties.  
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(any visitors to the site could see the user’s profile, but only members could contact 
them). However, in August 2013, PLM ‘closed’ the site by requiring all visitors to 
register an account in order to access its content.18 Prior to this, unregistered visitors 
also had access to a plethora of community information, including: 1) public profiles; 2) 
treatment reports that evaluate specific drugs, equipment, therapies, procedures, 
lifestyle modifications, etc.; 3) symptoms reports that discuss prevalence and common 
treatments; and 4) information about ongoing research and clinical trials. The public 
nature of these pages allowed nonmembers access to a significant amount of disease-
specific data and the opportunity to gather information without directly participating in 
the activity of the community.  
Now, upon required enrolment, the new user is asked to identify as a “Patient,” 
“Caregiver (and want to track someone else’s health),” or “Clinican or Research 
Scientist” (“Join”). If the new user selects “Patient” or “Caregiver,” he or she can, 
optionally, identify with one or more “conditions.” As a user types his or her condition 
(or that of the person he or she supports) into the search bar, a list of options based on 
predictive text technology appears. The user then selects one of the existing patient 
communities from this list. Users may also provide basic demographic information if 
they wish; however, the site recommends that users remain as anonymous as possible. 
After users register, they are initially prompted to provide an immediate report using 
the “InstantMe” option which asks, “How are you feeling now?” and, optionally, 
“Why?” The goal of this feature is to attract immediate user participation following 
initial registration and to compel daily user participation, with the suggestion that 
“answering this one question every day can help you discover how your well-being 
changes by the time of day, the day of the week or the seasons” (“My Profile”). Users !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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are then prompted to provide a basic profile (age, sex, location, biography) and disclose 
health information (condition history, treatments and therapy, symptoms and side 
effects, weight).  
The result of this rather time-intensive and methodical data collection is a series 
of clear, coherent and visually appealing graphs representing various aspects of the 
patient’s health status that henceforth appear on the user’s main profile page. A 
“patient icon” also functions to represent the user’s experience, displaying data quality, 
health status, and time since diagnosis. Data quality is measured, using a star rating 
system, according to the level of patient commitment to the site, with three being the 
highest level; one star is awarded for background disclosure, currentness, and 
completeness, respectively. Essentially, this functions as a ranking system as well as a 
compulsive icon urging users to participate as actively as possible (ideally, inputting 
data on a daily basis) in order to increase and/or maintain this symbol of expertise. The 
patient’s health status is represented by a small stick figure that may be colour coded 
according to mood (i.e. for mood disorders like anxiety or depression) or dissected into 
sections corresponding to motor functioning and colour coded according to severity of 
symptoms in each region (i.e. bulbar, arms, chest, and legs in the context of 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). Hovering over an “i” (info) symbol expands the patient 
icon to reveal the patient’s age, sex, location, disease-specific health indicators, and 
latest “InstantMe” report. 
Use of the PLM site demands, at a very basic level, that users identify or define 
themselves as “patients.” From the outset, this designation positions users under the 
scrutiny of the clinical gaze that Michel Foucault analyzes in The Birth of the Clinic, 
separating body from subjectivity and creating a new entity—“the object of the gaze”—
the “patient” (83). This categorization exists regardless of whether or not members are 
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actually patients, implying that use of the site as a form of cyber-healthcare 
automatically inserts individuals into this passive role. Similarly, the role of patient also 
situates individuals in a particular realm of “difference” in which they are defined by 
the physical or mental “abnormalities” they experience. All parts of the profile are 
specifically dedicated to characterizing, classifying, and depicting impairment; 
extending from this, users’ identities on the site are defined by their experiences of 
disease. This is not to say that the site should, or even could, fully represent an 
individual subject; our online representations are almost always fractured and 
incomplete. However, this system certainly contributes to a hegemonic discourse of 
disease in which individuals with illnesses or disabilities become defined by a quest to 
regulate difference and normalize the body. 
Despite the rhetorical framing of the site, I do not wish to suggest that the 
sharing and community-building that takes place here is exclusively negative; much of 
the interaction on PLM, as my discussion in the first part of this chapter revealed, is 
invaluable to both emotional well-being and disease management. However, the very 
notion of finding “patients like me” implies the pre-existence in users’ lives of a status 
quo of alienation or difference that requires them to seek out solidarity among others 
with similar experiences. In this way, the site reinforces the notion that illness or 
disability equals exclusion from other conventional avenues of group belonging; that in 
order to find empathic others individuals must seek out people “like them.” While a 
certain level of personal experience may be a prerequisite to genuinely understanding a 
person’s situation and to providing useful advice, at the same time, the language of 
similarity and difference embedded in the very name of the site subscribes to the notion 
of disability and illness as experiences that take place outside of the realms of “normal” 
experience. The language of similarity is further emphasized in the “My Conditions” 
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tab of the user profile, which encourages users to “enter all of your current, resolved, 
and misdiagnosed conditions to find patients more like you” (“My Conditions”). 
Interestingly, the goal is not to find more patients like you, but to find patients who are 
more like you. The underlying implication is that individuals with similar groups of 
conditions are better equipped to support one another and to share the right kinds of 
information. While this perspective may be true from a purely pragmatic, medical, or 
symptom-based standpoint, it contradicts evidence on other parts of the social network 
that experiential knowledge sharing and empathic support happen between individuals 
with vastly different medical diagnoses. 
In attempting to understand their past and present situations, users are also 
invited to judge or weigh their experience of illness or disability against the “average 
experience” of other users with similar conditions. This element of disease 
management, in appealing to statistical evidence regarding what is normal or 
exceptional in terms of disease symptoms, treatment side effects, etc. further 
perpetuates normative discourse. In his analysis of the construction of disability in 
Enforcing Normalcy, Lennard Davis traces the development of the “norm” from which 
the disabled body allegedly deviates. As he elucidates, this fixation on normalcy 
developed in close conjunction with the field of statistics, which emphasized average or 
mean states of being (Davis 27). The heavy prominence of line graphs as a way of 
charting patient experience on PLM is certainly relevant here. In the “Treatments” tab, 
for example, users can compare their reactions to a treatment using a graph that 
compiles data reported by all site members who used the same treatment. Davis notes 
that, in statistics, “the average becomes paradoxically a kind of ideal” (27). While 
individuals would likely prefer to deviate from the average in these graphs—to exhibit 
an exceptionally positive reaction to a treatment or to be experiencing fewer side effects 
!! 205!
than average—the “norm” that the average instates introduces a sort of “normality,” 
even in the midst of “abnormality.” The very reliance of the site on linear, statistical 
modes of narrating disease experience is problematic for the rhetorical weight that these 
modes carry in reinforcing the binary of normalcy and difference. 
The impetus to reject impairment in order to achieve an average, moderate, or 
middle state is further emphasized by member profile charts that provide “InstantMe” 
and “Quality of Life” reports. The “InstantMe” component asks users to rate how they 
are feeling at any given time on a five-point scale from “very good” to “very bad.” The 
“Quality of Life” indicator chart presents user-entered data regarding social, mental, 
and physical qualities of life; users are asked to “think back over the past 30 days” and 
report answers to over twenty symptoms with the following responses available: none 
of the time, a little of the time, some of the time, most of the time, all of the time. The 
symptoms are all negative, for example, “how much has your health limited you in 
accomplishing as much as you would like to?” An answer “none of the time” 
corresponds to a green happy face, while an answer “all of the time” is signified by a 
red sad face. Not only are these rankings based on “unstated but determining norms, a 
hypothetical set of guidelines for corporeal form and function arising from cultural 
expectations about how human beings should look and act” (emphasized by the use of 
emoticons), they are also entirely subjective (Garland-Thomson 7). As a result, the data 
that these graphs contribute to general statistics about patient symptoms and overall 
health is inevitably skewed by the inescapable subjectivity of such reports. 
The cycle of normativity that the site promotes reflects an orientation toward and 
reinforcement of what Judith Butler refers to as a “pure body” (Butler qtd in Tremain 
34). Through the use of categories—conditions, symptoms, treatments, and side 
effects—and their various subcategories, the site implicates and reinforces this pure 
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body—one that does not, like the diseased or disabled body, “[inaugurate] an 
explanatory need,” but “eludes [explanation] by virtue of its physical anonymity” 
(Mitchell and Snyder 60). The spectre of this elusive (because illusory) body is ever-
present on the site, and is reinforced as users weigh themselves against it. More 
importantly, from the perspective of the biomedical industry, the site’s efforts to enforce 
a pure body dwell at the core of the company’s profitability, as well as the financial 
success of its corporate customers who also depend for survival on the disciplinary 
power of normative discourse about the body. In implying a pure body through the 
documentation of ‘anomalous’ bodies, PLM engages in the political discourse of 
Foucaultian biopower, a point that I will expand upon shortly; symptoms or conditions 
function in the same way that Tremain notes impairments emerge, “as unitary and 
universal attributes of subjects through the iteration and reiteration of rather culturally 
specific regulatory norms and ideals about human function and structure, competency, 
intelligence, and ability” (42). 
In the same way that the site attempts to regulate—to reinforce the ideals of 
liberal humanism—it also conceives of the deviant body as fragmented or incomplete. 
The body, considered “broken” itself, is broken down into manageable sections; indeed, 
an image that exemplifies this movement toward fragmentation quite well is the small 
stick figure on the patient icon of persons with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) that 
attempts to represent the degenerative nature of the disease. As mentioned previously, 
the stick figure’s dissected pieces represent motor functioning and severity of 
symptoms in each region. This approach to representing and understanding the 
“abnormal” body as broken down at the same time implies that the body of the 
“normal” subject is constituted by an originary wholeness; that the body becomes 
fragmented only as it becomes anomalous. While many scholars, including Vivian 
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Sobchack, David Wills, Jane Bennett, and Cary Wolfe have elucidated a posthumanist 
understanding of embodied subjectivity and agency as unavoidably fragmentary, the 
antithesis is promoted on PLM, where the notion of fragmentation is only deployed in 
the context of a physical body that is constructed as fragmented, faulty, or 
malfunctioning. 
Arguably, PLM reinforces the same sort of “hegemony of normalcy” that Davis 
identifies in the novel, a form of writing that he says “promotes and symbolically 
produces normative structures” (41). Davis’s observations are particularly insightful in 
the context of the illness narrative tropes of overcoming and rehabilitation—narrative 
structures that seem to be replicated through the PLM framework for sharing one’s 
personal illness experience. On PLM, the desires to track progress and monitor health 
status contribute to a goal of normalization, whereby the deviant elements of the 
narrative, as represented by the linear graph, will eventually be resolved by the 
imposition of normalcy. In this cyber-representation of the clinic, disease sufferers and 
disabled individuals view their bodies as mechanical systems to be repaired, rather than 
complex organisms that operate according to, not only biological, but also social and 
cultural structures. In subscribing to normative categorizations about corporeal health 
and wellbeing, PLM overlooks factors beyond the site of the individual physical body 
that might create, aggravate, or skew perceptions of disease or disability. 
The simplicity that profile visualizations offer, in categorizing and defining, 
functions to elide the complexities of human corporeality and the intricate ways in 
which notions of health and disease are socially and culturally constructed. Further, in 
the sense of the website’s economic motives, the affordances provided through data 
processing and profile visualizations must be seen as, first and foremost, compulsive 
technologies that encourage users to share more data in greater detail in order to take 
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full advantage of the platform’s disease management tools. The site’s interest in 
containing corporeal deviance within a manageable space and its basis in Foucaultian 
clinical epistemological myths to give semiotic meaning to experience ensure that the 
individual body is constrained within a system of “regulatory control” (Foucault qtd in 
Epstein 4). While the social networking tools that the website provides facilitate 
community formation and individual disease management, the central profile 
visualizations limit the frame of reference for discussion to the categorizations and 
normative values of a medical discourse that, paradoxically, seeks to neutralize and 
objectivize personal disease experience. 
 
Commodification and disciplinary power 
The regulated nature of user disclosure in the patient profile is directly related to 
the surveilling gaze of corporate customers, which monitors even discussion board 
activity. The role of commercial interests in determining the cultural function of PLM 
cannot be underestimated. As I will explain, the marketing of the site to particular 
audiences of researchers and industry partners exposes a rather different perspective 
with regards to how PLM views its users and the ways in which it prioritizes, not 
culturally or socially productive “sharing,” but commercial opportunism. 
While information about the use of sold data is not immediately offered to users 
when they register for their free accounts, several links from the PLM homepage make 
explicit the company’s “Openness Philosophy.” This component of the site emphasizes 
the importance of sharing information in order “to effect a sea change in the healthcare 
system” (“Openness Philosophy”). The manifesto goes on to explain the site’s belief 
“that the Internet can democratize patient data and accelerate research like never 
before. Furthermore, we believe data belongs to you the patient to share with other 
!! 209!
patients, caregivers, physicians, researchers, pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies, and anyone else that can help make patients’ lives better” (“Openness 
Philosophy”). 
On a dedicated “PatientsLikeMe for Partners” website, a very different story is 
told about the function and purpose of the activity that happens on the SNS. The 
“Products & Services” section advertises a rather explicit agenda: “PatientsLikeMe 
collects such a rich amount of patient data – including genotype, individual genetic 
mutations, phenotype, quality of life measures, treatments and symptoms” and “sells 
access to our comprehensive research platform, which contains a real world population 
of 115,000+19 patients with over 1,000 conditions” (“Custom Research”). Rather than 
endorsing activities like sharing and connecting with likeminded others, the site 
directed toward corporate partners invites customers to surveil and exploit users, or to 
use the language of PLM, to monitor activity, access data, and identify market demands 
and opportunities. From this end, users of the site are merely opportunities for access to 
a rich store of market data. Here, not only is patient opinion assessed to determine the 
viability of potential healthcare products and services, but users also fall into the cycle 
of commodification as they, themselves, become the substance of products and services 
sold to corporate partners. Further, despite the rhetoric of openness that the site 
endorses, the information that it collects is not open to any research group with the 
means and inclination to advance knowledge on a particular condition; it is open only 
to those groups willing and able to pay.  
This situation also means that the site is ripe with potential for unethical use by 
commercial organizations that create fake profiles on the site in order to scrape valuable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 The current number of registered users on PatientsLikeMe, at the time of writing, is approximately 
250,000, suggesting that this page contains outdated information. 
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patient data. In May 2010, PLM caught media research firm Nielson using sophisticated 
software to copy conversations between users in disease community forums. Nielsen 
works with a variety of clients, including major pharmaceutical companies, to monitor 
the online activity of clients’ consumer bases. The company collects relevant data and 
sells it to its partners. PLM discovered three other fake accounts linked to Nielson that 
were actually computer programs extracting data and shut them down immediately, 
sending a message to users via the PLM blog to inform them of the security breach 
(Angwin and Stecklow). A Wall Street Journal exposé on the data scraping incident 
interviews legal experts who say the practice is legally questionable, but not necessarily 
illegal. The incident reveals the troubling reality that virtually all information that 
individuals make available online can be scraped and sold for consumer market 
research. When PLM chairman Jamie Heywood notes in his interview with WSJ, “We're 
a business, and the reality is that someone came in and stole from us,” he highlights the 
true issue at stake for the company (Anglin and Stecklow). In light of this reality, CBS 
MoneyWatch commentator Jim Edwards argues that PLM is “more villain than victim” 
in the Nielsen scandal. In his article, Edwards reminds readers that PLM “makes its 
money by persuading patients to give up the kind of private data that once rested 
securely in a locked filing cabinet in your doctor's office.” Edwards highlights the 
worrisome bottom line of such a privacy breach: “There was no privacy violation. 
Rather, Nielsen found a way to extract PatientsLikeMe's data without paying 
PatientsLikeMe to do so.” 
Adding to the website’s emphasis on commercialization, the very activity made 
available to corporate customers falls all too easily within the bounds of Michel 
Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power. Tremain elucidates Foucault’s concept of 
biopower in relation to what she sees as unstable (or illusory) boundaries between the 
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categories of ‘impairment’ and ‘disability.’ Discussing the ways in which the category of 
impairment was created to enable the continued regulation of ‘deviant’ bodies, Tremain 
notes that “technologies of normalization are instrumental to the systemic creation, 
classification, and control of ‘anomalies’ in the social body. Foucault argues that the 
function of these techniques is to isolate so-called anomalies, which can in turn be 
normalized through the therapeutic and corrective strategies of other, associated 
technologies” (36-7). This explanation is remarkably apt in the context of 
PatientsLikeMe, the work of which directly contributes to the development and 
proliferation of “other, associated technologies” like pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
health plans, etc. 
While some might argue that the data mining taking place on PLM simply 
leverages the built-in affordances of networked social media platforms, it is imperative 
to understand these practices as also actively constructing narratives about disease and 
disability through the information PatientsLikeMe requests from users and the ways in 
which it frames this disclosure. As discussed earlier, the categories and visualizations 
displayed on patient profiles conform to particular notions about ‘normal’ versus 
‘deviant’ bodies. Opportunities for sharing in this context force users to compare their 
own conditions or levels of wellbeing to some unstated, yet agreed-upon norm or ideal.  
At the heart of this situation is the question of who decides upon the categories 
through which users are asked to identify their experiences. When adding a condition 
to a PLM profile, users are asked to enter the first few letters into a search field and then 
select the appropriate label from the list of results. A user cannot simply identify with 
Depression, but must select what kind of depression from a lengthy list: Reactive 
Depression, Major Depressive Disorder, Postpartum Depression, Mild Depression, 
Dysthymia, Seasonal Affective Disorder, Bipolar I, Bipolar II, Atypical Depressive 
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Disorder, or Schizoaffective Disorder. Corresponding to each item in the dropdown list 
is the number of users who have listed this condition on their profile, as if this 
information might affect the user’s choice. After indicating a condition, users are 
expected to select symptom information from a default list. As the information box on 
this page indicates, “All PatientsLikeMe members start with five symptoms: Anxious 
Mood, Depressed Mood, Fatigue, Insomnia, and Pain. They are good indicators of your 
health regardless of your condition(s)” (“My Conditions”). Depending on the condition 
you add, other ‘common symptoms’ will be listed; for example, the dysthymia 
condition adds eleven additional symptoms to the list, and users can add new 
symptoms or remove non-applicable ones. These default lists represent another 
manifestation of disciplinary power, whereby a finite number of authorized conditions 
or symptoms indicate to users which of their ailments are valid, how they should be 
named, and what they mean. This component is an extension of the obsessive need to 
categorize and differentiate that propels the commercial pursuits of the healthcare 
industry and the epistemological regime that supports this commodification.  
A noteworthy example of such activity—which also perfectly represents the 
clashing dynamics of users and the corporation—is seen in a thread where a woman 
humourously, but also rather despondently, catalogues the physical changes MS has 
caused. In her post she lists various consequences that she connects to her illness, 
including loss of self-esteem, dry skin, hair loss, abnormal hair growth, weight gain, 
and other bodily changes. In the list, she suggests that her breasts now resemble banana 
peels and, as the algorithm does when an individual references a certain drug or 
treatment like Tysabri or Tylenol, PLM tags “banana.” This means that the word is now 
hyperlinked to a PLM treatment page about bananas where users can see which other 
members with MS are eating bananas as part of their treatment regimen. Because the 
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data-collecting algorithm cannot detect the context of the word’s usage, it cannot 
distinguish between a user creating a metaphor to describe her experience and a user 
discussing her treatment regimen in a literal way; this example, itself, is perhaps a 
useful metaphor for the reductive way in which PLM and the quantified self movement 
envision health.   
Added to the regulatory power of normative biomedical language, the seemingly 
omniscient voice of PLM, which communicates through regular notifications, 
reminders, and instructions, also works to enforce a sort of disciplinary control. For 
users who withhold information about symptoms, for example, the following finger-
wagging notification appears: “You haven’t filled out a complete symptom survey in 
over 30 days. To make your symptom and treatment reports meaningful, it is important 
to report on all of your primary symptoms regularly” (PatientsLikeMe). If a user 
attempts to add treatments before entering details about her condition and condition 
history, she receives the following notification: “Sharing a bit more about your 
condition will help put your information in context.” (“My Treatments”). Similarly, the 
“My Conditions” tab encourages users to share as much as possible: “Enter all of your 
current, resolved, and misdiagnosed conditions to find patients more like you” (“My 
Conditions”). At the same time, however, upon registration the user is informed 
politely of the freedom the site allows: “you can share all your conditions, or just the 
ones that you are most interested in exploring at PatientsLikeMe” (PatientsLikeMe).  
The work of trolling moderators also functions in a similar way; this panoptical 
brand of surveillance watches hawk-like over user activity, rewarding excessive sharing 
and discouraging neglect of the site’s opportunities. This mechanism is persuasive, 
since it convinces users that their participation is directly related to their ability to 
extract “meaning” from their situation. In the Multiple Sclerosis community, this 
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presence is most clearly evident through the postings of the moderator who oversees all 
activity in the message boards to ensure that participants are using the website as they 
should. Often, this means posting messages like the following, a response to a thread 
about side effects from the drug Tecfidera, used to treat relapsing remitting MS. In the 
post, a PLM moderator reminds respondents who report side effects and reasons for 
stopping treatment to complete a “treatment evaluation” for those searching the 
database. The moderator is not diagnosed with MS, but is instead an employee of 
PatientsLikeMe whose participation is guided by the interests of the corporation. 
Indeed, for this reason, the moderator’s gaze comes across as helicopter-like, a sort of 
control mechanism that disciplines user behaviour on the site. 
While the site’s mission statements promote a system that works to facilitate the 
needs and interests of patients, the overly regulated structure of PLM betrays the actual 
motivations of the site to acquire statistically meaningful information, rather than 
findings that are meaningful to the individual. This preoccupation is quite clearly 
voiced by co-founder and CEO Jamie Heywood in his lecture “The Big Idea My Brother 
Inspired,” in which he pronounces that user information on PatientsLikeMe is “a story 
until we convert it to data.” This telling statement suggests that subjective user 
experience is relatively useless until it is made objective, empirical, and scientifically 
relevant by the site’s conversions. However, to the individual using the site, 
meaningfulness is entirely subjective. Perhaps the user had no need to update her data 
over the past thirty days because her condition is stable; perhaps she feels the need to 
update only when something personally significant happens in her life; perhaps the site 
is a way for her to monitor only one aspect of her condition, or simply to access 
discussion forums. In all of these cases, significance is entirely relative, and, as many 
users make clear, the “story” is, in fact, the most important part. Along the lines of the 
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PLM business model, however, meaning is dependent upon scientific and economic 
value. 
A quick survey of the patient profile reveals that even the design and capabilities 
of the user interface correspond primarily to data collection. There is no space on the 
profile for unprompted, open sharing of information and opportunities for unguided 
narrative writing are limited. The “Biography” section of the profile consists of three 
sections: 1) “Interests” (a list of ten selectable reasons for being on the site, i.e. advocacy 
or research); 2) “Bio” (a text box where users are to “describe [themselves] in a few 
short sentences”; and 3) “About Me” (a text box where users can “describe [their] 
medical history to another patient like [them]” (“Profile”). Ostensibly, these areas 
present a one-time opportunity; while they can certainly be updated, the range of 
disclosure that they afford is relatively restricted. 
Perhaps to respond to this need, PLM recently added the “Journal” feature, 
which tracks users’ activity on the site in a similar way to the Facebook Timeline. While 
the ability of users to comment on these automatically-generated journal entries or 
share a link in their journal provides a degree of authorial control, for the most part, the 
“Journal” is not a journal at all, but instead an aggregated “News Feed” (to use more 
Facebook terminology) that is created by a computer algorithm that documents the 
user’s activity on the site, which may include writing comments, responding to posts, 
sharing new personal medical information on one’s profile, and so on. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the economic interests of PLM, the outcome of which is the regulation of 
user disclosure to facilitate the acquisition of statistically significant data, there are 
components of the site, namely the discussion forums, that allow for more complex and 
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nuanced narratives to emerge than those found on patient profiles. While the desires to 
track progress and monitor health status—in effect, to work toward a visualizable 
normalization of the individual—are the primary exigencies of the profile interface, the 
discussion forums meet a predominately social need. Rather than tracking and isolating 
the otherness or deviance of the individual’s experience, the forum marks a place of co-
identification or community building wherein users seek to relate their feelings, 
experiences, findings, or questions, as well as to build affective, interpersonal 
relationships, rather than statistical ones. In this way, the forums allow a space for 
alternative, non-normative narratives to develop. These spaces reveal illness or 
disability to affect individual lives, not simply as medical conditions, but as complex 
sets of cultural, social, environmental, and other factors that influence individuals’ ways 
of being. 
Interestingly, the forums also allow an opportunity for users to express criticism 
of the very structures that enable their participation on PLM. While analyzing the MS 
discussion forum, I became aware of the extent to which users are, indeed, conscious of 
the various gazes to which the information they share is subjected. In one thread 
questioning PLM’s data selling practices, one user links to a CBS News report about the 
Nielsen data scraping scandal in order to make other users aware of the presence of 
pharmaceutical representatives who use the website as moles, short-circuiting PLM’s 
commercial structures to scrape data about patients and also to plant information 
encouraging them to use certain drugs and avoid those sold by competitors. The 
conversation goes on to discuss the issues of privacy and exploitation of users on PLM, 
with some users expressing concern and others explaining their willingness to accept 
the terms and conditions of using the site. While some respondents share techniques by 
which they use the site subversively, such as intentionally not providing certain 
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personal information, others communicate their willingness to provide ‘free labour’ to 
PLM because they believe the rewards of participating are greater than the potential 
drawbacks. These justifications echo PLM’s claim that patient sharing on the site will 
further research on their diagnosed condition(s). While this may be true, it also furthers 
a highly exploitative agenda; if PLM were truly concerned about helping people, they 
would operate as a not-for-profit organization, acknowledging that the personal illness 
experiences of their users—and not their own data collecting mechanisms—are at the 
root of their value as a corporate entity. 
Indeed, complicating my discussion in the first part of the chapter of how users 
contest, redefine, and recreate a “norm” that resists the norm—their new normal—is the 
way in which some users talk about their participation in the data collection and forum 
discussions on PLM as a form of productive, empowering, and self-validating labour. 
This is complicated for a few different reasons, firstly, because of the way in which 
activities like ‘disease management’ and social interaction become validated through 
their framing as labour. Even as forum participants attempt to “re-engineer” their lives 
against a norm, in ways that accommodate their particular disabilities, they nonetheless 
interpret their own use of the site, normatively, as a form of productive contribution 
within a neoliberalist system. In this light, the user sees herself as, in Banner’s words, “a 
potential ongoing source of data, which becomes a gift to the health commons” (199). 
Secondly, the situation is fraught because of the way in which this labour works 
ultimately to support a medical-technological industry that, itself, profits from the 
biomedicalization of all illness. 
As I have discussed, the ability to frame illness biomedically is PLM’s greatest 
asset as a corporate entity; however, this framework has implications for the wider 
cultural context in which the website is embedded. In her text, Reading and Writing 
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Disability Differently, Tanya Titchkosky draws attention to the ways in which disability 
exists as a concept created by and between people, “made meaningful by the ways we 
say it to be and live its being” (12). If the user profile can be seen as another text through 
which illness is enacted, then seeing this text as an adequate representation of an 
individual’s disease means conceptualizing that embodied state as, predominately, a 
problem to be solved, rather than a mostly unavoidable condition of human 
embodiment. Titchkosky reinforces a point argued by Joan Scott that “we do not 
discriminate because we have noticed a difference. Rather, within a hierarchicalized 
techno-bureaucratic capitalist culture we discriminate and thereby enact difference” 
(24). On PLM, the user profile relies on the categorization of the individual and the 
documentation of his or her health status; in the space of this text—in its systems of 
measurement and visual techniques—difference comes into being. On discussion 
boards, however, the textual engagement is strikingly different. Even diagnostic 
categories are erased, as users with various disease experiences interact on message 
boards that fall outside of their ‘assigned’ positions on the site. 
Discussions between differently diagnosed ‘patients’ work to break down the 
boundaries that enforce regulatory controls upon bodies. Similarly, many forum 
conversations on the site also help to complicate normative understandings of what it 
means to be sick or disabled. While user profiles work toward normalization—the 
solving of a problem—discussion forums not only accept the existence of problems 
(symptoms, side effects, limitations, impairments) as normal, they also treat them as 
indefinite realities. While users’ lives are often negatively impacted by their diagnoses, 
an individual’s self-disclosure can reveal the staggering complexities of these 
‘undesirable’ experiences—for one, that persons with illnesses or disabilities are, 
nonetheless, capable of participating in a full range of human experiences and 
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emotions, including happiness, contentment, success, love, creativity, etc. This is 
equally true in the MS forum, where the degenerative nature of this illness looms large 
over any and all forum discussions, but not to the detriment of members’ abilities to live 
complete and fulfilling lives, to which their forum posts testify. 
Casting a heavy shadow over the highly constructive and meaningful exchanges 
that happen on the PLM site to reorient perspectives on ‘normalcy’ is the insidious 
nature of its economic position. While use of the site is technically free, the site’s 
business model employs user-disclosed information to further enmesh individuals as 
consumers in an already highly commoditized healthcare sector. As I have discussed, 
the forums, although they, too, fall within the category of data available for purchase, 
nonetheless offer a space where users actively construct their illness experiences in non-
normative ways. They are a site where users can critique the system, offer alternative 
options, and become informed and empowered co-creators of knowledge, rather than 
passive and complicit consumers.  Here, the discussion works to expose the medical 
and economic construction of biomedical ‘conditions’—of disability and disease, in 
general— to renegotiate how these states of being are understood as lived realities 
outside of their definition by hegemonic models. Indeed, user activity on PLM forums 
allows for resistance against commodification and subjugation within and through the 
healthcare industry, since it provides a space for users to question and discuss potential 
options for care, treatments, and solutions, beyond the information that is, perhaps, 
promoted on the site or in consumer literature. This space allows for subversion of 
traditional narratives of illness or disability or hegemonically dictated methods of 
dealing with bodily “abnormalities.”  
This chapter has intended to expose a central tension or contradiction in the way 
that the PLM site structures user engagement and the way that individuals appear to 
!! 220!
participate. Centrally, this analysis helps to expose how the movement toward so-called 
patient-directed healthcare, despite its laudable impulses, carries forward 
epistemological and economic structures that keep patients in the passenger seat, while 
exploiting them for their personal data. Indeed, troubling is not a strong enough word 
to describe the highly opportunistic nature of a PLM brand of commercial pursuit. And, 
certainly, the stakes are much higher than mere corporate gain or loss. The rhetorical 
framing of persons with disabilities or diseases on PLM, in perpetuating the hegemonic 
discourse of biomedicine, works to reinforce a problematic understanding of 
individuals with illnesses and disabilities as abnormal or deviant. Users’ opportunities 
to construct their own narratives about their experiences are limited by design 
structures that sculpt and retrofit stories to reflect data that meets the categorical 
imperatives of the scientific process, and financial profitability in general.  
While PLM occupies a relatively minute space within the vast realm of web-
based health tools and technologies, its rapid growth and increasing number of 
industry partners (sixteen and counting, including Merck, Genentech, and Novartis) 
(“Partners”), raises some cause for concern as to the direction in which our allegedly 
‘democratized’ spaces of online participation are headed. Above all else, this chapter 
attempts to present a cautionary perspective amidst the din of the zealous, and 
oftentimes industry-sponsored, enthusiasm over ‘Health 2.0’ and participatory 
medicine. If health-related social networking sites are to adopt the business model 
endorsed by PLM, in which patient activism and empowerment are co-opted to support 
commercial interests, then we really are witnessing the promulgation of real-world 
power relationships throughout Internet spheres. 
!! 221!
Chapter 5 | A Butterfly in a Jam Jar: Self-Narrative in Dementia Blogging 
 
…I am not sure I am brave, I often feel like a butterfly desperate to get 
out of a jam jar and sometimes think that maybe I write to mask 
anything is wrong with me. Perhaps it is more that I am saying, ‘here 
look, I am fine, I can write these words, so I must be ok. Maybe I will 
never get any worse.’ 
Mrs. Hsg, “Who am I?” (comments), Before I Forget20 
 
One of the themes I have highlighted throughout this dissertation is the 
resistance of many narratives of illness, particularly in the online spaces I have 
studied, to metanarrative structures like quest or restitution. While personal 
narratives of illness in social media often contain aspects of these framing devices, 
there are other important organizing concepts that writers employ in order to convey 
their experiences of illness. In the case of the dementia blogs that I will discuss in this 
chapter, this writing is less fixated on the goal of articulating a totalizing or 
mythologized interpretation of experience than it is on chronicling a series of 
moments, continually anchored in the present. The goal of such narratives is to 
respond to not just the existential and physical crises that illness introduces, but also 
particular social expectations surrounding illness. 
Of course, all illness life writers tell their stories as a way to find meaning in the 
midst of change, trauma, confusion, pain, isolation, and so on (Hawkins 10). But 
because many examples of life writing in social media spaces are not beset with the 
demands of narrative resolution—they offer forth a series of both reflections and 
perpetual presents—they must be considered separately from narrative frameworks !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 All quotations by blog writers in this chapter are the writers’ words, directly copied and unedited. 
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of illness in published, printed form. For example, in my last chapter, I discussed the 
organizing concept of a “new normal” narrative that emphasizes the ever-evolving 
and contingent “normalcy” that persons with chronic illness, specifically multiple 
sclerosis, experience. Stories told by individuals on PatientsLikeMe, while their 
writing may not necessarily be treated in the same way as a blog-style narrative, 
repeatedly highlight the contingency and uncertainty that characterizes all human 
experience, particularly in illness. This is a deliberate reframing of illness that is 
untied to a teleological trajectory. 
This chapter will turn to explore the blogs of persons with dementia and the 
narrative techniques they employ as they craft their stories of illness. I will 
demonstrate how the narrative perspectives presented in two exemplary blogs 
respond to social constructions of Alzheimer’s disease and related dementias (ADRD). 
The power of social expectations surrounding ADRD is the single greatest influence 
on how dementia bloggers understand their experiences and write about them, and 
for the most part, this is framed through the narrative trope of reasserting selfhood 
against an anticipated loss of self.  
Certainly, these narratives are similar in some ways to Kate Granger’s Twitter 
reflections on her cancer journey or the “new normal” stories of MS patients in the 
PLM discussion forum, particularly for the way in which they carve out subversive 
space for the performance of disability and illness. Firsthand stories of ADRD are also, 
however, quite distinct from other illness narratives in social media because of the 
social context out of which they emerge. The degree of dehumanization to which 
those with cognitive disability are subjected creates a rhetorical exigence for blogging 
rooted in the protection of selfhood, particularly through the assertion of the 
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autobiographical identity. I will first chronicle how the fear and dread surrounding 
this loss of self in dementia are socially produced through the endemic stigmatization 
of persons with dementia in Western society. The response by an individual 
diagnosed with ADRD to blog his or her status as “someone with dementia” is, at 
least in part, a conscious reaction to threatened selfhood. I will explore how the blog 
becomes a space to contend with a medically and socially overdetermined end-of-life 
story, paying particular attention to the generic qualities of the blog that facilitate this 
narrative response. The fixation on coherent selfhood appears to be the source of 
much suffering in these blogs, even as writers employ their narratives to continue 
proving their status as self-aware and self-determining. I will conclude by ruminating 
on the expectations of narrative medicine, in general, and the socially enforced 
obsession over the self in dementia, in particular. My aim is to add to the discussion 
about personal illness narrative by exploring how the theme of stable selfhood in 
dementia blogging emerges as a response to social constructions of ADRD. 
 
Dementia in context 
Social expectations of coherent and stable selfhood establish a particular 
blogging context for persons with ADRD who chronicle their dementia-related 
experiences online. Writers frame their stories in ways that attempt to assert the self, 
while at the same time questioning the fairness of, validity of, and need for such 
expectations. In my preliminary research on the topic, I noticed that blogs about 
ADRD are typically authored by: 1) an individual in the early stages of dementia; 2) 
an individual with dementia together with a supporter (family member or friend); or 
3) an individual who is a personal support worker, or lives with, or otherwise 
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supports a person with dementia. ADRD is an umbrella term for a cluster of 
progressive conditions, including Alzheimer’s (AD), frontotemporal (FTD), Lewy 
Body (LBD), mixed, and vascular dementias, that over time and at varying rates, 
diminish an individual’s capacity to form new memories and access old ones. While 
the symptoms of these kinds of dementia vary, as the diseases progress, possible 
symptoms also include mood and behavior changes, physical impairments, and 
difficulty speaking and writing (“What is Alzheimer’s?”). Thus, eventually, all 
bloggers with ADRD will likely require assistance in order to continue writing—to 
navigate the steps of operating a computer and navigating a website, as well as 
recalling words, phrases, or memories and translating these into a written narrative. 
Some may simply stop writing altogether if they do not have the support of 
collaborators or partners-in-care to facilitate their continued blogging practice. This 
helps to explain why all of the bloggers whose writing I discuss in this chapter are 
individuals who were diagnosed and began writing about their experiences during an 
early stage of dementia.  
It is worth noting that the number of bloggers who identify as “caregivers,” or 
what we might term in more empowering language, partners in care, far surpasses the 
number of those who identify as persons with dementia. The discrepancy in numbers 
between these two groups likely speaks to the inaccessibility of such a platform to 
those undergoing cognitive changes, varying in degree and kind, but which most 
likely affect linguistic abilities and fine motor skills. While my work in this chapter 
analyzes the narrative constructs employed by bloggers with dementia, more work is 
needed to assess the value of blogging for persons with dementia and to design more 
accessible blogging platforms. This is particularly imperative, since the potential 
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therapeutic effects for individuals with dementia of engaging in regular brain activity 
like reading and writing are currently of great interest to researchers. As Alzheimer’s 
Disease International explains in its World Alzheimer Report 2014, “cognitive 
stimulation may be beneficial for cognitive function in old age in both people with 
and without dementia” (57). One study conducted by researchers at Rush University 
observed the cognitive abilities of 300 healthy people, connecting cognitively 
stimulating activities, including reading and writing, to a less marked cognitive 
decline in the six years before death (Wilson et al.). While the consequences of these 
findings for adding to our scientific understanding of why and how different types of 
dementia develop are certainly exciting, my work in this chapter will focus more on 
the narrative side of personal experiences of dementia. As discussed, the dominant 
cultural myths surrounding dementia negatively overpower any compassionate or 
humane response we might have to persons diagnosed with the disease. In the 
interests of supporting the right to live well among those with dementia, we can 
benefit from hearing those individuals’ stories and understanding their motivations 
for telling them.  
Many campaigns to support Alzheimer’s awareness and research have been 
aimed at “ending the silence” surrounding the disease. In February 2014, actor and 
comedian Seth Rogen attracted a great deal of publicity for ADRD research and his 
Alzheimer’s fundraising organization, Hilarity for Charity, when he testified at a 
Senate hearing on the subject. Tellingly, while Rogen’s viral YouTube video has 6.6 
million views (“Seth Rogen Opening Statement”), only two of the eighteen senators 
on the hearing subcommittee stayed to listen to Rogen’s speech. In this context, 
Rogen’s words ring even truer as he states, “Americans whisper the word Alzheimer's 
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because their government whispers the word Alzheimer's. […] And although a 
whisper is better than the silence that the Alzheimer's community has been facing for 
decades, it’s still not enough. It needs to be yelled and screamed to the point that it 
finally gets the attention and the funding that it deserves and needs” (“Seth Rogen 
Opening Statement”). 
Importantly, however, a lack of conversation is not the only issue; simply 
speaking about dementia is not necessarily the solution to destigmatizing it. When we 
do speak, we must choose our words with wisdom and compassion, a response that 
seems to be desperately lacking in emerging conversations surrounding ADRD. 
Examples of this lack of compassion appear in the mainstream media on a regrettably 
regular basis. By way of example, a recent piece in the New York Times by physician 
Danielle Ofri, framed as a discussion about the silence of doctors surrounding AD, 
rather serves to perpetuate the image of the illness as both shameful and horrific. 
Describing her experience observing a patient—“an accomplished sculptor and 
intellectual contrarian” who is nearing the end of his life with dementia”—Ofri writes, 
“to see him now, with hardly a sliver of his personality left, encumbered with physical 
injustices you wouldn’t wish upon your worst enemy, was beyond heartrending.” She 
goes on to say, “There was something almost shameful in bearing witness to a fellow 
human being’s profound indignities. I was embarrassed for him, for how embarrassed 
he would likely be, if his former self could see his current self. That his current self 
lacked the capacity to be aware of his state offered little comfort.” Ofri proceeds to 
speculate on the clinical silence surrounding the subject of AD, suggesting that it 
could be due to “the invisibility of the illness, especially in its earlier stages,” or the 
fact that “all the top 10 killers in America are potentially preventable or at least 
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modifiable – all except dementia.” Both of these facts make the illness enigmatic and 
frustrating. Ofri’s conclusion points to doctors’ own existential fear over a loss of 
cognitive capacity as the true reason for the lack of conversation surrounding AD in 
the clinical setting, suggesting that “the idea of the mind vanishing is more petrifying 
than much of the bodily devastation we are privy to.” Ofri is certainly correct in 
asserting that physicians need to be mindful of their own emotional weaknesses in 
order to provide responsible and compassionate care, and she also raises many of the 
issues that create a particularly negative social environment for thinking about 
dementia. However, the premise of her article confoundingly serves to reinforce the 
notion of AD as a dreadful disease, particularly in the way that it describes the 
individual who inspires such ruminations. This frustratingly irresponsible approach 
on the part of medical professionals to discussions about dementia is an important 
point that Ofri leaves out of the conversation, perhaps because she does not realize the 
power of her own words to construct a stigmatized view of dementia.  
The same insidious portrayal of dementia is found in other articles that profess 
a concern for ending the stigma surrounding ADRD. In just one of countless 
examples, a CBC article reporting on a new “dementia buddy program” at 
Northwestern University that pairs persons with dementia and doctors-in-training, 
explains that the program is aimed at reducing the stigma of ADRD among physicians 
(“Dementia Buddy Program”). In the same breath, the article describes Alzheimer’s as 
“a devastating illness” and the program as providing patients “a sense of purpose […] 
before their illness eventually robs their minds.”  
With such media portrayals of ADRD that perpetuate responses of fear and 
horror, it is hardly surprising that when, in January 2014, Ohio State University made 
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its Self-Administered Gerocognitive Exam (SAGE) available to the public on its 
website, the level of interest in the test was so high that the website crashed 
temporarily. While Ohio State researchers say the test—described in the media as an 
“Alzheimer’s online test”—can identify cognitive impairment as effectively as more 
detailed clinical tests, it cannot isolate Alzheimer’s or dementia as the cause of poor 
test results (Knapton). The public reaction to the test clearly speaks to the level of fear 
and anxiety surrounding the disease. In part, this is due to the growing statistics we 
regularly hear reported on the illness. In Canada, there are over 450,000 people living 
with ADRD (Norris). In America that number is 5 million, where 1 in 3 older adults 
die with ADRD, making it the sixth most common cause of death (“Alzheimer’s 
Facts”). According to Alzheimer’s Disease International, as of 2013, there are 44.4 
million people with dementia worldwide, 62% of whom live in developing countries 
(“Dementia Statistics”). 
That such a scientifically misunderstood disease could be so frequently 
diagnosed is certainly cause for a rational degree of concern. The mystery 
surrounding the science of AD, in particular, at least partially establishes the popular 
perception of the illness as terrifying because it is believed to be undiscriminating. 
However, conversations of ADRD also take on a distinctly emotional tone of 
existential dread, largely in connection to the other popular association of dementia 
with the destruction of self or identity. As I have mentioned in previous chapters, 
certain illnesses, by way of the cultural meanings that have developed around them in 
North American society, have the power to evoke extreme reactions of fear and 
stigmatization. Susan Sontag’s pivotal works Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its 
Metaphors chronicle the cultural histories of tuberculosis and AIDS as carrying this 
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sort of weight within the popular imagination. Contemporarily, Alzheimer’s disease 
and other progressive dementias, such as fronto-temporal dementia and Lewy Body 
dementia, comprise the most salient examples of such an illness. As D. J. Jolley and S. 
M. Benbow note, like other stigmatized diseases such as cancer, tuberculosis, AIDS, 
and leprosy, AD “commands fear before sympathy, because it has been marketed 
largely through its most debilitating, demeaning and despairing features” (117). 
Arguably, the most demeaning of these features, as presented in mainstream media 
and popular culture, is the power of dementia to rob individuals of their selfhood. 
In his book, Self, Senility, and Alzheimer’s Disease in Modern America, Jesse F. 
Ballenger traces a cultural history of AD by treating “the dread surrounding dementia 
as a historical problem” (3). In tracing the beginnings of this reaction back to a mid-
nineteenth-century American context and chronicling the discourse on senility and 
AD since that time, Ballenger suggests that we might better understand dominant 
attitudes toward the disease and learn how to “respond with wisdom and 
compassion” (3). I am most interested in Ballenger’s observation that “the loss of the 
ability to independently sustain a coherent self-narrative—a loss that dementia 
entails—has come to be considered the most dreadful of all losses” (9).  
Related to this fear of a broken self-narrative is the tendency in North 
American society for individuals to resist states of vulnerability and dependence 
because they transgress neoliberal expectations of individual responsibility and self-
determination. We see this discourse emerge in discussions of euthanasia in relation 
to dementia, in which the fear of being a burden on one’s friends and family becomes 
a central justification for assisted suicide. One recent example of such a dialogue is 
provided by Gillian Bennett, an 85-year-old B.C. woman and retired psychotherapist 
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who ended her own life in order to avoid the implications of advancing dementia 
symptoms (Ryan). Bennett created the personal website DeadAtNoon.com to explain 
her choice and present a series of arguments in favour of physician-assisted suicide. 
Her justifications for suicide appeal to both anxieties I discuss here: the fear of being a 
burden on one’s family members or society and a refusal to face the vulnerabilities of 
impaired cognition. In the opening to the personal essay on her home page, Bennett 
writes, “I will take my life today around noon. It is time. Dementia is taking its toll 
and I have nearly lost myself. I have nearly lost me.” Describing dementia as a 
“typical” and “boring” disease, her rational approach to her illness reflects the 
worldview of a bright intellectual whose life has revolved around ideas and 
relationships. Thinking ahead to an increasingly more debilitated state, Bennett 
envisions herself as simply a “mindless body,” “carcass,” or “empty husk,” the care of 
which (because she sees herself not as a person by this point, but merely an “it”) will 
be financially costly and emotionally burdensome for her loved ones, an option that 
she sees as “ludicrous, wasteful, and unfair.” Bennett even presents her desire to “cost 
Canada as little as possible in my declining years” as one reason to end her life. Her 
pragmatic arguments are based on what Bennett sees as the ethical choice for persons 
of increasing age and declining health. Discussing the economic burden of a 
disproportionately large elderly population, she notes, “There are many ethical issues 
here: life extension radically alters people's ideas of what it is to be human—and not 
for the better. As we, the elderly, undergo manifold operations and become gaga 
while taking up a hospital bed, our grandchildren's schooling, their educational, 
athletic, and cultural opportunities, will be squeezed dry.” 
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I respect the pragmatism of Bennett’s approach and her right to choose the 
conditions for her own death—to ensure that they are personally validating and 
ethical. However, in the interest of interrogating her central concern here—the notion 
of how our treatment of older adults might alter our concept of what it means to be 
human—we must ask ourselves how the elimination of such occasions for 
vulnerability to exist in the world might also negatively impact human relationships 
(see Stephen Post). Discussions of physician-assisted suicide, like Bennett’s, become 
occasions to consider and assess the humanist values that sometimes overdetermine 
our expectations of our own lives and our relationships with others. Indeed, as 
Ballenger’s work illuminates, this tension stems in large part from the shame we have 
attached to states of vulnerability, such as cognitive disability. Unsurprisingly, many 
of the dozens of dementia blogs that I investigated in my research for this chapter 
begin with posts that articulate bloggers’ apprehension over what they foresee as their 
eventual burdensome dependency on family members and friends. 
I am interested in this area of illness narrative authorship because I think it 
brings to light a few different concerns regarding illness writing online and the 
representation of Alzheimer’s disease in the wider cultural arena. Specifically, in the 
work of Alzheimer’s supporters and self-advocates, there is a concerted push to break 
down the damaging stigma attached to an Alzheimer’s diagnosis and to reshape 
public thinking about the illness. Indeed, for many sufferers, the social alienation 
produced by the lack of support from misinformed friends and family is one of the 
greatest challenges of the illness. Characterizations of persons with dementia as “the 
walking dead” or “demented” abound in popular media representations. The 
promotion by groups like the Murray Alzheimer’s Research and Education Program 
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(MAREP) of public awareness and the breaking down of Alzheimer’s myths focuses 
on self-advocacy among persons with ADRD as one route to generating a more 
accurate and compassionate understanding of the disease. It mirrors the disability 
rights mantra “nothing about us without us.”21 
The goal of such projects is to disrupt the long legacy of stigmatization attached 
to a diagnosis of dementia. And doing this means understanding, from a cultural 
historical standpoint, how and why this particular perception of the disease—as 
dreaded and dreadful—has come to overshadow our capacity to think humanely and 
compassionately about the experience of dementia. In his history of senility and 
Alzheimer’s disease, Ballenger attempts to locate what set of conditions in American 
culture generated the “fearful line” (3) “between the normal and the pathological, 
between a coherent, stable self and the incoherent, chaotic dependency of dementia” 
(2). Ballenger suggests that the fear attached to the threat of dementia cannot be 
explained by simply the greater attention paid, in recent times by both scientists and 
journalists, to Alzheimer’s disease. Instead, the fear of dementia (or “senility” as it has 
historically been called), is deeply tied to changing perceptions surrounding selfhood 
and the life stage of older adulthood. Ballenger contends that the anxiety surrounding 
dementia within the American cultural imagination did not emerge until the late 
nineteenth century, and further, that the physical and cognitive decline often 
associated with aging have not always been regarded with dread. While eighteenth 
century tracts tend to describe older adults, problematically, as burdensome, they do 
not, Ballenger observes, see cognitive or physical changes as an unnatural or fearsome 
transition (5-6).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See David Charlton’s Nothing About Us Without Us for the history of this term in the context of the 
disability rights movement (3). 
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Ballenger’s central line of inquiry concerns the evolution of cultural ideas 
surrounding selfhood, specifically the moment at which selfhood became understood 
as something that one was personally responsible for—something that one must 
construct (9). Ballenger highlights a shift from the late nineteenth century discourse 
surrounding aging, in which “the senile man [was] the epitome of failure because his 
decaying brain collapsed under the pressure to produce in a modern industrial 
society” to the mid-twentieth century conception of the senile man as the epitome of 
failure because he could not “adjust to a consumer-oriented leisure society. Deprived 
of meaningful work, the aging man needed to find in leisure activities the means of 
creating a self. Senility was the failure to accomplish this” (59). Ballenger refers to this 
mentality toward aging as the “gerontological persuasion,” which focused on 
reforming societal attitudes toward older adulthood to reflect a norm or goal of 
“successful aging” (59). Ballenger argues that in the 1940s and 1950s in America, “the 
organizational infrastructure of aging,” including academic, medical, social service, 
and business campaigns, worked to address “middle class anxiety about the 
coherence and stability of the masculine self, but a self that now had to be established 
and maintained less through work than through leisure” (58). Marked by notions of 
aging gracefully, having a leisurely retirement, remaining healthy well into older 
adulthood, and maintaining a generally optimistic attitude toward aging, “the 
gerontological persuasion made dementia stand out much more clearly as a 
pathological condition” (60). 
Ballenger’s work builds on that of Elizabeth Herskovits whose 1995 article on 
subjectivity and AD observes the various political and social agendas that changing 
formulations of dementia have supported. The emergence, in the 1970s, of our current 
!! 234!
Alzheimer’s construct, damaging as it may be to persons diagnosed with ADRD, “has 
served specific political-economic interests, such as researchers’ and research 
institutions’ needs for funding and legitimacy, and solved certain clinical, pragmatic, 
and psychological problems, such as the need to create order out of chaos and to 
legitimize a range of therapeutic responses and sites” (Herskovits 147). Herskovits 
discusses how the act of demonizing those with AD reflects a widespread societal fear 
over the aging process. By categorizing what was once termed “senility” as, instead, a 
diagnosable pathology called Alzheimer’s disease, this medically abnormal form of 
aging could thus be contained through treatments, medications, care regimens, and 
research. In terms of the social context, the medicalization of senility has led to the 
popular conception of Alzheimer’s as a dreaded way to spend the final years of one’s 
life; the stigmatizing discourse used to describe those diagnosed with the disease “has 
led to an implicit debasing of the ‘self’” in dementia (152). 
Several other studies of the damaging discourse of dementia highlight the 
power of language to shape social relationships and actions that have real 
implications for those diagnosed with ADRD. Susan Behuniak’s (2011) analysis of the 
zombie metaphor to describe those with dementia exposes the implications of such 
dehumanizing terminology as “the walking dead” or “the living dead.” This trope 
serves to infuse popular understandings of the illness with both terror and disgust, 
sentiments that perpetuate misconceptions and poor treatment of those with 
dementia. Sam Fazio (1996), Gloria Sterin (2011), Steven Sabat et al. (2011), Kate 
Swaffer (2014), and others also draw attention to the power of language to shape 
thinking about dementia and the attendant need for a linguistic reframing of the 
illness. As Gail Mitchell, Sherry Dupuis, and Pia Kontos summarize in their review of 
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literature on this topic, “It is our experience, in bearing witness to persons with 
dementia, that a significant amount of suffering is linked with the way the tragic and 
the horror-filled words and images, that are common place in social and medical 
literature, get imposed on individuals living with dementia” (8). 
When looking at the voices of Alzheimer’s disease in the blogosphere I observe 
the presence of a movement to reshape popular ideas about ADRD, but I also see 
language that perpetuates stigmatization and, unfortunately, this is ever-present on 
the blogs of those who support persons with ADRD. Some of this stigmatization is 
immediately apparent through the titling of blogs, such as “Had a Dad” Alzheimer’s 
Blog, Missing Jim :: Confessions of An Alzheimer’s Wife, My Demented Mom, demention, 
Alzheimer’s is a Bitch, Alzheimer’s is horrid!, Living in the Shadow of Alzheimer’s, Living 
with a Thief named Lewy Body Dementia, and so on. In the case of titles like “Had a Dad” 
and Missing Jim, the subjects of these blogs were (or are) still alive at the time of blog 
creation and writing, suggesting that these writers appeal to the trope of persons with 
dementia as “already gone.” Even persons with dementia, however, seem to 
internalize the derogatory language and imagery attached to their diagnosis, with 
blog titles like Slip Sliding Away and Watching the Lights Go Out and blog post titles like 
“Future? What Future?!” (Silverfox). 
 
Selfhood in dementia 
In addition to a critical rethinking of the language attached to dementia by 
healthcare practitioners, partners in care, the wider public, and even those with 
dementia, much work has been done by scholars in health studies and gerontology to 
create “a re-visioning of the self in Alzheimer’s disease” and to “strongly challenge 
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the assumption that the loss of self is a direct consequence of a degenerative process in 
nervous tissue” (Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos 7). Instead of understanding the 
identity issues that persons with Alzheimer’s experience as being connected to the 
physical deterioration of the brain, Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos, Herskovits, Sabat et 
al., Tom Kitwood, Stephen G. Post, and others “purport that the debasement of 
personhood is more likely affiliated with the ways persons relate with those 
diagnosed with dementia” (Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos 7). Indeed, the accepted 
standards for what constitutes a “self” are too narrowly defined, predominately due 
to a fixation on autonomy as a marker of selfhood, conventional modes of 
communication as the only vehicles for self-expression, and clinical diagnostic 
interpretations of the Alzheimer’s experience as measures of quality of life. In 
thinking more inclusively about the cognitive changes that persons with dementia 
undergo, researchers have begun to explore embodied forms of self-expression as also 
constituting “responsive behaviours” that individuals employ to communicate aspects 
of their identities (“Understanding Responsive Behaviours”; Dupuis, Wiersma, and 
Loiselle). 
The notion of responsive behaviours deploys the concept of embodied selfhood 
to understand self-expression among persons with dementia as “consist[ing] 
primarily in their essential corporeality of being-in-the-world” (Mitchell, Dupuis, and 
Kontos 7). As Kontos (2004) elaborates, we typically expect that the “self” is enacted 
through cognitive processes, particularly linguistic acts. However, as she argues, 
persons with dementia have deeply ingrained and unique forms of physical 
expression that can also be seen as extensions of the self. Embodied selfhood emerges 
from both primordial and socio-cultural sources. Using Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
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concepts of non-representational intentionality and the primordial body, Kontos 
suggests that the self originates in the primordial body, “whereby selfhood emanates 
from the body’s power of natural expression, and manifests in the body’s inherent 
ability to apprehend and convey meaning” (837). Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s idea 
of habitus as the link between bodily dispositions and the social world, she then argues 
for the corporeal foundations of the socio-cultural dimension of selfhood, suggesting 
that social practices become internalized in bodily habits at a pre-reflective level (837). 
Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos echo these findings when they note that “many life 
patterns and ways of relating continue to be expressed in the presence of dementia 
because fundamental aspects of selfhood are embodied and not defined by cognitive 
function” (7). 
Ultimately, questions over the persistence of selfhood and self-awareness in 
dementia are entwined with broader questions about what it means to have, enact, 
express, or construct a self. As Herskovits points out, “representations of and debates 
about the self in Alzheimer’s attest to the very meaning and essential nature of the self 
and what constitutes subjectivity” (158). While Kontos and Mitchell, Dupuis, and 
Kontos challenge the cognitive foundation of selfhood as a way of rehumanizing 
cultural attitudes towards persons with dementia, this tactic might be seen as 
problematic for the reason that it continues to assert the coherence of a self. Is it 
possible that such a strong emphasis on the stable self, in fact, contributes to the 
problem of stigmatization? Why are we fixated on the notion of selfhood, or the 
coherence of self, as being the indicator of value, personhood, or humanness? Is it 
possible to retain one’s humanity and personhood while embodying a definitively 
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incoherent, perhaps chaotic, presence in the world? Is this state of discontinuity, in 
fact, a closer approximation of what it is like to enact a self over time? 
In her study of persons with dementia at a long term care facility, Kontos 
argues that residents’ abilities to manage “the social demands of eating in the dining 
room,” such as using utensils, napkins, and condiments signals “the coherence and 
consistency in the residents’ mastery of their social world” (842). This fact is related to 
embodied behaviour that results from a lifetime of socio-cultural priming. She 
suggests that residents’ interactions were not a deliberate response to the rules of the 
social environment. Instead, “the taken-for-granted, pre-reflective nature of their 
practices flowed from embodied selfhood” (842). I am sympathetic to the notion that 
selfhood is expressed and manifested in various ways and support the argument that 
all modes of relating with the outside world are grounded in the phenomenological 
conditions of embodiment. However, there does come a time in the journeys of some 
persons with dementia when the utility of a spoon or fork is no longer automatically 
apparent or the typical manners of polite society no longer resonate. In these cases, the 
presence of other residents, nurses, recreational therapists, and health care aides 
remind individuals of social norms for behaviour, essentially serving a disciplinary 
purpose. The fact that these embodied social practices will likely weaken as memory 
loss advances seems to reduce the validity of Kontos’ argument for embodied 
selfhood as the basis for the continued personhood of the individual with dementia. 
When embodied practices change, when they no longer express internalized social or 
personal norms, is selfhood compromised? When immobility increases and physical 
movement is impeded by cognitive changes, does the self begin to fade away, leaving 
us with the same philosophical problem? 
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The central problem with Kontos’ argument, and others that propose embodied 
selfhood as a resolution to the debate surrounding the self in dementia, seems to be 
the presumption of a stable self that persists even in the presence of cognitive 
dissolution. Her paper expresses an obvious desire to see the threads of individuality 
and selfhood that connect pre- and post-dementia states of being. This approach 
understands the self-expression of individuals with dementia through a normative 
framework—that is, it sees embodiment as creating the conditions that uphold ideals 
of coherence, autonomy, and individuality. My critique of this approach stems from 
the possibility that it is a too-convenient response; it doesn’t force us to do the difficult 
work of rethinking our definitions of personhood or what it means to be human. It 
doesn’t force us to see incoherence as a reality of human life, and the stable self as an 
illusion. We instead spend energy trying to locate where and how persons with 
dementia are like “us,” rather than making space for diverse and unconventional 
modes of subjective experience.   
A similar but distinct approach suggested by Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos is to 
redefine selfhood to see it as relational and intersubjective. As discussed in my second 
chapter, Judith Butler has also advanced this perspective, though in a different 
context, to show the many ways in which we are bound to one another. What 
Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos so skillfully highlight is the nature of selfhood as 
something that is produced in and through relationships. Thus, if we see the self as 
“breaking down,” the locus of such a break encompasses all actants and all 
relationships that interact with the individual; social contexts, environments, and 
individuals may be unequipped to support cognitive changes or not flexible enough 
to accommodate a person’s continued expression of a consistent self. As Kitwood has 
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argued in various places, the loss of self or personhood that we associate with 
dementia signifies a flaw in the social fabric and a failure of personal relationships, 
rather than a structural change in the brain (“Personhood” 239, 241). This reflects a 
failure on the part of supporters to nourish the experiential self of the person with 
dementia—the part of the person that relies on “I-Thou relating” (“Personhood” 239). 
The crux of this conversation can be articulated as such: the enacting or 
construction of self through writing or speech is a normative method by which one 
asserts one’s human presence in the world. These forms of communication allow 
others with similarly normative communication approaches to support, co-construct, 
or validate those expressions of selfhood. When normative modes of communication 
become less accessible, for example, for persons experiencing the cognitive changes of 
ADRD, the ability of their supporters to affirm, relate to, understand, or intuit 
expressions of self seems put to an insurmountable test. The incompatibility of these 
systems is, perhaps, what leads to a perceived loss of self. In reality, selfhood may 
persist—its expression hampered by a language barrier of sorts. Along these lines, 
scholars argue for the continued presence of an autobiographical, or what Kitwood 
calls an adapted self, that is still expressed through communicative, narrative means. 
As L.-C. Hydén and L. Örulv argue in their case study of storytelling by persons with 
AD, individuals use linguistic and non-verbal practices to express their identities. 
Despite the fact that stories told by persons with dementia are voiced in temporally 
discontinuous or repetitious ways that may be problematic for listeners (people 
without dementia), the fragmented nature of the story does not disrupt or interfere 
with the teller’s self-awareness or sense of identity. Hydén and Örulv point to the 
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need by researchers and partners in care to recognize a wider spectrum of 
communicative acts that serve to express identity. 
In another sense, Kitwood argues that persistent selfhood can be supported by 
the notion that “a person with dementia still has an emotional and relational life, even 
though without the stabilization and compensation that cognitions ordinarily 
provide” (“Personhood” 241). He presents several strategies for supporting the 
experiential self, one of which is “‘celebration’: simply sharing in the beauty, the fun, 
and the joy of living. . . . Strikingly, it is often in episodes of celebration, such as 
parties, outings and dances, that people who have dementia behave most ‘normally’, 
and the us-them barriers dissolve away to nothing” (241). The act of sharing an 
experience can allow individuals to connect at an ontological level, a point I will 
return to nearing the end of the chapter. 
Once again, these approaches continue to assert the centrality of persistent 
selfhood as that which proves the humanity of persons with ADRD. While one route 
to defending the personhood of those with dementia is to widen the criteria for what 
it means to have or express a “self,” a posthumanist move would be to deprioritize the 
notion of stable selfhood altogether, because of the way in which it is bound up with 
expectations of autonomy, self-determination, and personal responsibility—those 
“core cultural values” that the person with dementia transgresses (Herskovits 153). 
Changing the way that we perceive the construction and expression of self means also 
questioning the permanence of selfhood. As memory loses its power to shape 
identity—as it becomes unseated as the primary determinant of “self”—the self may 
be understood, personally and relationally, along different lines and according to 
different determinants. This might be akin to what Mark Freeman calls an ontological 
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or spiritual self, connected to the present moment and defined more by natural 
inclinations, preferences, or feelings, rather than an autobiographical self, defined by the 
referents of past experience. The larger question is, of course, even if selfhood, or 
awareness of self, does not persist, should this matter in our treatment of persons with 
ADRD? Notably, Stephen G. Post has argued for a treatment of persons with 
dementia based on moral solidarity—a principle that relinquishes the priorities of our 
“hypercognitive society” and rejects value judgments based on cognitive capacity.  
As I will explore in my analysis of dementia blogs, online expressions of 
selfhood are connected to the autobiographical self and represent a symptom of our 
fixation on the individual self-narrative. In the blogs that I investigate below, the 
desire to produce a coherent self-narrative is tied to serious anxieties over the loss of 
selfhood in dementia, interpreted as a loss of social worth and an obstacle to personal 
well-being. 
 
Dementia blogging: genre and rhetorical situation 
As Hydén explores in his discussion of narrative and selfhood in dementia, the 
apprehension or construction of a self or an identity has been intimately tied, in 
Western culture, to the ability to recount past details about one’s life—to the capacity 
for having or recalling memories. Hydén asks, compellingly, 
What happens in situations where the teller or author has some form of 
communicative disability leading to an inability to fulfill the roles of teller of 
the story, and narrator and character in the story? In short, what happens when 
we are unable to tell stories? Or, when we as tellers are unable to create, 
!! 243!
elaborate, revise, and scrutinize our own lives by telling stories? Does such a 
person lack an identity and a sense of self? (39) 
In his study he explores the function of “vicarious voices” that aid in the sounding of 
an individual’s story, explaining how co-tellers can honour the identity and 
personhood of individuals who are “narratively disabled” by helping to tell their 
stories. As my discussion in chapter two pointed out, I am hesitant to accept such a 
designation as “narrative disability” for the way in which it pathologizes non-
narrative modes of experience. However, like Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos, Hydén 
explores narrative creation as a relational act, which helps to alleviate the pressure 
exerted on the subject to construct a coherent self and life story. At the same time, 
Hydén’s article, alongside the voices I cited previously, expresses obvious anxiety 
over what cognitive disability and the inability to communicate normatively might 
mean for an individual’s subjectivity. Do individuals with memory problems still 
have selves? Do they still have identities if they cannot recall events from their lives, 
cannot talk to others about who they are or were? As I will discuss below, this 
preoccupation over questions of the self is not restricted to philosophical ruminations 
in academic journal articles. We must also consider how this obsession actually 
impacts those diagnosed with cognitive impairments; indeed, this same anxiety 
weighs heavily on the early stage dementia bloggers who write about their 
experiences online.  
One goal of this chapter is to answer the question: what do the narrative 
structures, or myths as Hawkins refers to them, of firsthand dementia blogs tell us 
about how the disease is experienced subjectively? The desire to reassert the presence 
of the self (“I’m still here”) through the act of writing is a direct response to the 
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silencing and stigmatization that all persons diagnosed with dementia inevitably face 
in their day-to-day lives. Secondly, the appeal to live in the present, and the 
mythology attached to this dictum that manifests itself in dementia bloggers’ writing, 
directly counters the culture of dread surrounding dementia and seems to be used 
self-consciously by writers as a framework for ordering their narratives. Persons with 
dementia who blog about their illnesses do not do so by accident. They make a 
deliberate choice and often commit, in a disciplined way, to the maintenance of their 
blog. It follows, then, that there are specific reasons why a blog, in particular, meets 
the rhetorical needs of writers who decide to share their stories online.  
In my analysis of the major narrative tropes of individuals who blog about 
their ADRD diagnoses, I rely on Carolyn R. Miller’s definition of genre as social action 
that emerges from recurrent rhetorical situations. In her 2005 article with Dawn 
Shepherd, “Blogging as Social Action,” the writers argue that the defining feature of 
the personal blog is its role as a site where a stable self can be expressed. In exploring 
the kairos, or social and cultural context, for the emergence of the blog, as well as its 
generic features—semantic content, formal features, and pragmatic value—the 
authors conclude that, above all else, “the blog-as-genre is a contemporary 
contribution to the art of the self” (n.p.). Blogging’s cultural moment is defined by 
“mediated voyeurism,” best exemplified by the phenomenon of reality television and 
the societal obsession with celebrity culture, that has led to a breakdown in the 
boundaries between private and public spaces. According to Miller and Shepherd, the 
act of expressing intimate details about oneself in the public space of the Internet is an 
outcome of a culture in which “voyeurism and exhibitionism have been morally 
neutralized” (n.p.). Because the semantic content of personal blogs is predominately 
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about constructing and validating “an identity that [writers] can understand as 
unitary, as ‘real,’” the authors regard the rhetorical convention of the blog as 
intimately connected to the desire to assert subjectivity in the midst of change and 
instability (n.p.).  
Miller and Shepherd’s observations are particularly useful when brought to 
bear on dementia blogs, and the important rhetorical exigence—or “objectified social 
need” (Miller 157)—of self-validation in these spaces. Indeed, writers’ self-professed 
and implicit rhetorical needs are met by the generic features of a blog. I will address 
three of these features below—temporal structure, imagined audience, and 
literariness—as serving the rhetorical needs of writers with dementia to reassert their 
selfhood against the perceived threat of loss. 
 
Temporal structure 
The writing of persons who blog about their experiences with ADRD disclose a 
similar kind of philosophy of “living in the present” in the face of a medically 
overdetermined, but subjectively uncertain, future. In some ways, these stories come 
close to what Arthur Frank calls “chaos narrative.” As he explains in The Wounded 
Storyteller, the chaos narrative is a story that “traces the edges of a wound that can 
only be told around. Words suggest its rawness, but that wound is so much of the 
body, its insults, agonies, and losses, that words necessarily fail” (98). The chaos 
narrative escapes from the lips of patients in what Frank describes as rambling “and 
then”-style utterances—unorganized, incoherent, and non-linear in fashion. 
Individuals experiencing the chaos of illness have been unable to find meaning or 
narrative significance in their experiences, or have yet to understand their pain 
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through the lens of a narrative trope like quest or restitution. Because of the nature of 
life writing in new media spaces, many writers who chronicle experiences of illness 
online may appear to tell their stories in the chaotic way that Frank describes—forever 
cycling through a series of present moments. This is a convention of social media 
genres that emphasize a perpetual present, chronicled in serial fashion. However, 
many of these storytellers, on Twitter and PatientsLikeMe, for example, in disclosing 
the vulnerability and rawness of right now, nonetheless reflect meaningfully on their 
experiences as a way to make them useful to themselves or to others. More so on blogs 
and social networking sites, writers also frequently record past experiences in 
narrative form and imagine possible future narratives.  
Despite the oftentimes chaotic nature of illness, blogs on this topic have been 
crafted to reflect an individual’s experience of reality in some way. As such, they are 
not true chaos narratives. Even if they reflect a chaotic present, bloggers and social 
media users have usually taken the time to sit with their stories and contemplate them 
as they record them. Nonetheless, these stories are also not always framed in terms of 
restitution or quest, or in Hawkins’ mythological frameworks of battle or journey, 
rebirth, and healthy-mindedness. In many ways, these narratives are profound 
because they take up the contingent, frightening, and vulnerable sides of illness that 
are central to Frank’s chaos narratives. The stories I describe in this dissertation—Kate 
Granger’s Twitter reflections on cancer and the dying process, the contingent state of 
the new normal among PLM users with MS, and the search for selfhood in the face of 
progressive dementia among bloggers with ADRD—all profess, and do not shy away 
from, human weakness. In the examples I study, this weakness does not simply 
represent a challenge for the narrator to overcome in her quest for health, but is, 
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instead, an expression of human experience. These stories also reject the fantasy that 
our lives, selves, and self-narratives could ever be immune to change, since they are a 
testament to the limits of human agency. And in this way, they comprise important 
cultural artifacts for understanding the value of posthumanist theory to medicine. 
Part of the reason why online narratives revel in “nowness” has much to do 
with the rhetorical framework of the spaces in which they are created. As discussed in 
chapter three, Twitter compels up-to-the-minute sharing of life details, with a 
particular focus on logging life as it happens. The brevity and informal nature of 
tweets facilitate a kind of on-the-fly, uncensored, and capricious form of 
communication. Though entirely different in terms of rhetorical function, the same 
temporal structure is true of blogs in which a backwards-chronological listing of posts 
enforces continuous prioritization of the present moment. This is not to say that the 
content of blog narratives is stuck in a perpetual present. Indeed, many bloggers reflect 
on the past and ruminate on the future, expressing their fears over the losses that their 
illness might eventually entail. In this way, blogs certainly travel back and forth in 
time. However, the temporal structures of the blog reinforce a present-focused 
orientation.  
For one, as I mentioned, the presence of the most recent post at the top of the 
blog home page signifies various conditions: a diminution of past posts in favour of 
the most recent and relevant information; the expectation that a reader will follow 
along and be up-to-date with reading; and a sense of “live-ness” or open-endedness, 
that reminds us that blogs (unless writers deliberately conclude them) are perpetual 
works-in-progress. Other temporal signifiers include the date and time stamp on each 
blog post that anchors every entry along a linear trajectory. This feature recalls the 
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generic conventions of a journal, diary, or personal organizer, providing writers with 
a primary organizational structure that is temporal, rather than thematic, spatial, 
relational, or otherwise. The organizational feature of the “previous posts” section of 
most blogs, which allows the reader to find individual posts according to year and 
month also reasserts the blogging function of keeping time. 
In the context of blogs by persons with dementia, the structure of a backwards-
linear narrative ordered in time is central. Indeed, for these bloggers, it seems that the 
act of blogging is a conscious attempt to stay in the present moment, even as they 
recall past memories and speculate about the future. The temporally based 
organization of a blog certainly supports the rhetorical need to reaffirm one’s 
continued presence as writer and stable self, acting as proof that “I’m still here.” In the 
example of the blog Slip Sliding Away…, co-authored by Ed, a person with Early Onset 
Alzheimer’s Disease, and Mindy, his wife and partner-in-care, Ed frequently returns 
to the blog after months-long absences, each time remarking that his hiatus has not 
been due to cognitive impairment. On one such occasion, he writes, “Gee, …despite 
being away from this site for over nine months since last posting… and despite what 
some of you may have surmised… no, I am not crazy yet…” (Ed, “Still Crazy…,” 
original ellipses). In another post later that year, he writes once again, “Several of you 
have asked me in separate emails why I have not posted in the last few months… the 
answer is… no, I am not any more crazy than before” (Ed, “Sinner’s Prayer,” original 
ellipses). 
The feature of dated and timed check-ins via the blog becomes particularly 
imperative in the context of dementia, as individuals who are diagnosed with ADRD 
must contend with the collective social anxiety of “loss of self” that has, over time, 
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become attached to this group of illnesses. In this case, the liberal humanist 
expectations of self-determination and autonomy become threatened and individuals 
with dementia feel immense pressure to cling to self in the face of worsening cognitive 
impairment. The way in which blogs mark time, reflecting a weekly or monthly 
report, supports the rhetorical need to make one’s status as “not yet crazy” known. 
The weight of this burden is evident in the blogging of persons with dementia, raising 
questions pertaining to the trauma inflicted, not by the physical disease, but by our 
social construction of it, a point I will turn to nearing the conclusion of this chapter. 
 
Imagined audience 
The conditions of production and consumption of the blog are also important 
here, since writing within this arena is not intended for the writer alone, as would be 
the case with a personal journal. The fact that blogs represent a form of social media 
implies that bloggers writing about their own dementia diagnoses are interested in 
placing their stories somewhere that they will be read by others, commented on, and 
generally situated in a social space where new connections and social validation may 
manifest. In analyzing the then-emergent genre of the blog, Miller and Shepherd focus 
their paper on the rhetorical situation created by “the peculiar intersection of public 
and private that weblogs seem to invite” (n.p.). While individuals speak to their 
communities of readers, Miller and Shepherd note that on blogs, the writer also 
engages in a dialogue with himself or herself. They observe that, for bloggers, “self 
expression serves the intrinsic self-disclosure functions of both self clarification and 
self validation, enhancing self awareness and confirming already-held beliefs. The 
blogger is her own audience, her own public, her own beneficiary.” As I will explain 
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below, taking into account the social dimension of blogging may support the idea that 
dementia bloggers write, at least in part, to prove their continued selfhood to others 
and, in the process, to themselves.  
Some bloggers profess to writing for their friends and family as a way to keep 
them informed about the details of their diagnosis and their journey with dementia. 
As Kris writes in the first post of her Dealing with Alzheimer’s blog, “My son has set up 
this blog for me. I'm hoping to use it as a journal of sorts to not only help me but my 
friends keep up with me. I have many many wonderful friends and family that keep 
up with me. I know it is as hard for them as it is me. They don't know how to ask how 
I'm doing and hopefully this will help them to understand” (“Christmas Eve 2003”). 
However, some comment that people in their real world social circles are too busy, 
disinterested, or in denial to follow their blogs. Over the course of five years of 
blogging, Silverfox writes that he sees his blog as a “lifeline,” noting, “It is like I am 
writing to a very close friend” (“This blog”). However, at earlier moments he 
expresses frustration over a lack of interest from his friends and family when he posts 
difficult or upsetting news and “no one has tried to contact me, help me deal with this 
shock, or even reacted to my posts!” (Silverfox, “The emotions of disappointment”).  
 At other times, bloggers are explicitly speaking to the “normal people” against 
whom they are defined as Other. Truthful Loving Kindness writes on her blog, in a 
plea for understanding, “My battle is the same as it is for you; to be the best “me” that 
I can be, despite dwindling resources. My sacrifice is my self; MY all – because that is 
the known outcome of this war. It will cost every single thing that I hold most dear, 
and my memories and connections with every being that I hold most dear. Eventually 
it will cost my life” (“Alternative to Consumer Terminology”). In this case, the writer 
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envisions the “you” reader as a cognitively “normal” person to whom she attempts to 
relate. At other times, the blog becomes an opportunity for writers to respond in a 
controlled and calculated way to frustrating experiences and attitudes they have faced 
in their daily lives. In this case, the writer envisions the audience as antagonistic, 
ignorant, or ill-informed and the blog is a space for mediating conflict or criticizing 
those who perpetuate dementia stigma. One image in a blog post from @mason4233’s 
blog Dementia survivor, so far… is a succinct, but powerful, example of the way in 
which dementia blogs sometimes address an antagonistic audience. The image reads: 
“I am a PERSON, not just a diagnosis,” followed by the blog text, “And you don’t 
have to raise your voice when speaking to me” (“I am a person”).  
This imagined audience, then, is evidently not a reflection of the community of 
readers who follow and comment on bloggers’ writing.22 As blog comments reveal, 
these readers are consistently supportive, likeminded, and, often, fellow persons with 
dementia. The imagined audience seems to function more flexibly for the writer as 
whomever—in the moment of writing—the blogger wishes to address. This flexible 
audience is important in the function of the blog as a space of self-validation. 
Indeed, the act of sharing one’s experience of illness through blogging is not 
only to make sense of it in the ways that Frank and Hawkins contend that we do 
when we write about sickness—that is, by using narrative as a way of “redrawing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 In this way, the perceived audience of the dementia blog seems to differ quite markedly from other 
blogging communities. By way of contrasting example, we can look to Aimée Morrison’s study of 
personal mommy blogs, in which she surmises that “the intimate public of personal mommy blogging” 
produces “direct emotional reciprocity among its participants” and communities that are small in scale, 
both features of which produce the conditions for a trustworthy, intimate, and likeminded audience 
(“Suffused” 38). Because of the political motivations—whether explicitly stated or not—of most 
dementia bloggers to, at the very least, contribute to the conversation about attitudes toward ADRD, 
and at a more political level, to campaign for better ADRD care, funding, and research, dementia 
bloggers seek out and expect a wide and diverse audience. However, for the most part, dementia 
blogging communities actually remain quite small. 
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maps and finding new destinations” (Frank 53). Because of the social nature of public 
blogs, these stories could also be about spreading awareness in the face of 
misinformation about dementia, or even connecting with others in an exchange of 
mutual support. Both of the bloggers I write about in the case studies mention these as 
central motivations, and other scholars have presented these as reasons for blogging 
about other kinds of illnesses (see Hardey, Orgad, Pitts).  However, there is clearly 
more to the situation, and this “something more” is related to the writer’s need to 
assert her selfhood in the face of various challenges and obstacles, some of which are 
socially constructed. Certainly, writers have the need, simply, to say: “Hey! This is 
happening to me. This moment of human vulnerability is real and raw and, because 
I’m a social creature, I need to tell you about it.” As in traditional illness memoirs, 
“the ill person needs to reaffirm that his story is worth listening to by others” (Frank 
56). At the same time, writes Frank, “he must also reaffirm that he is still there, as an 
audience for himself,” a point that certainly resonates with dementia bloggers’ writing 
(56).  
I will discuss this idea in relation to both of the bloggers below, but for now, I 
draw on an illustrative example of the flexible audience in the case of a blogger with 
fronto-temporal dementia (FTD) whose blog posts often take the form of free verse or 
prose poetry. Bruce Bane, the author of Living With Dementia, writes on his “About 
Me” page, “I am writing this blog first of all for myself – to try and understand how 
my dementia affects my life. And if this helps others better understand the effects of 
FTD, so much the better. I am trying to find my way through this wilderness of a 
disease and I invite you to travel with me. It’s always better to travel together instead 
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of alone.”23 The motivation of connecting with others in order to “travel together” is 
central to Bane’s writing. However, his goal is also, quite clearly, to put his words 
“out there” as a way of speaking to himself, about himself in the way that Miller and 
Shepherd observe. Many of his posts are explicitly on the topic of reconciling the 
changes in personal identity that he is experiencing with his sense of self. In one post, 
entitled “Who Am I Becoming,” Bane very explicitly employs the blog as a space to 
voice an interior monologue, writing: 
If life is the process of becoming who we are meant to be / !And then being who 
we are (no more, no less),!/ What does that mean for me?!/ Gradually it feels 
like I’m becoming less of who I am!/ This thing called dementia is draining me 
of myself!/ So I wonder, “Who am I becoming?”!/ When all is said and done 
will there be nothing left of me?!/ Or will there still be a spark that others can 
point to and say,!/ “Yes, that’s Bruce. I’d know him anywhere.” 
At the same time, Bane has an obvious sense that he is speaking to an imagined 
audience of others who are going through this experience with him. In his post “The 
Liar,” he characterizes dementia as a liar that “tells me lies about myself / About the 
people around me / Lies like, ‘You have no worth’, ‘People see you as a burden’, 
‘Everyone would be better off if you weren’t around’ / Believing these lies gives 
dementia power” (Bane). He ruminates on the dangers of accepting these lies, opting 
instead to believe the truths spoken by those around him that affirm his sense of self. 
Bane closes by saying, “Because when I listen to the lies I live them / And that 
becomes a burden for all of us / One that none of us deserves” (“The Liar”). In this 
post, the “us” that Bane addresses seems to refer to a general “us”—denoting society 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 The blog has been deleted since the time of writing. 
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or the collective—but it might also refer more intimately to his imagined readers, the 
ones who he sees as traveling with him on his journey with dementia. 
Literariness (and literacy) 
Connected to the generic affordance of the blog as a place to speak publicly to 
an imagined audience is the function of a blog as a manifestation of a normative 
communicational mode. While all of the dementia blogs that I researched, at various 
points, exhibit two of the narrative tropes that Frank highlights—chaos and quest—
the blog, itself, also becomes a diagnostic test of sorts. It is, as each blogger self-
consciously attests, a way to prove (to oneself? to the world?) that one has not yet 
“lost one’s mind.” The writing of a blog becomes a way of “passing” for normal, in 
spite of a cognitive disability. While each blogger chronicles his or her journey as it is 
marked by physical and mental changes that bring about both struggles and joys—
even as each blogger is meticulously documenting her difficult symptoms or social 
embarrassments or “dementia moments” as they are affectionately called—she is also 
struggling to prove her continued presence as herself. The importance of the blog genre 
to such a project is central, since it provides the resources to construct an ordered, up-
to-the-moment narrative.  
The expectation that one articulate one’s illness story in such a way, or the 
desire to do so, reflects a highly normative expectation of how one should process, 
cope with, and communicate one’s experience. This reality is an oversight that I 
believe Frank makes when he writes of illness as a call for stories. The social 
expectation that we mobilize our experience to serve a greater good of self-discovery, 
social connection, or heightened awareness, and that we do so through narrative 
means is based on the premise that we all have the resources to perform such an act of 
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self-disclosure. The choice by those in the early stages of ADRD to chronicle their 
experiences through blog writing becomes a way of proving one’s continued 
membership in this group of “normal people” who can communicate in conventional 
ways about what they are going through.  
Among other reasons, these bloggers write as a kind of rebellion—however 
diffident—against the knowledge that this ability is a temporary one. Upon reaching 
his 100,000th view, Silverfox writes, “As I have said before, I will continue to write as 
long as I can. And, I am sure you recognize that my journey is speeding up and 
gaining intensity. No big deal! I am still here. Maybe a little more grouchy, fuzzy, 
unstable, or disoriented, but still here. And, as long as spell check works, you will be 
able to figure out what I am typing for a while!” (“100,000 Views!”). Truthful Loving 
Kindness speaks often of her diminishing writing abilities, providing a metanarrative 
to writers, in one post, about her struggles to actually bring her “bits of brilliant 
insight” into a cohesive piece of prose writing. She writes, “I typed these pieces of 
notes from my cell phone, hoping that I could later finish and connect the thoughts. It 
has been over eight hours and I can’t seem to even grasp what I was talking about, let 
alone get to the point where I could continue thoughts or bring threads together like I 
had hoped.  Posting as-is…” (Truthful Loving Kindness, “Efforts to Gather Clarity”). 
The determination to “write anyway” can be construed as an unwillingness to accept 
the imposed silence that social constructions of dementia present. Along the same 
lines, the act of blogging, itself, supports the narrative trope of “proving oneself” that 
is persistent across many ADRD blogs, and which I will discuss through my analysis 
of two representative blogs by persons with dementia. The first, entitled Before I 
Forget, is a blog about Early Onset Alzheimer’s Disease (EAOD) written by a British 
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woman who calls herself Mrs. Hsg. The second blog, Watching the Lights Go Out, 
chronicles physician David Hilfiker’s first year of an Alzheimer’s diagnosis and the 
year following his doctors’ retraction of that diagnosis. I will explore how the 
narrative point of view of self-validation in each of these blogs is connected to the 
dread over loss of self that contemporary cultural imaginings of ADRD perpetuate. 
Bloggers’ writing oscillates between a desire to continue reasserting the self and an 
acknowledgment of the unstable nature of identity in dementia. 
 
Mrs. Hsg, Before I Forget… 
Mrs. Hsg wrote her first blog post in May 2012 when she began to notice that 
problems with memory were affecting her day-to-day life. After writing a few posts 
that month, she took a hiatus from posting until Christmas Eve 2012 when she 
announced her official Early Onset Alzheimer’s Disease (EOAD)24 diagnosis (Mrs. 
Hsg, “Christmas eve..”). One post shortly following this announcement reads, “I am 
thinking a lot today of what it means and how long I have before I am not me 
anymore. I lie in bed at night and can’t believe..no..don’t want to believe it. I want to 
die before I am a burden because my mind has gone” (Mrs. Hsg, “Leading Up to 
Christmas”). 
 Like many of the ADRD bloggers whose words I read in my research for this 
chapter, the diagnosis of dementia brings with it, first and foremost, a crisis of 
identity—or, rather, a crisis pertaining to identity loss. Mrs. Hsg first expresses 
anxiety over eventually not being “me anymore.” Unlike some of the claims that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The term EOAD is used to label a rare form of dementia that affects individuals under the age of 65. 
Most cases of EOAD are linked to genetic mutations in three different genes, although some people 
who are diagnosed with EOAD have the “common form of the disease,” just at an earlier age than 
usual (“Early-Onset Alzheimer’s”). 
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Frank makes about the vulnerability of the body and the embodied nature of illness 
storytelling, for those with dementia, the mind, the self, the intangible “me” is at the 
core of the trauma. For the bloggers who set out to document their journey post-
diagnosis, the act of blogging becomes many things—an opportunity to vent, a way of 
finding perspective, a forum for ADRD advocacy, and a vessel for memory keeping. 
Importantly, the blog also becomes an assertion of the self against the threat of 
dissolution, incoherence, forgetting, confusion, and so on. I find it noteworthy that, for 
the most part, the blogs I have read show very little evidence of an ADRD online 
community; the bloggers I write about (aside from Hilfiker) rarely receive more than 
one or two comments on their posts, if any. As mentioned in my discussion of the 
blog audience, at times, each of these bloggers seems to be speaking to an imagined 
reader reminiscent of a medical authority or suspicious caregiver—someone to whom 
the writer must prove his or her competency. At times, it seems that the writer is 
speaking to herself—to her own fear that she is becoming “someone else.” 
Over the past two years of blogging, Mrs. Hsg has posted several times per 
month and the majority of posts relate, in some way, to her diagnosis with EOAD. As 
with all of the other blogs I will discuss, the point of the blog is very overtly to 
provide a space to write about the experience of dementia, functioning as a personal 
journal where Mrs. Hsg can share her life with readers. She is candid about her strong 
relationship with her adult daughter, whom she raised as a single parent for many 
years, and her fears over that relationship changing as new symptoms emerge. She 
openly discusses the strain that the diagnosis places on her marriage, expressing the 
mutual decision by she and her husband that he will not be the one to provide in-
home care when the time comes. She also shares her experiences with the frustrating 
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bureaucratic intricacies of filing for early retirement and her disillusionment with the 
social support system (or lack thereof) for persons with EOAD in Britain, where she 
lives.  
 In the “Who Am I?” section of her blog, Mrs. Hsg writes, “I want to record my 
daily life and thoughts to look back on when I no longer remember. I hope I have 15 
years at least before I am no longer me. So I will try and write as long as I can.” The 
page that Mrs. Hsg has titled “Who Am I?” carries a special kind of significance in this 
context. The blog is heavy with the weight of her attempts to express a seemingly 
compromised self. This notion of feeling compromised or divided is emphasized by 
Mrs. Hsg in her interpretation of a quotation by Terry Pratchett, reflecting on his own 
EOAD journey: 
 There have been several quotes by Terry Pratchett that I can identify with. 
‘It occurred to me that at one point it was like I had two diseases – one was 
Alzheimer’s and the other was knowing I had Alzheimer’s.’ 
This is probably the quote I that strikes me most. Knowing you have 
Alzheimer’s is like being secretly give [sic] the date of your death and not being 
able to stop it or control how you will move towards it. It is like watching 
yourself in an out of body experience and not being able to intervene. The main 
thing is that nobody around you can imagine for one second how devastating it 
is to understand, and feel your own mental cognitive breakdown. (“The End 
Game”) 
In this passage, Mrs. Hsg positions herself as an observer, seeing evidence of her mind 
slowly changing as a result of her illness. In a sense, this is her position as the writer of 
a blog in which she is her own subject; her role is to maintain a stealthy gaze on any 
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signs of herself “slipping away.” She notes in one blog post that her tendency to 
“‘catalogue’ anything new publicly is to hopefully educate as many as I can about the 
world of living with Alzheimer’s and Dementia. Maybe I feel that I am on some kind 
of mission, if so the very act of writing this is supporting me by getting rid of the 
worms in my head :)” (“Living with Early Onset…,” 31 Jul. 2014). However, the way 
in which she thinks through and interprets the physical and cognitive changes that 
she catalogues also reflects an obvious desire to prove that, for as long as she can make 
these observations, she might maintain the upper hand on her illness. As I referenced 
in the epigraph to this chapter, Mrs. Hsg writes of feeling “like a butterfly desperate to 
get out of a jam jar,” supposing that she writes “to mask anything is wrong with me. 
Perhaps it is more that I am saying, ‘here look, I am fine, I can write these words, so I 
must be ok. Maybe I will never get any worse’” (“Who Am I?” (comments)). 
 Mrs. Hsg’s reflections on linguistic ability are one example of this perpetual 
self-monitoring. She writes, “Language has not left me but has become more 
important as I notice the demise of tiny parts of language that become dysfunctional 
in my brain. Language is communicating who you are, if you no longer have language 
do you fail to be you?” (Mrs. Hsg, “Language and Me”). Her answer to this quasi-
rhetorical question is that, indeed, “who she is” persists in spite of language 
difficulties because “who you are is much more than language or communication.” 
Nonetheless, a nagging question remains: “why do I feel that the more I forget and the 
less words I have, parts of me slip away?” (Mrs. Hsg, “Language and Me”). In another 
post, her struggles with grammar in her writing—particularly what she begins to 
notice as her newly acquired misunderstanding of the comma—also propel her to 
reflect on how the breakdown of linguistic ability affects her expressions of self. As 
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someone who is obviously inclined toward the literary—she also maintains a blog 
where she posts book reviews—a sudden difficulty with writing mechanics arrives as 
an assault to the very core of her being. 
 In her blog post on “Punctuation malfunction in my brain and my increasing 
fear of commas,” Mrs. Hsg notes, “As I write now I am having great difficulty in 
knowing if I am putting commas in the correct place and it has suddenly become a 
real issue. I have no idea why I am stressing about it so much… I am also misspelling 
words more frequently… Lately what I think is not what my fingers are typing, how 
can that be?” She brings up this issue mostly to voice her worry that she is becoming 
“less literate” and to communicate her awareness “of these small changes that I 
cannot do anything about.” She expresses her embarrassment over these mistakes, 
noting that, in the past, she has judged other bloggers for their errors in spelling, 
grammar, and punctuation. With great humility, she remarks that her new writing 
challenges have helped her to see “that it is what people are struggling to say that is 
more important.” Her sense of worry over what might be the implications of altered 
communication abilities is clear in the last line of the post, however, when Mrs. Hsg 
asks her readers: “but are people less likely to read a blog that has grammatical errors 
in even if the content is interesting?” 
 Her fear over not noticing changes in her own abilities or expressions of 
selfhood also becomes apparent in a blog post chronicling a trip to the memory clinic 
to assess her driving capabilities. Her discussion with the doctor eventually comes to 
the topic of post-mortem brain donation, and Mrs. Hsg is eager to have her brain 
donated to research after she passes away. Thoughts of her eventual cognitive 
deterioration and death are clearly amplified by her trip to the memory clinic, and this 
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leads her to reflect on her fears. Although she wants to be “a person who accepted 
things as they were so that I could focus on everything else,” she acknowledges her 
instinct to “fight this” (Mrs. Hsg, “Memory Clinic”).  The anxiety underlying her 
words is palpable, as she writes, 
When the problem is in your brain, you may not be aware of the rate the 
cognitive decline is happening, your thoughts will simply change without it 
seeming odd or wrong. I am scared that with cognitive decline I shall not be 
aware that dementia is increasing, because then I can no longer fight it. (Mrs. 
Hsg, “Memory Clinic”) 
The act of taking an inventory of symptoms on her blog is one way that Mrs. Hsg self-
monitors in order to stave off what she fears will be her eventual ignorance of her own 
dementia. This inventory taking is a framing device that each of the ADRD bloggers 
that I discuss uses at some point on her or his blog. Generally speaking, this tendency 
to “check in” is characteristic of the personal journal style of blog. In the case of 
ADRD, it also becomes a way to track evidence of symptoms as a personal medical 
record might. While Mrs. Hsg’s posts certainly do not report on daily, or even weekly, 
symptoms—her posts appear only about two or three times per month—her writing 
self-consciously announces its purpose, at least in part, as a kind of diagnostic test or 
form of self-monitoring.  
 
David Hilfiker, Watching the Lights Go Out 
 On October 19, 2014, in a post titled “The Last Post … (?),” blogger David 
Hilfiker writes: 
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Some of you will have noticed that I haven’t written in almost a month; you 
may be wondering what’s happened to me. I’m fine, but I just haven’t had 
anything new to say. My cognitive lights are no longer winking out. True, some 
are still burned out and unlikely to return, but it seems I’ve written everything 
I’ve had to say about them. So it’s time to end this chapter in my life and close 
“Watching the Lights Go Out.” 
Hilfiker’s experience with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a rather unique one, in the 
sense that his original diagnosis of cognitive impairment (probable AD) in September 
2012—his reason for having started his blog—was revoked and downgraded to 
subjective cognitive complaints (SCC) just over a year later. A diagnosis of SCC means 
that the individual reports memory problems, however, these do not show up 
“objectively” through neuropsychological testing (Hohman, et al. 125-6). As the first 
year of Hilfiker’s blog testifies, his life became consumed by the fears, stigma, and 
uncertainty attached to an AD diagnosis. After doctors reassess this decision, 
Hilfiker’s blog gradually begins to examine the jarring process of readjusting to a life 
without Alzheimer’s disease.  
 Hilfiker’s blog is one of the more publicized examples of ADRD blogging, due 
to his prominent position as a socially conscious physician and author. In the ’80s, 
Hilfiker practiced what he called “poverty medicine” in economically disadvantaged 
rural and urban communities in and around Washingon DC. In 1990, he and his wife 
Marja founded Joseph’s House, a residence for homeless people with AIDS and 
cancer. He is the author of the 1982 book Healing the Wounds, a collection of candid 
reflections on his career and the medical profession; the 1994 memoir, Not All of Us Are 
Saints: A Doctor’s Journey with the Poor; and the 2003 book Urban Injustice: How Ghettos 
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Happen, a social history of poverty and critique of contemporary policies of social 
assistance in America. Hilfiker’s decision to publicly chronicle his journey with AD 
received media coverage from several different outlets, including the Daily Mail 
(Peterson), Washington Post (Vargas), Huffington Post (Hall), Policy Mic (Adams), 
Mashable (Wertheim), and New York Times (Span). This degree of visibility is certainly 
not the case for the other dementia bloggers I write about in this chapter, so we can 
conceive of Hilfiker’s readership as being significantly wider than that of the average 
dementia blogger. 
 Hilfiker is extremely candid about his experiences with cognitive impairment 
and repeatedly vocalizes his unwillingness to feel shame for the neurological changes 
that are producing new, different, or disappearing behaviours. His openness about his 
symptoms and cataloguing of these changes are voiced in an overtly activist tone, as 
well. Like Mrs. Hsg, Hilfiker sees his blog as a space to clear up the misconceptions 
about his disease that have insidiously found their ways into the cultural imagination. 
The emphasis on activism and paying witness to the truth of living with dementia are 
important ways in which these blogs form a kind of collective voice. Their explicit 
agendas to combat dementia stigma are a response to the fact that all individuals 
diagnosed with ADRD, without exception, find themselves on the defensive, forced to 
contend with dehumanizing attitudes and incorrect assumptions about the disease 
that derive from a deep-rooted collective fear over cognitive breakdown. 
Uniquely, Hilfiker’s observations on his illness also, quite clearly, emanate 
from the medically oriented perspective of a doctor who is perpetually on the lookout 
for signs and symptoms. He notes repeatedly that many small incidents about which 
he writes that would have meant nothing to him before his diagnosis, now activate his 
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“medical mind” and cause him to search for connections between the occurrence and 
his impairment (Hilfiker, “The Forward Lean”). His professional training can partially 
account for his meticulous journaling of these symptoms. However, this tendency 
appears across the spectrum of personal blogs by individuals with dementia and 
relates to the totalizing nature of such a diagnosis. When an individual receives an 
ADRD diagnosis, every small change in temperament, behaviour, or personality 
enters into the service of validating that diagnosis. As Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos 
observe,  
Once diagnosed with dementia, persons and their feelings, actions, and 
expressions become symptoms within a problematized field of possibility. If 
persons with dementia express feeling healthy and well, they are judged as 
being in denial. If they are having trouble remembering details but fill in the 
gaps to save face, they are said to be confabulating. If they get angry with the 
way in which health workers are providing care, then they are labeled as 
aggressive and may end up being restrained and isolated. Other scholars have 
also noted this totalizing process of labeling and problematizing that engulfs a 
person’s entire life and relationships with others. (4) 
Dementia blogs, while they are complex narrative spaces containing multiple 
rhetorical exigences, seem to serve this function by placing the subject under self-
scrutiny. Hilfiker’s blog is a prime example of such self-scrutiny, as he spends just 
over one year defining his life experiences through the lens of dementia, only to have 
this lens shattered when the diagnosis changes.  
The notion of an Alzheimer’s “identity” and how the self becomes redefined in 
the wake of a diagnosis become central foci on Hilfiker’s blog as he chronicles both 
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transitions—internalizing his diagnosis and then de-identifying from it. Hilfiker’s first 
three posts connect to three of the major concerns of this chapter. His blog begins as 
many dementia blogs do, with the announcement of a diagnosis. Entitled “Now It 
Begins,” Hilfiker writes, “Yesterday, the cliché goes, was the beginning of the rest of 
my life.” Similarly to Mrs. Hsg and other bloggers as they ruminate on their 
diagnoses, Hilfiker describes the path of his future as predetermined, tainted by the 
anticipation of sadness, loss, and dependence. He writes, “Alzheimer’s has always 
seemed like the worst way to go out. […] Curiously, I feel more sad than scared: sad 
that I’ll not see much of my grandchildren’s growing up, sad that people’s last 
memories of me will be of a body unable to recognize anyone or speak cogently, sad 
that Marja and I won’t grow old together and that she’ll be burdened with taking care 
of me.” The vision of this predetermined path is bound up with the medical diagnosis, 
but also with every image, story, metaphor, or sentiment about ADRD that we’ve 
seen, read, heard, or felt—what Herskovits refers to as the “public consciousness of 
Alzheimer’s—a consciousness that is produced by the totality of discourse […] about 
Alzheimer’s” (147). This consciousness is infused with the stigma, dread, and fear that 
I discussed in the first part of this chapter, meaning that those who are handed an 
Alzheimer’s diagnosis are also handed the weighty burden of our cultural 
constructions of the disease.  
In line with my focus for this chapter, Hilfiker’s next post is on facing the loss 
of self—that most dreaded loss according to Western cultural understandings of 
ADRD. As he will continue to do throughout his blog, Hilfiker turns to Buddhist 
wisdom to remark that “suffering arises just here in this identification with ‘self.’ My 
identity is as an intellectual and I’m going to lose it” (“Spiritual Questions”). What he 
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understands as his eventual loss of self causes him anxiety, and yet he realizes that if 
he can deprioritize this fixation on “self,” then he can circumvent much of the 
suffering that the “predetermined path” of Alzheimer’s portends. 
His third post questions the situation I have just described following an 
Alzheimer’s diagnosis, in which all life circumstances become connected, in some 
way, to pathology. He writes, “I’m interpreting so many mistakes I make in light of 
the dementia: typing mistakes, skipping words when I write, forgetting where I put 
stuff. In the past, I have sometimes used my diagnosis of depression as an excuse to 
avoid things, to pull back from life’s challenges. I don’t want to repeat that mistake 
here by interpreting everything through the eyes of this illness” (Hilfiker, “Is Every 
Mistake Alzheimer’s”). This is even more of a concern for Hilfiker because he has not 
actually received a firm diagnosis of AD—this does not come until approximately 
January of 2013. And, yet, as his blog unfolds, we see this urge being very difficult to 
resist. In his subsequent posts, he returns to this question—to the nagging desire to 
reframe his world according to Alzheimer’s disease: “Every day I notice something 
more that is amiss in my mind. I’m typing slower and with many mistakes; I’m so 
easily distracted; I’m so slow in getting things done; my memory seems to be getting 
worse by the week. Are those things evidence of worsening disease or am I beginning 
to imagine things in order to conform to the diagnosis?” (Hilfiker, “Fear”). Again and 
again, Hilfiker returns to this problem, and he does indeed continue to seek out 
connections between his memory, mood, and behaviours and his diagnosis.  
Over the course of his first year of blogging, several daily and major life events 
become framed in the context of Alzheimer’s. Small changes that become 
preoccupations include: getting lost and disoriented in a well-known part of the city 
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(Hilfiker, “Lost”); an uncharacteristic disinterest in the presidential debate 
(“Uncertainty”); difficulties socializing at a conference (“Speaking at a Conference”); 
offering “bread” from the collection basket at church (“Learning to Laugh at Myself”); 
trouble following tech support instructions (“Why Am I So Happy Within My 
Alzheimer’s?”); an inability to memorize directions (“Losing My Life”); repeating the 
same information on his blog multiple times (“God’s Humour”); difficulty following 
the rules of board games (“Receiving Help”); and repeatedly forgetting the same 
intention to do something within seconds of having it (“Little Things”). 
There are larger changes, too, like memory problems that interfere with his 
duties as church bookkeeper and eventually force him to resign (“Losing Self”; 
“Confusion”; “A Huge Mistake”) and “difficulty in writing and a general mild 
apathy” (“Life Lessons”). He also chronicles some positive changes, like spending 
more time with his children and grandchildren, finding more joy in “living in the 
present” rather than the future, and greater comfort in being emotionally open and 
vulnerable with others, which has resulted in deeper interpersonal connection. 
Most noteworthy, with regard to the processes of self-monitoring that 
Hilfiker’s blog takes up, is perhaps a palpable (and rather immediate) shift in his 
sense of identity (or identification) with this illness. At an early stage, he seems 
willing—even eager—to take on an AD advocacy role, remarking, “There are parts of 
me, I find it hard to admit, that are actually excited about this diagnosis, […] parts, in 
fact, that even want it.  It’s not the prospect of real dementia or lying drooling in a 
nursing home bed, of course, but there is something titillating about the present, 
about being that person who can shock others, who talks honestly about his illness 
and helps others relate better to it. […] How strange! (“Standing Out”). Very quickly, 
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even before his diagnosis is confirmed, Hilfiker feels that he has “in some real way 
integrated the diagnosis into my self-image” and that this letting go of uncertainty 
over the diagnosis has been a freeing experience (“Telling Karin”). In a blog post 
titled, tellingly, “Why Am I So Happy Within My Alzheimer’s?,” Hilfiker discusses 
the improvements he has experienced in his life since accepting that he has AD: 
“Gone is the sense that I should be doing more. […] I don’t feel the same necessity to 
live in the future, fearing the judgment that will come if I don’t do it right.” 
In taking on an advocacy role, Hilfiker finds purpose and empowerment 
through a diagnosis of AD. While he sees this as a shift in selfhood, I would argue that 
Hilfiker more likely fits the diagnosis into his sense of self, so that he can continue to 
be the person he was before—the person who doesn’t shy away from confronting 
difficult realities, like medical mistakes, social injustice, and, now, cognitive 
impairment. His blog, despite his reflections on letting go of self, is actually a 
manifestation of his desire to keep being the writer, the intellectual, the free thinker, 
the analytic mind, and so on. 
Perhaps the real trouble with Hilfiker’s experience is that, even if he had 
accepted the need for a Buddhist-inspired process of detachment from ego, his 
“journey with Alzheimer’s” ends rather abruptly. For the first year of the blog, 
Hilfiker writes about his symptoms and dementia-related experiences a few times per 
week; however, some doubts begin to surface about his diagnosis and, in September 
2013, he is finally cleared by a neurologist (“Waiting”) who tells him there is “no good 
evidence of brain dysfunction or cognitive impairment” (“Letting Go --Third Time 
Around”). Hilfiker reflects on what this means for his rather tenuous sense of self: 
“It’s true,” he writes, “a year ago, as I was getting used to the diagnosis of 
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Alzheimer’s, I wrote about having to let go of self and I’ve mentioned it a lot since, for 
instance, here and here. The Buddhists point out that hanging on to one’s sense of self 
is a sure recipe for unhappiness because our self is always changing” (“Letting Go --
Third Time Around”). He notes that he had started to let go of his “self-image as an 
intellectual, as the independent, competent one who needed no help”—though, as 
mentioned, there is little evidence on his blog that he has truly given up these markers 
of identity. He goes on to explain his renewed crisis of self, now that he feels the 
weight of expectations to “return to normal”: 
Now I have to give up the self who is the Alzheimer’s patient, the one who 
would create much suffering for his family as he declined, yet also the one who 
is losing his intellectual capacities but accepting it with grace, […] and the one 
who is willing to speak and write about his disease publicly. That identity was 
an attractive self that I had become very attached to over the past year. It’s hard 
to let it go. 
The Buddhists are right again: In spite of the overwhelming good news 
of the last several months, I have felt almost cheated, suffering this loss of 
identity, unable to embrace the good news in all its fullness. (“Letting Go --
Third Time Around”) 
With this last visit to the neurologist in January 2014, Hilfiker remarks that he begins 
to feel a release, once again, from the Alzheimer’s identity, a “freedom from that 
tension between who I am and who I thought I was” (“Letting Go --Third Time 
Around”). And yet, it seems almost with sadness and regret that he ends his blog in 
October 2014. He expresses guilt over feeling as though he has misrepresented 
himself. The blog has not served the purpose he had originally intended, and this is 
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difficult for him to accept. He feels as if he has “promised one thing and delivered 
another. It’s an irrational sense that I have something to apologize for” (“The 
Community Responds”). Despite having continued for the last year of his blog to 
chronicle symptoms that were no longer Alzheimer’s, but some other form of 
cognitive impairment, the erasure of a diagnosis makes his complaints feel less 
purposeful—without a diagnosis, he is actually unable to rally around a coherent new 
sense of self in illness. 
Hilfiker’s writing in this post and elsewhere points to the profound power of a 
diagnosis to shape an individual’s expectations of self and the world. One of the major 
themes in his blog is to explore how he reacts to what he believes will be others’ 
expectations of him as someone with Alzheimer’s disease. His writing is enlightening 
in countless ways, but with regard to my purposes in this chapter, Hilfiker’s work to 
expose the social expectations that we create around selfhood in ADRD is noteworthy. 
The burdens that social constructions of ADRD place on individuals with cognitive 
impairment are clearly real and endemic.  
 
Moving beyond narrative? 
In our conversation I told my husband that all I understood were the 
first phrase of the paragraph and the last phrase of the paragraph, so all 
the sentences in the middle might just as well have been “blah blah 
blah.”  He took me in his arms and his reply was, “Okay, are you 
listening?” 
“I love you blah blah blah … forever.” (Truthful Loving Kindness, 
“I was going to write”) 
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The blogs of Mrs. Hsg and David Hilfiker both reveal, in their own ways, how 
self-narratives—the stories that we tell ourselves, and others, about who we are—can 
be the source of great anxiety in the face of progressive cognitive impairment. Both 
blogs serve as a way for writers to assert coherence in response to threats of the 
dissolution of self—they are spaces where a life narrative can be articulated 
meaningfully. They are also archival spaces where writers record evidence of who 
they are—or were. The blog becomes a vessel or time capsule, or in some articulations, 
a prosthetic memory for writers who hope to record as much as possible about their 
lives before their neural structures are no longer capable of storing memories. This 
perceived need to construct a prosthetic self of sorts can be construed as an 
anticipated need for defense against future silencing and dehumanization. The 
prosthetic blog-self can provide affirmation of selfhood once writers cross the so-
called threshold into critical memory loss. 
 The urgency of such a project for both Mrs. Hsg and David Hilkfiker emanates 
from the discourse of dread and fear over ADRD that sees the illness as, ultimately, 
one of narrative trauma. Ostensibly, in dementia, the rational, autonomous, self-
determining person becomes one who, while clinging to old and weakening ties to a 
self—that is, to the autobiographical markers of identity—is simultaneously losing the 
faculties of memory that would allow her to effectively continue to be that self. This 
attachment to narrative—or, more specifically, to the need for a coherent self-
narrative—is central to the suffering that a diagnosis of ADRD brings. 
In his essay “Beyond Narrative: Dementia’s Tragic Promise,” Mark Freeman 
describes the experience of his mother who has dementia, observing that her most 
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traumatic moments with the illness occur when her desire to assert her identity crash 
into the realities of her cognitive impairment. She self-identifies as the “office manager 
and check book balancer, able to do just fine, thank you, on her own” (172). But 
interruptions to the story that she tells about herself come as a profound and painful 
shock. While she is able, mostly, to get by on her own, the overwhelming experience 
of trying—and failing—to recall a schedule of social appointments and the desire to 
continue working, driving, and managing her own finances as these abilities decline, 
send her into crises of identity that compromise her happiness and sense of stability 
(169-71). On the other hand, life “becomes most worthwhile for her precisely when 
she—qua autobiographical identity—isn’t there. Or, to put the matter somewhat 
differently, if paradoxically, her healthiest and most life-affirming experiences as a 
self, a vital self, are precisely when her autobiographical identity, and narrative, are in 
abeyance” (172). As Freeman notes, “the self who loves music” and “the self who 
loves Sophie [her granddaughter]” remain ever-present during these times, “but it is a 
self that is rooted mainly […] in the living moment, in relation to what is Other. Her 
identity at these moments, therefore, is not so much a narrative identity, born out of 
the particulars of her history, as what might be considered a kind of ontological or 
spiritual identity, born out of her being” (172). 
Freeman draws our attention to two distinctly different subjective experiences: 
that of autobiographical identity, which is temporally situated within the trajectory of 
past, present, and future, versus “what Iris Murdoch has referred to as ‘unselfing,’” 
made possible by complete absorption in the present moment (173). Murdoch’s 
concept of unselfing, as Freeman describes it, involves “putting aside one’s ego and 
thereby letting in the world, in all of its profound otherness” (182). Murdoch uses the 
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example of great art to explain the moment of unselfing, during which we observe 
and admire an object without needing to possess or instrumentalize or appropriate it 
“into the greedy organism of the self” (64).25 
The importance of these moments of “unselfing” lies in “the very energy and 
vitality they are able to generate[, which] may well tell us something about the limits, 
even the dangers, of narrative” (172). Citing both Murdoch and Crispin Sartwell, 
Freeman notes that, although we may be “narrating animals,” we are also filled with 
anxiety over the production of narrative. Furthermore, while the absence of narrative 
has been said to characterize certain types of psychosis, an excess of narrative may be 
another kind of madness (Sartwell 67). Freeman’s exploration of this possibility in the 
context of dementia questions how a release from the expectations of autobiographical 
narrative might lessen the psychic and emotional trauma of the disease. He wonders if 
“by moving beyond narrative, beyond the confines of storylines that do not serve her, 
[his mother] too will experience something like liberation” (175). Moving beyond 
narrative implies opening up space for those with dementia and their supporters to be 
situated in a present moment that is free of expectations of narrative significance.  
In terms of the loss of autobiographical selfhood for Freeman’s mother, he 
writes, “The end of narrative would thus spell the beginning of oblivion, of the very 
absence of Other, or world” (179-80). However, it may be the case that after this 
autobiographical identity dissolves, an ontological or spiritual self may remain—and 
this “core self” may be continually affirmed through its encounters with the world 
(180). This is certainly not to idealize progressive dementia or frame it as a kind of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 What Freeman doesn’t acknowledge when he critiques Murdoch’s use of the word “detachment” to 
describe this process is the connectedness of her theory to the Buddhist philosophy of nonattachment. 
This state is very much relational, while at the same time an abdication of the ego’s power to cling to 
desire. 
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mystical experience (183). Instead, and I think for the purposes of our response to 
those with dementia, this problematization of the self-narrative in ADRD might lead 
us to more compassionate relationships, at both individual and societal levels. This 
acknowledgment of the different modes of experience available to human beings is 
the ultimate opportunity for what Mitchell, Dupuis, and Kontos, citing James H. 
Olthuis, refer to as “knowing other-wise”—“an opportunity to see difference as 
potential wisdom instead of something to be changed or fixed” (13). The mode of 
subjective experience described by Freeman—similar to what Kitwood calls an 
expression of the experiential self—productively complicates normative expectations 
of self-expression. 
Thinking twice about the primacy of narrative to govern our understanding of 
ourselves, each other, and the world provides an occasion to see how meaning might 
be produced in other ways. Various scholars have critiqued the predominance of 
traditional narrative in our methods of reasoning, critique, interpretation, and 
historicization. Sartwell, although often labeled anti-narrative, rather challenges its 
authority over our meaning-making activities, drawing attention to non-narrative 
ways in which we express ourselves and relate to one another, such as through the 
circular movements and structural repetitions of blues music. Other scholars, 
particularly in disability studies, have highlighted the power of narrative frameworks 
to perpetuate normative attitudes. Lennard J. Davis reveals how the novel form, itself, 
reinforces ableist attitudes through the use of traditional narrative structures. Jay T. 
Dolmage, in his recent text Disability Rhetoric, compellingly asserts the rhetorical 
tradition of mētis as an undervalued approach to scholarly analysis, suggesting how 
new knowledge might emerge from addressing research questions moving 
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nonlinearly—sideways and backward—and layering hegemonic conceptions of 
history with alternate interpretations. This approach recognizes that “getting the story 
straight” is a tactic that reinforces the “straight body”—a “body that is itself a fantasy. 
To get these stories crooked, we should also shift our view to bodies that exceed and 
challenge norms and affirm that history comes from the body’s crookedness, too” (8). 
These scholarly voices enrich our understanding of human meaning-making and 
interpretation, and they also help to illuminate the ways in which the logical, rational 
approach of linear narrative might be limiting—even dangerous. 
In this chapter, I investigated the narrative structures employed by bloggers 
who write about their firsthand experiences with different forms of dementia. In 
exploring the motivations of individuals with dementia to maintain a blog, I also 
discussed how bloggers’ attitudes toward their illnesses are an obvious response to 
the discourse of dementia that frames the disease as ultimately a loss of self. Indeed, 
blogs by persons with dementia reveal a tendency to internalize the cultural anxiety 
over selfhood in ADRD. Writing a narrative about this experience is, itself, an act of 
self-validation and a means by which to insulate the self against dissolution. In 
dementia, this tactic might act as a buffer against the expectations that individuals 
come to hold surrounding their dementia diagnoses—expectations that emphasize the 
dementia journey as one of tragedy, loss, and eventual oblivion. The fact that 
narrative functions to psychologically protect individuals in this way might make it 
an effective coping strategy. This possibility is perhaps best left for researchers in the 
social sciences and health studies to interrogate.  
While I do not believe that this activity is dangerous in the least, I do harbor a 
degree of concern over the narrative structures that persons with dementia employ on 
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their blogs. My misgivings surrounding the use of narrative as a tool by persons with 
dementia to combat dehumanization emerges from the worry that it distracts 
attention from the very need for such a response in the first place. While Frank 
suggests that all illness is a call for stories—that bodily trauma is psychic trauma that 
needs the voice of narrative—I worry that illness is a call for stories because of the 
culture of fear and stigmatization surrounding most, if not all, illness. This culture 
establishes the conditions that make narrative writing necessary, as a defense 
mechanism and a safe space for voicing experience. The rhetorical situation from 
which dementia blogs originate seems to be one of fear, judgment, and negative self-
scrutiny. I bring these concerns into the context of scholarship on narrative medicine, 
not to deny the power of storytelling and the importance of subjective experience in 
medicine, but to complicate the understanding of narrative and the need for it within 
a healthcare setting. In the context of blog writing by persons with dementia, the 
creation of narrative is not a solution to the problem of why those narratives become 
urgently necessary in the first place.  
 !  
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